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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Who gets the risks? The risks are given to the consumer, the unsuspecting consumer and the 
poor work force. And who gets the benefits? The benefits are only for the corporations, for 
the money makers. 
(Cesar Chavez) 
 
As polarizing as this quote may be, it makes a good starting point for this 
enquiry. This research is a contribution to the discussion on how some of those 
benefitting from the risks can be prevented from or at least held responsible for 
putting others on the line. It assesses how home state, i.e. usually Western state, 
TNCs can be influenced and held responsible by these very home states when 
acting abroad. This enquiry does not, however, claim to have found a panacea or 
perfect solution to any case within the highly controversial debate on TNCs’ 
human rights responsibilities. Yet it does reveal the manifold options for home 
states that do exist and the possible future developments of these tools and 
options, reaching from legislative changes, for example to empower home state 
courts or broaden parent liability, to political actions like sanctions and trade 
bans. However, before these different home state options will be assessed in 
more detail in the succeeding chapters of this work, the following sections will 
sketch the underlying situation and arguments and mark the starting point and 
key aspects for the discussion and analysis to follow. 
 
I CURRENT EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND INTERFERENCES 
BY TNCS 
To get an idea of the scope of the issue and the different effects on different 
human rights TNCs may have and of the different ideas of holding TNCs liable, 
some examples of recent cases made public by NGOs and media will be 
sketched in the following. From these cases is can be seen that TNCs may 
violate and impair different kinds of human rights, like the right to form and join 
trade unions (art. 8 ICESCR, art. 22 ICCPR, ILO Convention No. 87), the right 
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to life (art. 6 ICCPR), the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health (art. 12 ICESC), the rights to health and 
safety working conditions (art. 7 ICESC), the right to a remuneration which 
provides as a minimum among other things fair wages (art. 7 ICESC), the right 
to limited hours of work (ILO Convention No. 1) and weekly rest (ILO 
Convention No. 14). 
 
A  Apple Case 
Apple has been criticized for the poor labour standards at Foxconn, one of 
Apple’s major suppliers.1 There, the employees are working in “super-
factories”, where they are also living as these factory areas serve as self-
contained cities.2 As China Labor Watch describes the working conditions are 
those of a sweatshop - little pay, long working hours, not being able to earn 
enough to live without doing excessive overtime and harsh conditions 
disregarding the value of human life.3 It is claimed that Apple is directly 
benefitting from the sweatshop conditions, by in fact controlling the supplier 
Foxconn, without being liable for what is happening there.4 Yet in spite of of its 
great control and influence over the suppliers, Apple simply states that Apple 
was not to blame if the suppliers did not adhere to Apple standards.5 However, 
without Apple changing their demand or payment for the products provided by 
the suppliers, nothing is going to change.6 This is even more so as Apple’s 
                                                 
1
 See for example China Labor Watch, “Keeping Pressure on Apple to promote Real Change 
at Apple and Foxconn” at <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-412.html> 1 May 
2014; Malcolm Moore, “Apple admits using child labour”, Telegraph (27 February 2010), at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/7330986/Apple-admits-using-child-
labour.html> 1 May 2014, also including other cases. 
2
 Malcolm Moore, “Apple admits using child labour”, Telegraph (27 February 2010), at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/7330986/Apple-admits-using-child-
labour.html> 1 May 2014. 
3China Labor Watch, “Keeping Pressure on Apple to promote Real Change at Apple and 
Foxconn” at <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-412.html> 1 May 2014. 
4
 For the garment sector the Clean Clothes Campaign, an alliance of  NGOs and trade unions, 
tries to improve labour conditions for the workers and to engage corporations into actively 
protecting labour law, Clean Clothes Campaign, Website at 
<http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> 1 May 2014. 
5
 China Labor Watch, “Keeping Pressure on Apple to promote Real Change at Apple and 
Foxconn” at <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-412.html> 1 May 2014. 
6
 Ibid. 
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guidelines allowed for 60 working hours a week, while Chinese labour law only 
allows for 49 and even the 60 hours are exceeded in reality.7 Due to public 
pressure, Apple has now decided to work with the NGO Fair Labor Association 
to improve the labour conditions in its Foxconn factories.8 China Labor Watch 
beliefs that this would not have happened without the - rather randomly used 
tool of - public pressure.9  
 
B  La Oroya Case 
In La Oroya in the Peruvian Andes a large polymetallic smelter is operating.10 
According to reports hardly anything is growing there any longer, the air is 
polluted with sulphur dioxide, lead and arsenic, causing the blood lead levels of 
the people in La Oroya to rise up to seven times above the limits of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO).11 Since 1997 the smelter is run by Doe Run Perú, a 
subsidiary of the US corporation Doe Run12 and it is done so in a rather lax way. 
Instead of fulfilling its environmental obligations in due time, it asked for 
extensions and the government in Lima granted them.13 Therefore, several 
NGOs decided to pressure the corporation to fulfil its standards.14 Since then the 
                                                 
7Malcolm Moore, “Apple admits using child labour”, Telegraph (27 February 2010), at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/7330986/Apple-admits-using-child-
labour.html> 1 May 2014. 
8
 China Labor Watch, “Keeping Pressure on Apple to promote Real Change at Apple and 
Foxconn” at <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-412.html> 1 May 2014. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 See Blacksmith Institute, “La Oroya Lead Pollution” at 
<http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/display/36> 1 May 2014; Doe Run Perú 
Website, <http://www.doerun.com.pe/content/pagina.php?pIDSeccionWeb=1> 1 May 2014, 
“Operations”. 
11
 See Blacksmith Institute, “La Oroya Lead Pollution” at 
<http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/display/36> 1 May 2014; Knut Henkel, “Blei im 
Blut”, Amnesty International Journal (December 2009/January 2010) 57.  
12
 Knut Henkel, “Blei im Blut”, Amnesty International Journal (December 2009/January 
2010) 57; Ralph Weihemann, (TV documentary) “Blei im Blut- die vergifteten Kinder von La 
Oroya”, WDR Fernsehen (2008), summary available at 
<http://www.wdr.de/unternehmen/presselounge/programmhinweise/fernsehen/2008/12/20081
214_tag7_blei_im_blut.phtml> 1 May 2014. 
13
 Doe Run Perú, “Doe Run Peru’s compliance with PAMA” (2011) at 
<http://www.doerun.com.pe/images/upload/paginaweb/archivo/15/Logros_Ambientales_de_
DoeRunPeru_Ingles.pdf> 1 May 2014. 
14
 Blacksmith Institute, “La Oroya Lead Pollution” at 
<http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/display/36> 1 May 2014. 
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poor environmental standards and health risks for the people in La Oroya haven 
been criticized many times by different organisations and the media. In 200615 
and 200716 for example the Blacksmith Institute,  a US environmental 
organization, listed La Oroya among the top ten of the “World’s Worst Polluted 
Places”, a German public broadcaster did a documentary on La Oroya, aired in 
December 200817 and AI Germany published an article in their December 
2009/January 2010 edition.18 In 2008 the smelter was shut down,19 but 
operations have been restarted in May 2012 and Doe Run Perú promised to fulfil 
its environmental obligations, claiming it has been investing already since it 
took over the smelter.20 Yet like in the Apple Case, public pressure is not a 
satisfying tool to protect human rights. It is rather an emergency solution, 
randomly filling small bits of a larger gap. 
  
C Nestlé Case 
On September 11th 2005 Luciano Enrique Romero was kidnapped, interrogated, 
tortured and murdered by paramilitaries in Colombia.21 He had worked for 
Cicolac, a subsidiary of Swiss Nestlé and was a trade unionist in the trade union 
SINALTRAINAL.22 Only a couple of weeks after he was killed he would have 
                                                 
15
 Blacksmith Institute, “The World’s Worst Polluted Places” 2006 Annual Report 4, available 
at <http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/files/FileUpload/files/Annual%20Reports/2006ar.pdf> 
1 May 2014. 
16
 Blacksmith Institute, “The World’s Worst Polluted Places” 2007 Annual Report 4, available 
at <http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/files/FileUpload/files/Annual%20Reports/2007ar.pdf> 
1 May 2014. 
17
 Ralph Weihemann, (TV documentary) “Blei im Blut - die vergifteten Kinder von La 
Oroya”, WDR Fernsehen (2008), summary available at 
<http://www.wdr.de/unternehmen/presselounge/programmhinweise/fernsehen/2008/12/20081
214_tag7_blei_im_blut.phtml> 1 May 2014. 
18
 Knut Henkel, “Blei im Blut”, Amnesty International Journal (December 2009/January 
2010) 57. 
19
 Doe Run Perú, “Doe Run Peru’s compliance with PAMA” (2011) at 
<http://www.doerun.com.pe/images/upload/paginaweb/archivo/15/Logros_Ambientales_de_
DoeRunPeru_Ingles.pdf> 1 May 2014. 
20
 Doe Run Perú, “Doe Run Peru is ready to restart operations on May 1st, 2012” at 
<http://www.doerun.com.pe/images/upload/paginaweb/archivo/15/20120301_Comunicado_L
icenciaSocial_Eng.pdf > 1 May 2014. 
21
 ECCHR and Misereor, “Special Newsletter on the criminal complaint against Nestlé” 
available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html > 1 May 2014, 2. 
22
 Ibid. 
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testified against Nestlé at the World Conference in Bern.23 In 2002 disputes 
arose between Cicolac and SINALTRAINAL concerning payment and other 
working conditions and Nestlé informed the great land owners and cattle 
breeders of the region, who are known for their close contacts to the 
paramilitaries that are supposed to protect the country against left-wing guerrilla 
fighters.24 There is even evidence that Cicolac made payments to the 
paramilitaries.25 Trade unionists were dismissed and Romero received death 
threats after Cicolac officials falsely defamed him and others as guerrilla 
fighters.26 As during the last 25 years more than 2,500 unionists have been 
murdered27 and unionists and other left-wing groups are persecuted by 
paramilitaries and public officials,28 it seems falsely defaming Romero was a 
call to the paramilitaries to commit the murder.29 Due to insider information 
from the paramilitary Romero’s murderers were finally be found and tried.30 
Even the judge trying them suggested that the prosecutor should also investigate 
the police, the secret service and the Nestlé management.31 The European 
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and SINALTRAINAL 
filed a criminal complaint in March 2012 against Nestlé managers and Nestlé 
itself, which is possible under Swiss law.32 They claim that the accused “have 
                                                 
23
 Peer Teuwsen, “Ein lebensbedrohliches Arbeitsumfeld”, ZeitOnline, 07 March 2012, 
available at <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2012-03/nestle-klage-
menschenrechtler/> 1 May 2014. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 ECCHR and Misereor, “Special Newsletter on the criminal complaint against Nestlé” 
available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html > 1 May 2014, 2. 
26
 ECCHR, “Nestlé precedent case: Charges filed in murder of Columbian trade unionist” 
Newsletter No. 23 (2012) available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/newsletter.328.html > 
1 May 2014. 
27
 ECCHR and Misereor, “Special Newsletter on the criminal complaint against Nestlé” 
available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html > 1 May 2014, 7. 
28
 Ibid. at 2. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Peer Teuwsen, “Ein lebensbedrohliches Arbeitsumfeld”, ZeitOnline, 07 March 2012, 
available at <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2012-03/nestle-klage-
menschenrechtler/> 1 May 2014. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 ECCHR and Misereor, “Special Newsletter on the criminal complaint against Nestlé” 
available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html > 1 May 2014, 2; on art. 102 (1) 
Swiss Criminal Code (1937) see p. 11-12 of the Newsletter. 
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acted with negligence having failed to prevent the crime”33 by “negligently 
contributing to the death of Romero through omission of a duty”34, because 
Nestlé knew of the behaviour of Cicolac and the overall situation in Colombia 
and the risk for trade unionists, especially when defamed like this, and even 
particularly of Romero’s case35. However, whether Nestlé and/or its managers 
can be held responsible under Swiss criminal law for the murder of Romero has 
not been answered. In March 2013 the Swiss Canton of Waadt found the matter 
had become time-barred and did not to intiate any further investigations.36 This 
case shows that it would be easier to hold the parent Nestlé liable if more action 
had been taken by Switzerland to provide clear legislation for cases like this. 
 
D Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Case 
In 1994 several members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) in Nigeria were arrested, tried by a special military court, violating 
fair trial standards, sentenced to death for murder and executed.37 Before, 
MOSOP hat protested against the environmental impacts of oil exploration in 
the Ogoni region in the Niger Delta by the Nigerian subsidiary of the 
Dutch/U.K. corporation Royal Shell Dutch Petroleum and they had campaigned 
for increased autonomy of the Ogoni people.38 The situation for the Ogoni 
people was and had been tense. In 1993 and 1994 Ogoni villages were 
systematically targeted by military action, including looting, rape and property 
destruction.39 Esther Kiobel, wife of one of the executed activists, filed suit 
                                                 
33
 ECCHR, “Nestlé precedent case: Charges filed in murder of Columbian trade unionist” 
Newsletter No. 23 (2012) available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/newsletter.328.html > 
1 May 2014. 
34
 ECCHR and Misereor, “Special Newsletter on the criminal complaint against Nestlé” 
available at <http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html > 1 May 2014, 2. 
35
 Ibid. at 5. 
36
 ECCHR, “Nestlé has nothing to fear from Swiss legal system” available at 
<http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/nestle-518.html> 1 May 2014. 
37
 Business & Human Rights Website, “Shell Lawsuit”, available at <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/Sh
elllawsuitreNigeria> 1 May 2014. 
38
 Ibid.; Center for Justice & Accountability (CJA) Website “Kiobel v. Shell” at 
<http://cja.org/section.php?id=510> 1 May 2014. 
39Center for Justice & Accountability (CJA) Website “Kiobel v. Shell” available at 
<http://cja.org/section.php?id=510> 1 May 2014. 
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against Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum in the US in 2002, arguing that the 
Nigerian military Junta had been supported by Shell through the corporation’s 
Nigerian subsidiary,40 therefore Shell were complicit in, amongst other things, 
extrajudicial killings and torture.41 After the District Court dismissed the case 
and the Court of Appeals42 held that corporations could not be held liable under 
the American Tort Claims Act (ATCA)43, a law allowing foreigners to sue in the 
US in cases of a breach of the law of nations, the US Supreme Court finally 
decided in April 2013 that the case could not be decided by US courts, because 
there was no sufficient link to the US.44  
 
However, this was not the only human rights related suit filed against Shell by 
people living in the Niger Delta. In January 2013 for example a Dutch Court 
decided that in one out of five cases brought before it, Shell’s responsibility for 
one of the five oil spills was proven and Shell’s Nigerian Subsidiary was liable 
for the damages because of its negligence and failure to invest in proper safety 
systems.45 
 
E  Bangladesh Garment Industry Case(s) 
In April 2013 the “Rana Plaza”, an eight-storey factory building housing 
garment factories, collapsed in Bangladesh, causing the death of more than 
1,000 garment workers inside the building.46 The building had been evacuated 
before, but workers were told to return to their working places before the 
                                                 
40
 Business & Human Rights Website, “Shell Lawsuit”, available at <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/Sh
elllawsuitreNigeria> 1 May 2014. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv (US App. 2010). 
43
 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) (US, 1789). 
44
 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum No. 10-1491 (US Supreme Court, decided on 17 April 
2013); the decision will be assessed in Chapters II and III of this research in more detail. 
45
 See for example BBC News, “Shell Nigeria Case: Court acquits firm on most charges” (30 
January 2013) available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21258653> 1 May 
2014; Fiona Harvey and Afua Hirsch, “Shell acquitted of Nigeria pollution charges” (January 
30 2010) The Guardian, available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/30/shell-acquitted-nigeria-pollution-
charges> 1 May 2014. 
46
 See for example BBC News, “Bangladesh Factory collapse toll passes 1,000” (10 May 
2013) available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22476774> 1 May 2014. 
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building finally collapsed.47 In this building, workers produced, amongst other 
things, garments for (international) Western retailers,48 i.e. Western TNCs. In 
May 2013 eight people died when a fire broke out in a clothing factory in 
Bangladesh.49 In June 2013 a fire erupted in another garment factory in 
Bangladesh and workers were injured when escaping from the building.50 It was 
said that the workers there had produced garments for, amongst other things, a 
US American business.51 Yet unfortunately these were not the first nor the only 
incidents of that kind. Labour Rights Groups claim that within the past decade 
hundreds of workers have died because of fires in factories in Bangladesh.52 
Working conditions, especially safety issues, are a pressing issue in Bangladesh, 
not least because of Western retailers demanding changes.53 Bangladesh has 
promised to implement reforms set out in an ILO statement,54 however 
“implementation remains a question”.55 
 
As could be seen from the sources cited above, Western media covered the 
current cases broadly, stressing the link to Western companies and retailers and 
also asking whether these Western corporations were contributing to the bad 
working conditions by demanding cheap production, thereby bearing 
                                                 
47
 Ibid.; Jufikar Ali Manik and Jim Yardley, “Another Garment Factory Scare in Bangladesh”, 
The New York Times (13 June 2013) available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/another-garment-factory-scare-in-
bangladesh.html?_r=0> 1 May 2014. 
48
 BBC News, “Bangladesh Factory collapse toll passes 1,000” (10 May 2013) available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22476774> 1 May 2014. 
49
 Farid Ahmed, “Eight killed in Bangladesh garment factory fire” CNN (9 May 2013) 
available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/bangladesh-fatal-fire/index.html> 
1 May 2014. 
50
 Jufikar Ali Manik and Jim Yardley, “Another Garment Factory Scare in Bangladesh”, The 
New York Times (13 June 2013) available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/another-garment-factory-scare-in-
bangladesh.html?_r=0> 1 May 2014. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Vikas Bajaj, “Doing Business in Bangladesh” The New York Times (14 September 2013) 
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/doing-business-in-
bangladesh.html> 1 May 2014. 
54
 See Farid Ahmed, “Eight killed in Bangladesh garment factory fire” CNN (9 May 2013) 
available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/bangladesh-fatal-fire/index.html> 
1 May 2014. 
55
 Ibid. 
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responsibility as well.56 Several suggestions as to how to react were and are 
discussed in different fora in the Western world. TNCs relying on subcontractors 
and suppliers from Bangladesh are for example reacting by building an alliance 
to improve working standards and maintain the job opportunities in the garment 
industry in Bangladesh.57 They designed the “Accord on Fire and Building 
Safety in Bangladesh”,58 a legally binding agreement signed by more than 70, 
mostly European, brands and retailing companies so far.59 Several governments 
were and are at the same time considering implementing trade sanctions as well 
as positive incentives to pressure or influence the government in Bangladesh to 
put into effect and implement the promised reforms mentioned above.60 The US 
for example have suspended Bangladesh’s trade privileges.61 So it can be said 
that the Western world’s attention has been grabbed by the disasters.62 
 
II HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES - COROLLARY OF A GLOBALISED WORLD? 
The examples just mentioned are just a random selection of the many more 
cases that exist concerning cases of TNCs.63 Some more examples will be 
                                                 
56
 See for example also Vikas Bajaj, “Doing Business in Bangladesh” The New York Times 
(14 September 2013) available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/doing-business-in-bangladesh.html> 1 
May 2014. 
57
 FAZ, “Fabriken in Bangladesch sollen sicherer werden“ (16 May 2013). 
58
 Information on the Accord is for example available at FAQ about the Bangladesh Safety 
Accord” at <http://www.cleanclothes.org/issues/faq-safety-accord> 1 May 2014. 
59
 The Economist, “Clothing Firms in Bangladesh: Accord, alliance or disunity?” (13 July 
2013) available at <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21581752-transatlantic-divide-
among-big-companies-may-hinder-efforts-improve-workers-safety> 1 May 2014. 
60
 On the possibility of EU trade sanctions and positive incentives see for example FAZ, 
“Bangladesch wehrt sich gegen Sanktionen” (6 May 2013); see also Spiegel Online, “EU-
Kommissar zu Arbeitsbedingungen: Auch gegen Entwicklungsländer können wir Sanktionen 
verhängen“ (17 December 2012) available at 
<http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/eu-kommissar-de-gucht-zu-
arbeitsbedingungen-in-entwicklungslaendern-a-872050.html> 1 May 2014 where Karel de 
Gucht points out that trade santions should not be applied too easily. 
61
 The Economist, “Clothing Firms in Bangladesh: Accord, alliance or disunity?” (13 July 
2013) available at <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21581752-transatlantic-divide-
among-big-companies-may-hinder-efforts-improve-workers-safety> 1 May 2014. 
62
 See Vikas Bajaj, “Doing Business in Bangladesh” The New York Times (14 September 
2013) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/doing-business-in-
bangladesh.html> 1 May 2014. 
63
 There are many more cases and more human rights that are violated, like for example 
indigenous people’s land rights as in the case of Oil Drilling in the Colombian Andes in the 
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mentioned in the chapters to come, as due to its very topic the focus of this 
research is on the existing clashes between human rights and TNCS acting 
abroad. For all the following chapters of this research it is important to 
understand the factors contributing to those human rights violations and 
impairments by TNCs acting abroad, as these are the challenges and questions 
this research is discussing. 
 
A  Challenges of globalisation in the TNC context 
The first and easiest answer that comes to mind to explain TNCs’ behaviour 
affecting human rights are the internationalized production of goods, the 
globalised world economy64 with its trade liberalisation and the increasing 
power of TNCs in such a world, where they can easily choose to produce in the 
cheapest places with the lowest standards to maximize their gains. It is claimed 
that human rights are not exactly a priority for businesses.65 They are entities 
with the economic goal of earning money and maximizing profits. This means 
cheap production methods, often including low-cost labour and lack of safety-
standards, causing health risks, environmental damage, etc. However, when an 
answer to such a complex question comes so easily a second glance may be 
                                                                                                                                                        
land of the U’wa by the Colombian subsidiary of the US based Occidental Petroleum, see for 
this case Lilian Aponte Miranda, “The hybrid state-corporate enterprise and the violations of 
indigenous land rights: theorizing corporate responsibility and accountability under 
international law” (2007) 11 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 135; see also Promotion and Protection of 
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right 
to Development- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises  
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (23 May 2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-2-addendum-23-May-
2008.pdf> 1 May 2014, where labour and non-labour rights violated by businesses are named. 
64
 The term “globalisation” will not be defined in any detail in this research, but is used as a 
broad expression for the developing internationalization and denationalization of relations 
among actors, be they state actors or private ones, including those of businesses. On the issue 
of defining the term see Jost Delbrück, „Globalization of Law, Politics and Markets- 
Implications of Domestic Law. A European Perspective” 1 IJGLS (1993) 9, 10-11; Klaus 
Dicke, Waldemar Hummer, Daniel Girsberger, Katharina Boele-Woelki, Christoph Engel and 
Jochen A. Frowein, Völkerrecht und Internationales Privatrecht in einem sich 
globalisierenden internationalen System – Auswirkungen der Entstaatlichung transnationaler 
Rechtsbeziehungen (Heidelberg: Müller Verlag, 2000)13, 14 and 21; Frank J. Garcia, “The 
Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle” (1999) 25 
Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 51, 52 and 56-62 wfr. 
65
 See on the discussion Beth Stephens “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 45, especially 62-4 wfr. 
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helpful to capture more of the width and factors contributing to current debates 
on a topic such as human rights violations by Western TNCs. Therefore, in the 
following sections, “second glance answers” will provided after sketching “first 
glance” answers. 
 
1 Power of TNCs 
TNCs often have great power, an (economic) power that, in some cases, exceeds 
the power of states, especially of small and developing states,66 thereby 
constituting and shaping a “new world order”.67 It was already observed in the 
mid-nineties that “of the world’s 100 biggest economies, only 49 are states, 
while the remaining 51 economies are corporations.”68 As Bolewski points out: 
“[O]ne third of the international transactions already take place within 
transnational companies”.69 TNCs, mostly based in developed states,70 gained 
their power due to globalisation, particularly because of the free flow of capital 
international trade71 and private foreign investment flow.72 They also advanced 
                                                 
66
 See Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 54 referring to the budgets of TNCs; see also UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2011 at <http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed_en.pdf> 1 May 
2014, p. X, according to which TNCs’ production accounts for a quarter of the global GDP. 
67
 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
68
 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, “The Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power” 
(updated version, 2000) available at 
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf> 1 May 2014; see also 
David C. Korten, “The Failures of Bretton Woods”, in Edward Goldsmith and Jerry Mander 
(eds), The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn toward the Local (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books, 1996) 20, 26. 
69
 Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 54. 
70
 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Web Table 34: “Number of parent 
corporations and foreign affiliates, by region and economy” at 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2034.pdf > 1 May 2014, 
according to which 70,7% of the parent corporations are located in developed states (73.144 
in developed countries and 30.209 in developing countries). 
71
 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context (2nd ed, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Dutch Sections of Amnesty International and Pax Christi 
International, Report: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (2nd ed, 2000) 16. 
72
 Philip Alston, “The Not-a-Cat-Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime 
Accommodate Non-State Actors?” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights 
(Oxford: University Press, 2005) 3, 17-8; see also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 
at <http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed_en.pdf> 1 May 2014, 24-5, according to 
 12
globalisation by acting internationally.73 Globalisation is even defined by some 
as, amongst other things, the increase in the number of international participants 
(including TNCs),74 issues and challenges.75 This shows that globalisation and 
TNCs are inseparably interconnected and intertwined and have influenced and 
strengthened one another. The power of TNCs due to their great budgets and 
international action is also derived from their economic attractiveness for any 
country because of TNCs’ investments and employment opportunities.76 That is 
why both states, the state of domicile, i.e. the home state, as well as the state in 
which a corporation invests, i.e. the host state, are under a latent threat that the 
corporation might move and thereby harm the state if conditions become 
unattractive.77 It is claimed the significance of the state is therefore undermined 
by globalisation78 and some even suggest that states have waived their control 
by allowing for changes caused by globalisation in a broad sense of the term.79  
States are losing their powers, it is said, including the power to protect their 
citizens and other individuals, because for example economic and social rights, 
particularly civil liberties, are adapted to the market-place demands by the neo-
liberal reforms.80 Yet despite all these suggestions of fading state power one can 
also argue that states still have a great amount of power as they are the main 
actors in public international law and politics and that their power and 
importance may even grow in the light of new non-state actors on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
which the international production by TNCs accounts for 40% of the TNCs’ added value, 
while in 2005 it was only 35%, the TNCs in the developed countries being 80% of the TNCs 
in the world and accounting for 70% of the global foreign direct investment outflow. 
73
 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context (2nd ed, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 1349. 
74
 Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 17. 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Olivier de Schutter, “The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in 
European Law” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: 
University Press, 2005) 227, 314. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Celia Kay Wells and Juanity Elias, “Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate 
Players on the International Stage” in ibid. 141, 145. 
79
 Dutch Sections of Amnesty International and Pax Christi International, Report: 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (2nd ed, 2000) 16. 
80
 Chris Jochnick, “The Human Rights Challenge to Global Poverty” in Willem van Genugten 
and Camilo Perez-Bustillo (eds), The Poverty of Rights, Human Rights and the eradication of 
Poverty (London, New York: Zed Books, 2001) 159, 164. 
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international stage with which they might cooperate in new forms.81 However, 
whether one agrees that states are losing their power or not, TNCs are gaining 
power, not only economic but in the wake of it also political power82 and power 
over the public sphere in general,83 which includes human rights and public 
international law.84 Yet at a certain point the amount of power an entity bears 
does not allow for neutrality any longer - and even more so because TNCs do 
not act neutrally anyway, but often influence governments’ tax and trade 
policies as well as environmental rules.85 Whether actively engaging or simply 
condoning grave injustices and rights violations, a position is thereby taken 
whether the corporation wishes to do so or not.86 That companies can, and 
sometimes do make a difference by becoming engaged could be seen in the 
1980s in South Africa where some companies stretched the apartheid laws and 
regulations so far that they were finally contradicting their intended purpose87 
and adopted the Sullivan Principles, a voluntary code of conduct to fight 
apartheid.88 Others publicly advocated fundamental changes in the government 
policies.89 Another example of such an engagement is the refusal of companies 
to inform countries correctly, where the country may prohibit the importation of 
                                                 
81
 Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 5. 
82
 Ibid. and at 20. 
83
 Olivier de Schutter, “The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in 
European Law” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: 
University Press, 2005) 227, 314; Cristoph Menke and Arnd Pollmann, Philosophie der 
Menschenrechte (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2007) 31; on different theories for the bargaining 
of host states and TNCs see Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises  and the Law (2nd ed, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 104-110. 
84
 On the influence on international customary law see Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and 
International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 90 wfr. 
85
 Celia K. Wells and Juanita Elias, “Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players 
on the International Stage” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 141, 173. 
86
 See Dutch Sections of Amnesty International and Pax Christi International, Report: 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (2nd ed, 2000) 53. 
87
 Ibid. at 54. 
88
 Su-Ping Lu, “Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights through 
Deceptive Advertising Law” (2000) 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 603; Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, 
„Promoting International Respect for Workers Rights Through Business Codes of Conduct“ 
(1993) 17 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1. 
89
 Dutch Sections of Amnesty International and Pax Christi International, Report: 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (2nd ed, 2000) 54. 
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products from Israel or regarding the employment of Jews.90 However, many 
TNCs were criticized by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
because of their inaction, which effectively supported the state and the apartheid 
rule.91 So it seems rather random and up to the good will of the corporations 
how they in fact treat human rights. As powerful actors TNCs can violate a 
broader amount and different kinds of human rights than individuals are usually 
able to, for example the freedom of association with others and the right to join 
trade unions.92 The necessary step to go is therefore to link TNC power to 
responsibility.93 That is why the suggestion that the duty to protect those rights 
should be imposed on TNCs lies at hand.94  
 
2 Legal separate entities in home and host state 
The internationalization or globalization and rise of TNCs holds another main 
challenge. As Steiner and Alston have identified, one of the five problems when 
it comes to enforcing corporate responsibility by the host state is the complexity 
of corporate transactions and actions, because it is hard to keep track of or find 
out afterwards who was doing what when and where and can be held 
responsible.95 This is even more so as often the parent company and the 
subsidiary are legally separate entities, which makes it difficult to “pierce the 
                                                 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report Vol. 4 (1998), available 
at <http://www.justice.gov.za/Trc/report/finalreport/Volume4.pdf> 1 May 2014, 49-54. 
92
 Both granted for example in art. 22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)1966. 
93
 See for example Igor Fuks, “Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: 
Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability” (2006) 106 Colum. L. Rev. 112, 
117-18 wfr, stating that TNCs using low-cost labour in a way that is violating human rights 
and are not being held responsible for these violations are in fact “[c]ollecting monetary 
awards for violations of those rights”; David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: 
The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibility for Corporations at International Law” 
(2004) 44 VA J. Int. Law 931, 935; Beth Stephens “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 45 wfr. 
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 See for example Dutch Sections of Amnesty International and Pax Christi International, 
Report: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (2nd ed, 2000), 18; Chris Jochnick, “The 
Human Rights Challenge to Global Poverty” in Willem van Genugten and Camilo Perez-
Bustillo (eds), The Poverty of Rights, Human Rights and the eradication of Poverty (London, 
New York: Zed Books, 2001) 159, 172. 
95Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context (2nd ed, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 1349. 
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corporate veil” and to attribute the subsidiary’s behaviour to the parent TNC and 
consider it the TNC’s action abroad. 96 In 1970 the separate legal entity principle 
was accepted by the ICJ.97 Yet this was more than 40 years ago and TNCs, their 
role and perception has changed since then. In the UK for example, courts did 
pierce the veil to hold parent corporations liable where there is enough evidence 
showing both a duty of care and the fact that the enterprise constituted a single 
integrated business.98 In Germany parent and subsidiaries may be considered 
economic entities under the Stock Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz), relying on 
factual control and management.99  So holding the parent liable is possible. That 
there is a need to do so can be seen from the Nestlé Case mentioned above and 
also by the UNCTAD findings, where it was observed that “TNCs increasingly 
control and coordinate the operations of independent or, rather loosely 
dependent, partner firms, through various mechanisms”100 e.g.  ownership, 
contractual clauses or simply bargaining power.101 Also the HRC report 
mentioned above found that “the majority of indirect cases made allegations that 
Western (European and North American) firms were contributing to or 
benefiting from third-party abuses abroad.”102 That is why it seems unacceptable 
that they should be treated as absolute separate entities. Therefore different ways 
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 See for example Eric Engle, Private Law Remedies for Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Violations (2006) at <http://elib.suub.uni-bremen.de/diss/docs/00010289.pdf> 1 May 2014, 
99; Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 115. 
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 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgement 
(Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970; see also Yaraslau Kryvoi, „Enforcing Labor Rights 
against Multinational Groups in Europe“ (2007) 46 Indus. Rel. 366, 378. 
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 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 at 
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 Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development- Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises  A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (23 May 2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-2-
addendum-23-May-2008.pdf> 1 May 2014, 17, the indirect cases account for 41% of the 
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of attribution have been found already, like the already mentioned one of 
“piercing the corporate veil” by effectively disregarding the separate legal 
existence of parent and subsidiary,103 imputed liability especially in tort law at 
least where the subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent company.104 There is a 
lot of change and development in this area. This issue will be addressed further 
in Chapter II and III of this research. 
 
B Potential of globalisation in the TNC context 
As already stated above, it seems too easy to just blame “globalisation” for the 
violations and impairments of human rights caused by TNCs when having a 
look at the current discussion. 
 
1 Positive impacts of globalisation 
One of the promising ideas of globalisation and its free trade, is that it allows 
each state to specialize in producing what it is best equipped for and to export its 
goods to all other states.105 This specialized production allows goods to be sold 
at lower prices than when each state is producing everything itself in small 
numbers. So this also means consumers enjoy lower prices.106 That is why by 
specializing and producing large numbers of the same or similar goods and 
exporting them, the exporting state gains in terms of welfare,107 which (in the 
end) also promotes human rights.108 As every state can specialize in those goods 
it is best equipped to produce, this can in fact result in an increase in welfare in 
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 Eric Engle, Private Law Remedies for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations (2006) at 
<http://elib.suub.uni-bremen.de/diss/docs/00010289.pdf> 1 May 2014, 99 and 100 giving 
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 Ibid. at 108; Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission of the European Communities 
AB C-286/98 (ECJ, 16 November 2000). 
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 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global 
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all states around the world. This welfare is not only welfare of states as a whole, 
but also of consumers and employers by raising the standard of living, ensuring 
full employment.109 Participating in globalisation indeed meant a growth of 
national economies in the developing countries almost twice as fast as the 
economies of OECD states in the 1990s and 2000s.110 Yet, of course, how this 
increasing wealth is spread within these countries is a different question and that 
free trade by itself will generate desirable outcomes concerning human rights 
may be doubted.111 
However,  globalisation can indeed create jobs in areas where they are needed 
for people who have not had (formal) jobs before. As Kabeer stresses, the 
garment industry in Bangladesh for example, although far from perfect as far as 
human rights are concerned, especially when considering issues like wages, 
irregular payments, fire hazard, long working hours and sexual harassment,112 is 
nevertheless providing  jobs for women in the formal sector that did not exist 
before.113 This opportunity to find a regular job allows the women in Bangladesh 
employed in the garment sector to enjoy more personal freedom and personal as 
well as economic liberty.114 Kabeer also stresses that the closer the link and 
direct contact of the garment industry factories with international buyers, the 
better are wages and working conditions.115 So Western influence and pressure 
is indeed shaping the working conditions abroad and the great power of TNCs 
described above also offers great chances and potential for the protection of 
human rights. For of course power and influence that exist as a threat can be 
used in a positive way as well, which in this case means although there are more 
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potential violators of human rights due to the emergence of new powerful actors, 
there are also more potential protectors, promoters and defenders of human 
rights.116A 1998 UN Publication for example observed that at first the business 
community was opposing sanctions against South Africa, arguing that economic 
growth must not be impeded, because this growth itself would contribute to end 
apartheid.117 However, the business community’s view changed over time and 
sanctions were finally supported by the business community, which tried to 
distance itself from the régime.118 In the publication it is therefore stressed that 
“the business community is a specific and aggressive force for change in South 
Africa”.119 Especially where host states cannot or do not protect human rights 
properly, however, the responsibility of TNCs is most important and should 
come into effect.120 
Yet the impact of globalisation is not limited to welfare and economics and the 
human rights linked to these areas. Trade as an economic connection, way of 
communication and sign of interrelatedness and interdependence among states 
leads to peace among the nations, as observed already by Montesquieu.121 This 
was also the underlying idea when creating closer trading relations within 
Europe after World War II in the 1950s, which then over time developed and 
transformed into the EU.122 The EU is - by the way - also a good example that 
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human rights and trade law do not have to contradict one another. Within the EU 
free trade as well as a high protection level of human rights go hand in hand.123 
 
2 Other factors influencing the current debate in TNC responsibility 
TNCs are not a new phenomenon. The first transnational corporations can be 
found in ancient Rome or at least in the East India Company.124 Yet, of course, 
their number has grown and, as seen above, so have their power and influence.  
Yet this is not the only reason why TNC responsibility is a current issue in 
international law and politics and a growing number of people are focusing on 
the negative aspects of TNCs. 125 As Leisinger observes “most citizens of 
modern societies […] expect good financial business results, but not in isolation 
from good social, environmental and political performance.”126 This could also 
be seen in the Western media coverage of the Bangladesh Cases mentioned 
above. So it seems that people’s perception of business may have changed, 
especially when Western TNCs or consumers are involved. Yet this is not the 
only change in people’s perception. As Hernández-Truyol and Powell stress, “ 
[t]he Second World War was the watershed event for the change of the status of 
individuals in international law”.127 The Nazi atrocities led to the punishment of 
individuals in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The idea of holding individuals 
liable for gross human rights violations is thus a relatively new one. The idea of 
even holding individuals liable for the impairment of human rights or the non-
observation of moral rather than legal human rights responsibilities is an even 
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newer and controversial development, let alone the question of whether TNCs 
can or should be treated as individuals. Only since the 1970s have international 
codes of social responsibility of TNCs been addressed in different forums.128 
NGOs dealing with human rights and the production of goods like GoodWeave 
International (GWI), formerly known as Rugmark, Fairtrade International (FLO) 
and Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. One of 
the factors fuelling the current debate on TNC responsibility concerning human 
rights violations and impairments is a rather new awareness of the human rights 
responsibility of individuals. A further factor is a new awareness of human 
rights and their universal character or - put in a more general way- “the notion 
that moral obligations extend beyond state borders and that the state itself is not 
always the best instrument for the furtherance of universal goals.”129 Yet the 
perception of human rights to be universal and the idea that there are human 
rights and human rights standards that have to be observed all over the world has 
often been and still is criticized, especially by developing countries as being 
protectionist, preventing developing countries from competing with developed 
ones by setting the standards too high for developing countries to reach, thereby 
protecting the economy of developed countries.130 All these changing 
perceptions of business and human rights cannot be read in isolation from one 
another. They rather supplement and influence one another, forming a coherent 
progress. Without these new perceptions the debate on how to deal with human 
rights violations by TNCs would simply not exist. Yet within this progress, the 
current debate on globalisation and human rights seems an unavoidable step. 
 
                                                 
128
 See Miriam Mafessanti, “Corporate Misbehaviour & International Law: Are there 
Alternatives to ‘Complicity’?“ (2010) 6 S. C. J. Int’l L. & Bus 167, 170, stating that only in 
the last 20 years the idea that TNCs could be responsible for human rights violations 
alongside states has been recognized; Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises  and the 
Law (2nd ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 113, stating that the concept of corporate 
self-regulation has been increasingly advocated since the 1980s; UNCTAD, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Social Responsibility UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/22 (New 
York and Geneva: United Nations, 2001)1; on the different international codes developed see 
Chapter III. 
129Greg Flynn and Robert O’Brien, “An Internationalist Western Labour Response to the 
Globalization of India and China” (2010) 1 Global Labour J. 178, 181. 
130
 See for example ibid. at 182-7; see also below at IV.A.2. 
 21
III HUMAN RIGHTS - TOO WEAK A TOOL? 
As just seen above, human rights violations and impairments are not necessarily 
the logical consequence of globalisation and neither have they been invented by 
it. Furthermore, this enquiry does not suggest that all TNCs or their subsidiaries 
abroad are disrespecting human rights. Yet it is a fact that human rights 
violations and impairments like the ones mentioned in the very beginning of this 
research do occur. And it is for these cases that solutions have to be found. 
 
A Challenges of human rights law 
A main factor not exactly helping to prevent human rights violations committed 
by TNCs when acting abroad is human rights law itself, because there are many 
frictions as to how human rights law should be applied and by whom. 
 
1 Fragmentation of Human Rights Law 
Human Rights law is codified in many different ways in many different types of 
codes with different legal status, some of them binding and enforceable, some of 
non-binding or recommendational character. Customary international law, 
including human rights law, is binding on all states.131 Whether the UN Charter 
for example is such customary law, imposing binding obligations is still debated 
and different states have different views on this issue.132 The same is true for the 
UDHR.133 Yet binding obligations are for example provided for in several UN 
Conventions,134 such as the ICESCR,135 ICCPR,136  and CEDAW.137 However, 
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for example the obligations in ICCPR are “muddier” that those provided for in 
the ICESCR,  only demanding states to protect the mentioned rights “to the 
maximum of its available resources”.138 Yet, while the ILO Conventions are - in 
contrast to the ILO Resolutions - binding once ratified, their enforcement is 
rather based on good will, which makes them pretty toothless when it comes to 
violations of rights provided for in the Conventions.139 In addition, not all states 
are bound by the same human rights laws. Apart from ius cogens, human right 
law as part of public international law in treaties and conventions is only binding 
for the signatory states that ratified the treaty or convention.140 Furthermore, 
there are many regional human rights treaties and conventions like the Banjul 
Charter141 and the ECHR142 and there are other areas of public international law 
not dealing with human rights (directly), creating own duties and obligations 
that may nevertheless influence human rights obedience and protection.143 
 
2 States as primary addressees of human rights duties 
Not only are there many sources for human rights law, the easy solution of 
imposing direct wide ranging human rights duties on TNCs is not provided for 
under current public international law.144 This is because states are the ones 
primarily responsible for the protection against human rights violations 
committed by private actors, including TNCs.145 The responsibilities of states 
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for the realization of human rights have been divided into three types of action 
by Asbjørn Eide: to respect, to protect and to fulfil.146 Sometimes a fourth type 
is added - the obligation to promote.147 Lately John Ruggie developed the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,148 which clearly states that - at 
least at the moment - the protection of human rights is the duty of the states, not 
of private actors like TNCs, because the latter only bear the duty to respect 
human rights. 
 
3 Criticism of applying human rights law globally 
As human rights protection is a state duty, every state has its own obligation to 
fulfil this duty. In the context of TNCs acting abroad, this means the home state 
as well as the host state bear human rights protection duties. Yet who should be 
the one protecting human rights in such a situation? The above mentioned 
examples suggest that sometimes the host states cannot or do not protect human 
rights sufficiently. Yet against the protection of human rights in the host state by 
home state action several objections are made. 
 
(a) Human rights and state sovereignty 
There is for example an ongoing discussion on whether their application by a 
single state abroad violates the sovereignty of other states. It is said that on the 
one hand there is no longer a consensus that human rights are a purely domestic 
matter, but on the other hand there is not yet a consensus in the international 
community as a whole concerning human rights and sovereignty.149  
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(b) Imperialism by applying human rights in host states 
Steiner and Alston’s fifth problem concerning the enforcement of corporate 
responsibility in the host state deals with this issue as well, as they find it 
difficult to define a minimum standard of human rights that can be claimed valid 
in all states.150 Today there are several conventions, treaties and laws addressing 
the protection of human rights, usually based on and derived from respect for 
human dignity of all human beings.151 Examples are the UN Declaration, the 
UN Charter, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW152 and the conventions and resolutions 
mentioned above. As the place of origin of written human rights is the 
“West”,153 the origin of the idea of human rights and their universal protection is 
discussed vividly,154 as already mentioned above. Some are therefore claiming 
the very idea of universal human rights, whether based in natural law155 or 
rationalism,156 is a form of western imperialism, trying to force western laws, 
morals and perceptions on the world, not caring for other cultures and their 
uniqueness.157  
 
(c) Human Rights application abroad and protectionism 
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Another reproach made concerning the application of human rights in the TNC 
context is protectionism. International social clauses, for example when their 
introduction into WTO/GATT ist under discussion, are often considered to be 
protectionist158 in favour of “Western” jobs, employees and working conditions, 
because non-industrialized states lack the resources to comply and control 
compliance with such high standards and on the other hand may profit from not 
imposing these standards, thereby gaining competitive advantages.159 Some 
authors argue that the intent or aim of such an international clause is decisive for 
its protectionist or non-protectionist character.160 However, although aims can be 
an indicator, they are subjective and therefore difficult to isolate and determine 
in an objective way. 
 
B Potential of Human Rights law 
However, all these reproaches and difficulties do not render human rights a 
useless tool in the TNC context. On the contrary, some of their seeming 
weaknesses can also be considered their very strength. Human rights are for 
example incredibly flexible in forms and enforcement as will be sketched now. 
 
1 Flexibility in forms 
As seen above, there are binding human rights obligations, some of them contain 
more rigid rules, some “muddier” ones, that are more flexible, taking into 
account different developing states and economic and cultural differences.161 
These kind of rules are often called “soft law”. The expression is used either 
because of a soft content of a binding legal rule or because of the non-legal and 
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therefore non-(legally)binding and non-enforceable character of a rule.162 In this 
enquiry the terms “non-binding” and “binding” or “enforceable” rules will be 
used, differentiating human rights rules by their different legal characters rather 
than the design of their content. Apart from the already above mentioned 
“muddy” norms, which can be binding nevertheless, there are also non-binding 
human rights norms that influence the application and interpretation of binding 
ones. These non-binding rules may be codes of conduct, guidelines, 
recommendations, resolutions, expert or committee decisions, etc.163 These 
examples already suggest that non-binding rules are more flexible and can adapt 
faster and more easily to new challenges and are at the same time influencing 
and shaping the application of binding ones.164 That is why they are considered 
to have quasi-legal character and therefore are more than “simply politics”.165 In 
addition, there are moral beliefs and politics or political positions containing 
human rights issues, but not (yet) having quasi-legal character.166 These different 
kinds of human rights norms influence one another and are in constant 
development and progress. Moral codes and non-binding obligations may be or 
become valid interpretation tools for enforceable and binding law norms. They 
may even become binding rules, either by formal codification in treaties or 
conventions or by becoming customary international law.167 Yet this does not 
mean the ultimate aim for all human rights related moral codes or flexible rules 
is to become binding and enforceable law some day. The very interaction of the 
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more flexible non-binding rules with the binding ones provides human rights 
protection mechanisms with their very vitality and flexibility.168 
Yet binding rules can also be flexible. As already mentioned above, the 
obligations provided for by the ICESCR are rather “muddy”, only demanding 
states to “try hard” to fulfil their obligations.169 Yet this also makes it possible to 
treat states differently, not imposing obligations on states they cannot fulfil, 
while still demanding progress and change over time, not allowing states to 
move backwards.170 Rich states and poor states can be treated differently whilst 
the overall goal of promoting the protection of human rights is not dismissed. 
This is an approach easier to accept for developing states than the provision of 
rigid “hard law” obligations.171 
 
2 Flexibility in enforcement 
The flexibility of human rights is not only a matter of different forms and 
appearances, but also of enforcement. As human rights protection is primarily a 
nation state obligation as seen above, national law is created in order to protect 
human rights - at least within a state’s jurisdiction. National courts can therefore 
be considered one of the most powerful and most effective bodies to protect 
human rights. Yet human rights enforcement mechanisms do not stop there. 
Several regional human rights courts like the ECtHR or the IACtHR exist and 
even international ones like the ICJ and the ICC. Not only can these different 
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courts on different levels enforce human rights law, they can also develop 
human rights law, contribute to changes in forms and even transform moral 
demands into enforceable law,172 in particular where national and international 
courts cooperate.173 
Furthermore, there are monitoring mechanisms within the UN to ensure the 
adherence to UN Conventions. Seven of the nine core human rights treaties 
provide for bodies that can consider individual complaints,174 once the nation 
state has agreed to submit to their jurisdictions.175 In addition, there are 
international organisations like the ILO that supervise the respective nation 
state’s obedience to its human rights conventions. However, as already 
mentioned above, the ILO’s enforcement powers are rather weak.176 Weakness 
in enforcement power is in fact a reproach made against most international 
human rights protection mechanisms.177 As Keenan once put it rather strikingly: 
“human rights law is gloriously easy to develop and notoriously difficult to 
enforce.”178 This leads to considering another nation state enforcement 
mechanism, namely politics. National political decisions, negotiations and 
pressure may be a tool to enforce human rights even on an international level. 
The ultima ratio of such political influence and pressure is imposing sanctions 
or trade bans on another state. 
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IV FRAMING THE TOPIC AND OUTLINE  OF CHAPTERS  
The just mentioned flexibility of human rights, their different forms reaching 
from moral beliefs to enforceable legal rules and the manifold ways human 
rights can be put into effect are the key note of this research. With a changing 
world order and a changed perception of the challenges for human rights, human 
rights protection itself has to change and it is indeed capable of doing so. In the 
following chapters of this research different options as to how human rights can 
be protected, how human rights protection may conquer new niches, will be 
assessed, putting emphasis on the different forms of enforcement. Yet this will 
not be done in a too general way. As already mentioned above, this enquiry is 
confined to home state options of holding home state TNCs and their 
subsidiaries acting abroad liable for human rights violations and impairments. In 
doing so the full flexibility of human rights, their development and application 
can be analyzed best, because many of the reproaches and criticisms made 
concerning human rights protection in a host state in the TNC context can be 
overcome in the very context of home state subsidiaries acting abroad. 
 
A  Potential of home state action for protecting Human Rights 
States, and in particular powerful Western home states may use many different 
kinds of human rights obligations and applications to hold their TNCs liable. As 
Stephens puts it “[w]ether the corporation is a creature created by law, one 
arising out of a web of individual contractual agreements, or a distinct legal 
being, it is subject to state regulation.”179 
 
1 Home states’ capability to act 
As mentioned above, states bare the duty to protect human rights, corporations 
to respect them. Yet neither corporations with their duty to respect human rights 
nor host states with their duty to protect human rights are successfully 
preventing human rights violations. This is confirmed by the data presented in a 
report of the HRC Special Representative from 2008 that evaluated 320 cases 
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posted on the Business and Human Rights Resource Center web page from 2005 
to 2007. The report states that at least 75% of the alleged incidents took place 
outside Europe and North America.180 While TNCs have accumulated much 
power, the mostly non-industrialized host states181 often lack the power or - like 
the TNCs - the willingness to use it, for example due to competition reasons.182 
The difference is that the host states are in fact obliged to protect human rights, 
whereas TNCs as private actors are not. According to Alston and Steiner three 
of the five problems they are naming concerning the enforcement of corporate 
responsibility in the host state are the unwillingness of the host state, the 
economic inability of the host state to enforce corporate responsibility and the 
attempts of the host state to attract foreign investments by being the cheapest 
location, which usually means having the lowest human rights standards 
concerning labour law, environmental law, etc, causing a “race to the 
bottom”.183 In addition, even where laws etc exist, bribery is a problem.184 That 
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is why it is for example suggested in this research that where the host state is not 
protecting the human rights it is in fact in charge of protecting, home states, 
which also have the duty to protect human rights, should fill this gap at least 
where their TNCs violate human rights abroad.185 This could also have sped up 
the environmental and health protection in the La Oroya Case mentioned above. 
 
2 Home state action facing the challenges related to  sovereignty, 
imperialism and protectionism 
As far as the different disputes concerning human rights standards implied 
abroad that were mentioned above are concerned, they are neither impeding the 
discussion on home state options nor are they impeding the use of these options. 
On the contrary, confining the use of home state options to cases of home state 
TNC involvement may facilitate the acceptance of home state action. Even the 
issue of fragmentation of human rights law may be overcome when at least the 
actor is defined clearly. 
 
(a)  Home state action and sovereignty 
The issue of sovereignty for example is a complex one itself, because protecting 
human rights globally by intervening for the sake of human rights protection 
means limiting state’s sovereignty, while on the other hand we still need strong 
states to protect human rights within their territories and also to decide on the 
mechanisms and prerequisites of when human rights may or even have to be 
protected within the territories of other states.186 In addition, to deal with new 
powerful actors, strong sovereigns are even more important. Yet as seen above, 
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many host states are not strong enough to deal with this challenge, but may at 
the same time feel they are losing even more of their sovereignty by home state 
interference. On the other hand, in many cases host states may not feel this way 
at all, especially because only those corporations in the host state are concerned 
that are actually controlled by home state corporations. How possible solutions 
can be found will be assessed in more detail in Chapter II and III. 
 
(b) Home state action and imperialism 
As far as universalism is concerned, considering it as imperialism is just one 
point of view. Others are convinced that although human rights might have 
emerged in the “West” in a written form for the first time and now set standards, 
they emerged not because of but despite “Western” values and forms of life.187 It 
is stated that they were and are far from perfect188 and that at least core human 
rights exist and should be protected in every culture.189 Although of course 
different cultures might approach and interpret human rights differently and 
although their concept might still be influenced by the “west”, they cannot be 
generally condemned. This is even more so when considering that hardly any 
culture is isolated in the 21st century and as the modern state is a “western” 
invention spreading throughout the world, entailing globalisation as well as 
TNCs, human rights, stemming from the same source, should accompany it.190 
Donnelly for example argues that human rights may be imperfect, but they are 
the only way to protect human dignity in a globalized world so far,191 which is 
supported by the fact that most states have signed human rights treaties and 
conventions and thereby at least formally share basic values of respect for 
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human dignity and life.192 A sensible case by case approach in cases where 
culture might seem to contradict human rights protection is preferred over too 
easily abandoning the universality of human rights in general.193 Furthermore, 
the values, i.e. these human rights and the acknowledgement of their 
importance, are often shared by the host states, but they are too weak to 
implement and enforce their protection while TNCs may use this to their 
(economic) advantage.194 In addition, once universalism is accepted as a basic 
principle when applied in a sensible manner, this also creates universal 
obligations to promote and protect human rights195 for home states. 
  
(c) Home state action and protectionism 
Concerning the reproach of protectionism it has to be said that human rights 
protection should not be sacrificed due to the difficulties that may arise. 
Solutions supporting developing countries could be found. The ILO 
Conventions for example try to provide social standards for workers, yet it is up 
to the states to ratify the conventions.196 Another idea is allowing developing 
states to apply lower, but controlled minimal standard of human rights instead of 
asking them to fulfil a full high level protection. The adequate degree of 
compliance could be monitored and controlled by the UN and supported by the 
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“Western” states.197 Concerning the protectionist reproach in the light of the 
home state TNC context it is - as the reproach of universalism - much weaker, 
because it does not aim at applying “western” human rights standards in a 
general way in the host states, but only onto those TNC subsidiaries that are in 
fact controlled by “western” TNCs.  
 
B Outline of the following chapters 
As will be pointed out in the following chapters, the ways in which home states 
may hold their TNCs responsible for human rights violations and impairments 
abroad are manifold. They may foster international agreements and changes in 
public international law, they may use domestic law and courts or employ 
political measures to hold TNCs responsible. All these options will be assessed 
in more detail in the following chapters. In doing so, the following first two 
chapters are focusing on legal tools such as legislation and judiciary and the 
second two are focusing on political means like countermeasures and trade 
restrictions. 
 
Upcoming chapter II deals with the potential of domestic law to hold TNC 
subsidiaries and host states liable for human rights abuses. After sketching 
different approaches in domestic law to hear a case before domestic courts, the 
applicability of domestic law on such trans-border cases and the challenges 
faced when creating such law are outlined. It is then shown how these 
challenges could be overcome in the confined TNC-human rights context and 
possible future developments and domestic legislation are commented on. 
 
Chapter III assesses the potential of international law to tackle the issue of TNCs 
harming or affecting human rights abroad. After giving an overview of the 
primary role of human rights and human rights protection, the relationship of 
human rights and TNCs is assessed. Then domestic courts using international 
law to hold TNC subsidiaries liable and international courts and tribunals 
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holding TNCs and host states liable are studied, before conclusions on different 
possible future developments in the TNC context are drawn. 
 
Chapter IV examines whether political sanctions or countermeasures may be an 
option to answer human rights issues caused by TNCs acting abroad. As the 
term “sanction” is rather complex, it will be defined in more detail before 
examples of sanction in human rights contexts are given, the different kinds of 
sanctions are classified and their requirements under public international law are 
set out. After that the applicability of sanctions in the TNC context is assessed, 
including the issue of whether sanctions can be applied on TNCs directly. Lastly 
a conclusion and outlook on the issue is given. 
 
Chapter V investigates the idea of using trade restrictions like labelling and trade 
bans to answer human rights issues caused by TNCs acting abroad. After 
providing for some examples, the challenges for trade restrictions under WTO 
law are assessed. After sketching the complex relationship between human 
rights and trade law, developments within WTO law are described and ways to 
overcome tensions between human rights and trade law are elaborated, before 
some concluding remarks are given. 
 
Finally, chapter VI delivers a final conclusion and comment on the findings of 
this research. 
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 CHAPTER II: POTENTIAL OF DOMESTIC LAW TO HOLD TNCS AND HOST 
STATES LIABLE 
As just mentioned in the introductory chapter, human rights protection in the 
TNC context is manifold concerning the actors as well as the law and the legal 
systems involved. In the following, the possibility of home states holding TNCs 
liable by domestic human rights protection law will be assessed. As states create 
their domestic law themselves, it seems to be the easiest option for a home state 
to simply create a law that provides for the desired liability. Yet, as will be 
described below, deciding on harms that occurred abroad in home state courts is 
neither an easy nor a popular thing to do. Several questions arise, such as why 
should the case be decided by home state courts at all?  Should home state or 
host state law be applied? An overview of these issues will be given before 
assessing the question of whether it could be an option to create home state law 
that is especially designed to cover the trans-border cases of TNCs acting 
abroad. 
 
I WHO IS TO DECIDE - DETERMINING THE FORUM 
Whether the domestic courts of a state may hear and decide a case firstly 
depends on its admissibility rules. Therefore, if a home state wants to be able to 
decide on a case, it has to provide access to its courts. When considering suing a 
responsible party over human rights violations by TNCs, one can either think of 
suing the host state or the TNC (subsidiary) itself. In either case, an action 
before home state courts may seem more promising than one before host state 
courts, as the host state is often unable or unwilling to enforce human rights 
protection as seen above. Therefore the following will examine whether the 
TNC or the host state may be sued in home state courts.  The main admissibility 
issues in these cases are finding the right forum, the immunity of states and state 
officials, comity and linked to immunity and comity considerations concerning 
the Act of State Doctrine. 
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A When suing TNCs 
Suing the TNC means suing a private actor, which is a common occurrence. 
That is why numerous rules and laws exist in different states and legal systems 
to handle such trans-border cases and their main admissibility issues before 
domestic courts. Different legal systems apply different procedural laws and 
different rules on the applicable law, which affect the outcome of a court 
decision. That is why it is important to find out which is the competent court, i.e. 
the forum, that is going  to decide on these issues and the case. Yet not only 
when determining the applicable law, but also when deciding on the appropriate 
forum itself, different benchmarks are used in different legal systems and states. 
The sources of the rules to determine the competence of a court are manifold, 
reaching from codes and statutes to multilateral conventions and case law.198 
Some ways to decide on the appropriate forum will be sketched in the following, 
taking into account the differences between private and criminal law. 
 
1 Private law/ tort law or criminal law? 
Engle observes that, generally speaking, private law remedies are what is mainly 
used in the US to answer human rights violations whereas criminal law is the 
main remedy used in Europe for these cases.199 Whether this is and will be true 
for cases of TNCs violating human rights abroad will mainly depend on the 
domestic laws in the different states and their future developments. However, 
both approaches, the use of torts and criminal law, have their own advantages.200 
Criminal law is graver as far as stigma and moral condemnation is concerned.201 
Tort law on the other hand does not need a state prosecutor with its limited 
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resources to initiate a proceeding and to investigate.202 This also means that 
politically unpopular - because for example costly - complaints can be made, as 
the political influence is minimized when not needing an official party to trigger 
the proceedings. 203 Thus Ratner stresses that tort law is therefore of great 
importance to the enforcement of human rights.204 That no official prosecutor is 
needed also means that the victims themselves initiate the proceedings,205 they 
can fight back, tell their story and confront the defendants publicly, which may 
empower the victims.206 In addition, the negative publicity for the violating 
corporations may deter future abuses.207 Even the reactions and consequences 
due to a tort claim for the defendant in an individual case may be severe. 
Gramajo for example was banned from the US after being held responsible in a 
tort claim for summary execution and torture of Guatemalan Indians.208 
Furthermore, civil law is more flexible than criminal law with its rigid rules like 
nulla poena sine lege, legal certainty, etc which for example allows more often 
for trials in absentia209 and also to respond to a case more individually and may 
even lead to a greater amount of damages than a criminal proceeding.210 When 
suing corporations, the damages might even be paid more often as assets of the 
                                                 
202Eric Engle, Private Law Remedies for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations (2006) at 
<http://elib.suub.uni-bremen.de/diss/docs/00010289.pdf> 1 May 2014, 135; Nicola Jägers and 
Marie-José van der Heijden, “Corporate Human Rights Violations: The Feasibility of Civil 
Recourse in the Netherlands” (2008) Brook. J. Int’l L. 833, 866-7. 
203
 Eric Engle, Private Law Remedies for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations (2006) at 
<http://elib.suub.uni-bremen.de/diss/docs/00010289.pdf> 1 May 2014, 135. 
204
 Michael Ratner, “Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations” in David Barnhizer 
(ed), Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate 
Dartmouth, 2001) 249. 
205
 Nicola Jägers and Marie-José van der Heijden, “Corporate Human Rights Violations: The 
Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands” (2008) Brook. J. Int’l L. 833, 866-7. 
206
 Michael Ratner, “Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations” in David Barnhizer 
(ed), Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate 
Dartmouth, 2001) 249, 250. 
207
 Nicola Jägers and Marie-José van der Heijden, “Corporate Human Rights Violations: The 
Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands” (2008) Brook. J. Int’l L. 833, 868. 
208
 Xuncax v Gramajo and Ortiz v Gramajo 886 F. Supp. 162 (Distr. C. Mass., 1995); on the 
ban see Michael Ratner, “Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations” in David 
Barnhizer (ed), Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (Aldershot, Burlington: 
Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 249, 250. 
209
 See David Barnhizer (ed), Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (Aldershot, 
Burlington: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 249, 252 on Filártiga v Peña-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2nd 
Cir., 1980) which was continued without Peña-Irala. 
210
 Nicola Jägers and Marie-José van der Heijden, “Corporate Human Rights Violations: The 
Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands” (2008) Brook. J. Int’l L. 833, 868. 
 39
parent may exist in the forum state.211 In addition, tort law may be the only 
remedy there is in countries where corporations are not considered criminally 
liable.212 As finding the right forum is the first step to take before court and the 
prerequisites are different for tort law and criminal law, both will be assessed in 
the following, starting with tort law. 
 
2 Private law/tort law 
As just seen private law remedies are a flexible tool and therefore important in 
the discussion of human rights violations committed by TNCs abroad. As 
finding the right forum is the first step for a successful tort claim, the ways of 
determining the right forum for civil law remedies will be sketched in the 
following. 
 
(a) Civil law system approaches 
To decide on the right forum, i.e. whether the domestic court the case was 
brought before is competent to decide the case, international civil procedural law 
of the state the court is situated in is used.213 The procedural law may be derived 
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from domestic law, regional law and bi- and multilateral treaties.214 Once the 
forum is found, the applicable law is decided upon by using the forum’s conflict 
of law rules.215 
Civil procedural law in civil law systems are for example the German Code of 
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)216 and the Council Regulation (EC) NO. 
44/2001,217 which both refer to certain linking factors between the facts of the 
case and the forum to create the competence of domestic courts.218 As linking 
factors the Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 for example uses the domicile of the 
respondent,219 the place where the harmful event occurred,220 concerning 
contracts the place of performance221 and as far as legal persons are concerned 
the statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business222 as well 
as the place where its branch, agency or other establishment is situated.223 The 
claimant does not have to be domiciled in an EU member state, so the victims 
could usually sue in Europe.224 
Yet in the situation of a TNC subsidiary violating human rights outside the EU, 
the respondent is the subsidiary with its seat, central administration or principal 
place of business in the host state, the event occurred in the host state and if 
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there happened to be a contract with the victims it had to be performed in the 
host state. Suing the subsidiary at the place of the branch, agency or other 
establishment, which could be the parent company and therefore the home state, 
is only possible where the subsidiary itself has its seat, central administration or 
principle place of business within the EU.225 So subsidiaries incorporated outside 
the EU usually cannot be sued within the EU. All these considerations point 
towards the host state as the appropriate forum, not the home state. The only 
situation where Regulation 44/2001226 allows for suing the EU parent in the 
home state for violations that occurred at the subsidiary’s place abroad, i.e. 
outside the EU, is where the parent company was involved in the violation by an 
act or omission, decision or lack of supervision of the subsidiary. In such a case 
the place where the harmful activity (the act, omission, decision or lack of 
supervision) occurred lies within the EU and the parent company as the 
defendant is domiciled within the EU.227 However, as long as parent and 
subsidiary are acting as two separate legal entities and parent responsibility is 
not based e.g. on factual control,228 a lack of supervision will be hard to provide 
evidence for.229 Only when the corporate veil is pierced and parent and 
subsidiary are treated like parent and branch, liability is given more easily in the 
home state, i.e. by the parent. As Engle observes: 
Once the corporate veil is pierced, obtaining jurisdiction under COM 44/2001 would 
be relatively easy. Thus, at least in theory, it would be possible to impute tort liability 
to a parent company either for a tort committed by a wholly owned subsidiary.230 
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This shows that so far suing the subsidiary itself before home state courts is 
hardly possible231 and suing the parent is difficult as well. 
 
(b) Common law system approaches 
In common law systems such as the US232 the competence of the court to decide 
a case  is also restricted and different matters are considered to determine the 
appropriate forum. Yet not only connecting factors such as the nationality233 or 
the presence in the jurisdiction, for example of corporate officers or potentially 
harmful products, resulting in personal jurisdiction234 and protective 
jurisdiction,235 are relevant for deciding on the appropriate forum. A further 
criterion used to decide on the forum is the forum non conveniens doctrine.236 
This doctrine is additionally used to flexibly confine the cases domestic courts 
have to decide due to an excessively wider base of domestic jurisdiction.237 
Furthermore, when using only the linking factors to decide the forum 
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conveniens, more than one possible forum may exist in trans-border cases. That 
is why a plaintiff may want to choose to sue in the jurisdiction which he or she 
considers most favourable in terms of for example procedural law or 
compensations granted. This is called “forum shopping”.238 In many civil law 
countries with their closed systems of strictly confined court competences that 
do not allow for the kind of discretion applied when using the  forum non 
conveniens doctrine, forum shopping is either not possible due to the restrictive 
competence rules of domestic courts, 239 is not considered to be negative,240 but 
legitimate241 or is dealt with by other means, such as refusing the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgements.242 That is why the forum non conveniens 
doctrine is not referred to in order to tackle this issue in civil law systems.243 In 
common law legal systems on the other hand, forum non conveniens provides a 
benchmark for the cases where due to different existing linking factors more 
than one jurisdiction has the competence to decide the case, confining forum 
shopping. Yet the prerequisites for the discretional244 forum non conveniens 
decisions vary in different common law states. 
 
(i) US approach 
In Gilbert245 the Supreme Court developed a balancing test for forum non 
conveniens decisions in domestic cases, involving more than one US state, 
taking into account private and public interest factors. The private interest 
factors are for example:  
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the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action, and all 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. 
There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is 
obtained.246 
 
When considering the public interest factors the following aspects have to be 
taken into account: 
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested 
centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be 
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In 
cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in 
their view and reach, rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of 
it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a 
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a 
court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to 
itself.247 
However, the Court also said that it “has repeatedly recognized the existence of 
the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances”.248 The necessity 
for these “exceptional circumstances” should therefore be kept in mind as an 
underlying explanatory benchmark when applying the balancing test of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine. So what about trans-border cases involving 
TNCs and human rights? In Koster249 the rule of favouring the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum was established, yet this was abolished later in Piper250 for international 
cases. These international cases involving foreign plaintiffs became an issue due 
to certain particularities of US law - as US courts were known for the high 
damages they granted and the contingency fee system concerning lawyer’s fees, 
plaintiffs thought is was an advantage to sue in the US, especially in cases of 
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product liability where US products had caused harm outside the US.251 
Therefore, the forum non conveniens doctrine just mentioned was used as a 
restriction in the 1980s to prevent foreign plaintiffs from filing so many suits in 
the US.252 Declining jurisdiction in international cases on the basis of  forum non 
conveniens is thus rather the rule than the exception today253 as can be seen in 
many cases involving TNCs causing human rights violations by causing 
environmental damages and health hazards.254 A striking example of forum non 
conveniens concerning TNCs acting abroad is the 1986 Bhopal case255 brought 
before US courts under the already mentioned Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).256  
In this case, the plaintiffs, victims of a gas leak disaster at a pesticide plant of the 
US-American Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) in Bhopal, India, argued that 
the Indian legal system was not adequate to decide on such a case,257 that the 
TNC UCC was responsible and liable for its Indian subsidiary because 
construction, design and operation of the subsidiary were controlled by the US 
parent258 and that there was a great public interest in the US for the case due to 
similar plants in the US and because the US should encourage its TNCs to 
“protect health and well being of peoples” all over the world.259 Judge Keenan 
however rejected the arguments in his decision, which was upheld by the Court 
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of Appeals.260 He argued that Indian tort law was based on English tort law and 
was therefore able to cope with the case. Yet a condition to the forum non 
conveniens decision was that UCC voluntarily submitted to Indian jurisdiction to 
allow Indian courts to decide the case in the first place. This shows the forum 
non conveniens decision is used in a very broad way, maybe even overused by 
dismissing the case even when there is no sufficiently linked alternative forum, 
but further steps to create such a forum are necessary.261 Judge Keenan argued 
further that India was the place where the accident occurred, the principal 
witnesses were in India and as Indian jurisdiction had the superior regulatory 
interest in the case India’s public interest in the litigation was outweighing the 
US interest.262 
Due to this forum non conveniens decision, regarding the case as a mere 
accident in India, the case was not decided in US courts. Muchlinski therefore 
concludes that victims of injuries caused by US subsidiaries abroad may have 
hardly any chance of a decision before a US court “unless there is clear proof of 
the direct involvement of the parent company in the wrongdoing, and there is a 
clear US interest in the litigation.”263 This, although more confined, reminds of 
the dilemma in the civil law systems, where due to a lack of other links an 
involvement in the causation of a harm by the parent company is necessary to 
create a sufficient link to access the home state forum. Furthermore, the idea of a 
link is not alien to ATCA either. The defendant may claim that it does not fall 
under US jurisdiction because it is a foreign corporation. Yet in most cases they 
will not be too successful as Heil points out: 
In cases against corporations, courts generally use the rule that a corporation must 
have a presence in a state or must be conducting "continuous and systematic business" 
in a state for jurisdiction in that state. This can sometimes be very simple for the 
plaintiff, since many states require a corporation to officially register with the 
Secretary of State of a state to be able to conduct business there. Registering a 
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business generally submits a corporation to general jurisdiction in that state.264 
 
However, there have been cases since Bhopal where a dismissal of jurisdiction 
was refused or had to be reconsidered like in Jota265 where the Ecuadorian 
subsidiary of the US corporation Texaco was accused of having dumped toxic 
by-products into the local rivers, or the Wiwa case,266 where the court decided 
that the Nigerian victims could sue Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, incorporated in 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in the US. Although this last example 
is not exactly the situation examined in this work because the defendant was no 
subsidiary of a US parent company and it was stressed that two of the plaintiffs 
were US residents, it is an important example of US cases involving TNCs and 
human rights violations abroad, brought before US courts under ATCA, because 
in this decision the court “altered the balance of forum non conveniens, making 
it easier to bring claims based on a foreign human rights violation despite the 
availability of an alternative forum”.267 It did so by stressing the interest of the 
United States in adjudicating human rights abuses no matter where they occur. 
Yet the US interest in deciding the case does not automatically override that of 
the host state because of the mere fact that the action is based on ATCA.268 
Furthermore, this is no Supreme Court decision and different courts in the US 
have taken different approaches towards ATCA, arguing in the very opposite 
way and dismissing foreign cases.269 In Kiobel270 the US Supreme Court now 
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even decided that ATCA is not applicable in extraterritorial cases where the only 
link to the US is corporate presence there. It explicitly stressed that “there is no 
indication that the ATS [i.e. ATCA] was passed to make the United States a 
uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.” 
Yet already before these decisions the US approach of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine and its different uses by different courts had made it rather difficult for 
foreign victims of violations caused by foreign subsidiaries of US TNCs to sue 
these subsidiaries before US courts. Therefore, some suggestions have been 
made to ease access to US courts. Some of these ideas will be sketched in the 
following, demonstrating that many had perceived and interpreted ATCA in the 
opposite way than the US Supreme Court. Schwartz for example points out the 
fact that ATCA’s very object is to provide foreign victims with a remedy for 
extraterritorial torts. Therefore the extraterritorial occurrence of harmful events 
should not cause a dismissal of the case, especially where TNCs are involved as 
their complex interactions and structure make it difficult to define where the 
harmful event was caused in the first place.271 Fuks refers to the Sosa272 decision, 
which according to him suggests that the status of the defendant as a corporation 
eases the admissibility of a case before US courts. 273 Kee generally opposes the 
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in ATCA cases, arguing that in 
Sosa274 the Supreme Court developed restrictive requirements to sue under 
ATCA so that additional grounds for dismissal are not necessary and rather 
unfair: 
As both the ATS and Sosa require, only a foreign plaintiff with a tort claim based on a 
well-settled and well-recognized norm of customary international law can properly 
come before the court. Under such requirements, if a federal court were to undergo its 
typical Gilbert/Piper forum non conveniens analysis in ATS litigation, it would strike 
this author, in the words of Hamlet, as if "time is out of joint." By doing so, the court 
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assigns the ATS plaintiff the nearly impossible, Herculean task of proving that the 
U.S. forum is the more convenient or appropriate forum, without the needed deference 
to do so. 275 
 
In addition, he stresses the findings of Davies that a plaintiff who was dismissed 
in one forum usually does not sue again in the “appropriate” forum.276 
Nico suggests amending the balancing test of the forum non conveniens decision 
by adding social and moral factors and points out that  
courts could do so simply by weighing the responsibility of American companies to 
their employees in foreign countries in which they manufacture goods. Forum non 
conveniens is already a multifactor balancing test, and arguably there is room for an 
additional prong.277 
 
A legislative reaction to the broad use of the forum non conveniens doctrine in 
the US is a law in the Dominican Republic that allows for transnational product 
liability cases to be decided before Dominican courts if they have been 
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens elsewhere.278 
 
However advantageous it may seem to allow more human rights violation cases 
to be decided by US courts under ATCA, the already earlier mentioned 
challenges, such as the reproach of imperialism and disrespect of sovereignty, 
may arise when allowing them to judge foreign cases too easily.279 To minimize 
the chances for these reproaches, there are additional admissibility conditions in 
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US law apart from the forum non conveniens balancing test. When suing private 
parties these are the Act of State Doctrine and the comity principle, which may 
be relevant due to host state interests and involvement in the TNC subsidiaries 
concerned. As Black puts it the Act of State Doctrine “precludes the courts of 
this country from inquiring into the validity of governmental acts of a 
recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own country.”280 International 
comity 
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation. […] Under the tenets of international 
comity, United States courts customarily refuse "to review acts of foreign governments 
and defer to proceedings taking place in foreign countries, allowing those acts and 
proceedings to have extraterritorial effect in the United States. 281 
 
In Patrickson v Dole282 for example Peru opposed the case against a mining 
company being decided in the US as mining provides 50% of the country’s 
export income and 11% of the GDP and is therefore essential for the Peruvian 
economy. In addition, the Peruvian government was involved in the defendant’s 
activities. Therefore most vital Peruvian interests and even its sovereign 
interests and consequently Peru’s relations to the US were affected by the case. 
Another example is the ATCA Apartheid283 case where multinational 
corporations were sued for having benefitted from the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa and South Africa worried that the US would interfere in the very 
own domestic matters of South Africa without knowing the background and 
situation well enough. The unique situation in South Africa of reconciliation and 
fighting poverty demanded a well-considered approach towards multinational 
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corporations and their role in the Apartheid system which South Africa intended 
to take itself.284 
These latter examples show once more the interrelatedness between jurisdiction 
over foreign cases and politics and inter-state relations. Yet although there are 
various obstacles and these were imposed for different reasons, some cases 
make it to US courts and admissibility is granted. However, depending on the 
particular substantive law applicable, further admissibility issues may arise, as 
for example under ATCA, by requiring a violation of the “law of nations” as will 
be assessed in more detail below. So access to US courts is not granted easily 
and the courts are driven by different motives and interests when deciding on the 
forum. 
 
(ii) UK approach 
The forum non conveniens doctrine approach in the UK is more limited than the 
US approach285 and generally based on the Spiliada286 doctrine.287 In this case 
Lord Goff states that  
the burden resting on the defendant is not just to show that England is not the natural 
or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum 
which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.288 
Such a more appropriate forum is the forum with the most substantial connection 
based  
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not only [on] factors affecting convenience or expense (such as availability of 
witnesses), but also [on] other factors such as the law governing the relevant 
transaction (as to which see Cr dit Chimique v. James Scott Engineering Group Ltd., 
1982 S.L.T. 131), and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry on 
business.289 
If this test shows that there is a clearly more appropriate alternative forum, more 
factors are taken into account to determine whether stay can be granted or an 
exception has to be made because the circumstances of the case demand 
admissibility in spite of a more appropriate forum abroad.290 This was in fact 
done concerning human rights violations by subsidiaries of British parent 
companies abroad where the House of Lords allowed for proceedings to take 
place in the UK, for example in Connelly v RTZ Corporation plc291and Lubbe v 
Cape plc.292  In the former case the House of Lords decided that the case should 
be tried before British instead of Namibian courts due to the need for financial 
aid and expert evidence, which were both only available in the UK. In Lubbe v 
Cape plc293 the House of Lords similarly ruled that lack of means in South 
Africa allowed proceedings in the UK. It is even stated that in contrast to US 
courts, courts in the UK and Australia are using their discretion under the forum 
non conveniens doctrine in favour of holding parent corporations liable for 
human rights violations they committed abroad.294 However, European Law, 
especially Regulation 44/2001,295 has confined the use of the Spiliada doctrine 
by British courts.296 The ECJ basically ruled that the Brussels Convention,297 
now Regulation 44/2001, precludes courts from declining jurisdiction for 
reasons not laid down in the Convention, finding that the reason that a court in a 
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non-member state is the more appropriate forum cannot be applied, even if no 
other member state is affected by this decision.298 This means the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens will not be applied any longer where the Regulation is 
applicable, i.e. when UK-based TNCs are sued either for contributing to human 
rights violations of their subsidiaries abroad or because of the conduct of their 
subsidiaries attributed to the UK-based parent as outlined above. Holding the 
parent liable due to breaches of their duty of care, i.e. due to their own conduct, 
is therefore still possible. UK courts could still do so under Regulation 44/2001, 
thereby maybe even accelerating this approach throughout Europe. Furthermore, 
regardless of the changes in the UK, non-EU states that have adopted the 
Spiliada doctrine like Canada299 and New Zealand,300 are still applying it 
broadly. In addition, as in the USA, there are also further obstacles to the 
admissibility of a case, namely the act of state doctrine and comity.301 
 
(iii) Canadian Approach 
As just mentioned, Canada’s forum non conveniens application is also based on 
Spiliada, so the moving party has to show that there is a more appropriate 
forum.302 The factors are quite similar to those used in the UK.303 In contrast to 
the US approach, courts wait for the application of one of the parties before they 
apply the doctrine304 and judicial economy and similar matters are not used.305 
What is important concerning foreign plaintiffs is that there is no favouring of 
the local plaintiff’s forum.306 Even in Québec, where civil law is applied, the 
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forum non conveniens doctrine exists as it has been included into art. 3135 
Québec Code of Civil Procedure. Although it is said that this in fact nullified 
case law approaches concerning the doctrine, the factors involved and used to 
decide on are very similar to Canada’s common law approach307 when deciding 
whether “exceptionally”308 jurisdiction can be declined. In Cambior309, which 
was decided in Québec, it was found that Guyana was the more appropriate 
forum to decide on a spill of toxic effluents caused by the subsidiary of a 
Canadian gold mining company. The reasons the court based its decision on 
were that the mine was in Guyana as were the victims, witnesses and other 
elements of proof, the spill happened there, the applicable law was that of 
Guyana and the victims would not be denied justice if the case was tried in 
Guyana, where others were already pending.310 Interestingly the court made a 
comment on the liability of the parent company, stressing that liability was not 
automatically excluded because parent and subsidiary were legally two separate 
entities, because in this case the parent company had financed the study and 
plans later carried out by the subsidiary.311 Yet as forum non conveniens applied, 
the liability was not assessed any further. 
 
(iv) Australian approach 
The Australian forum non conveniens approach is less restrictive than the US 
and UK ones. It is sufficient that the Australian forum is an appropriate forum, it 
does not have to be the clearly appropriate forum.312 In addition, the burden of 
proof is reversed compared to the Spiliada doctrine - a case is dismissed by 
Australian courts when the Australian forum is “clearly inappropriate”.313As it 
tends to be easier to show that the foreign forum is clearly more appropriate than 
to show that the local forum is clearly inappropriate, this approach facilitates 
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trials before Australian courts.314 Yet facing globalization and forum shopping 
there are supporters also among the deciding judges for a stricter approach, 
either due to their understanding of international law and extraterritoriality in 
general or because of a felt need for a more harmonized approach in common 
law systems, favouring the UK approach.315 This would of course make it more 
difficult to bring a case before an Australian court as well. Furthermore, as in the 
US and the UK forum non conveniens is not the only obstacle plaintiffs face 
when bringing a case before Australian Courts, as the Act of State Doctrine is 
used in Australia as well.316 
 
3 Criminal law, criminal prosecution 
Usually states hear criminal cases committed abroad only when there is a link 
between the facts of the case and the state, either under the theory of passive 
personality principle317 when a crime was committed against the state’s own 
nationals, under the theory of active personality principle when the state 
prosecutes one of its own nationals or under the protective principle in cases 
related to the protection of the state and its sovereignty, for example when its 
currency is counterfeited.318 Another example could be the crime of treason 
where extraterritorial jurisdiction is applied under UK and South African law no 
matter where the crime was committed or who committed it.319 As far as TNCs’ 
human rights violations are concerned, as already mentioned above when 
assessing tort law, a link has to be found. As the victims are usually nationals of 
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the host state and the direct offenders as well and vital interests of the home 
state are hardly at stake, indirect action or involvement of the parent is the most 
promising connecting factor.320 Yet this is often hard to prove, especially as long 
as acts of the subsidiary are not attributed to the parent due to factual control and 
duty to control. In the Nestlé Case mentioned above, it was argued by the 
ECCHR that the parent itself neglected its duties and was therefore responsible 
because of omission. Whether this is a successful line of argumentation that will 
convince the prosecutor and the court has not been answered yet.321 Establishing 
the link would be much easier, if the action of the subsidiary could be attributed 
to the parent more easily. Yet current domestic laws do not provide for this 
possibility, neither in tort not in criminal law.322 
 
However, there is an exception to the necessity of a link between the state 
hearing and deciding the case and the facts of the case as far as the violation of 
ius cogens and possible universal jurisdiction for these crimes are concerned.323 
In France for example article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code du 
Procédure Pénale) provides for universal jurisdiction for the wrongs listed in 
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international conventions, but the defendant has to be in France to be criminally 
prosecuted.324  
Several countries use universal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute grave human 
rights crimes like crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Some of 
these countries are France,325 Germany,326 the Netherlands,327 until 2003 also 
Belgium328 and until 2009 also Spain.329 The law they are applying is provided 
for by domestic law that - like ATCA - reproduces and refers to public 
international law.330 Spain and Belgium used their universal jurisdiction in a 
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broad way in numerous and rather prominent cases. Spain for example 
investigated against former Chinese ministers for human rights violations in 
Tibet and against members of Falun Gong, against the US because of CIA 
flights in Spain and human rights violations in Guantánamo, against the former 
Israel Minister of Defense Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and six further military 
officers and in many more cases, including the genocides in Rwanda and 
Guatemala.331 Belgium also investigated against Rwandan genocide perpetrators 
and in addition against Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, Saddam 
Hussein and President Laurent Gbagbo.332 Yet not only the broad use of their 
universal jurisdiction is what both states have in common, but also the intention 
of changing this broad approach to prevent becoming the “world police” and 
facing too many diplomatic and political resentments with the foreign states 
involved.333 Belgium already changed its law in 2003334 and although it is still 
rather broad in terms of crimes that can be prosecuted, a link between Belgium 
and the facts of the case have to be established now to be able to trigger criminal 
prosecution. That means universal criminal jurisdiction in its absolute sense, not 
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caring for the nationality or residence of the victims and the prosecuted, was 
abolished in Belgium.335 There has in fact been an investigation and trials against 
the French corporation Totalfinaelf (Total) by Belgium beginning in 2002.336 
Total was working on building the Yadana gas pipeline in Myanmar. Total is 
said to have used Myanmar military as security forces to protect the site, which 
led to human rights violations such as torture and forced labour.337 However, as 
Belgium changed its laws on universal jurisdiction in 2003, the case was 
dismissed.338 In Spain parliament voted in favour of confining universal 
jurisdiction in 2009339 and the respective law restricting the universal criminal 
jurisdiction of Spain was passed in the same year.340  
Yet even when universal jurisdiction is given, because ius cogens is concerned 
several issues may arise in the TNC context, not even to mention the already 
rather complex issue of defining what is ius cogens in the first place. Firstly, it 
may be difficult to hold corporations liable because corporations are not equal to 
individuals in terms of criminal law consequences and sanctions. Corporations 
as private actors have to be treated differently. While many states provide for 
criminal liability of corporations, some do not and neither does public 
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international law in a general way.341 They are for example not subject to the 
ICC.342. So the first obstacle is whether corporations can violate ius cogens at all. 
While universal jurisdiction is widely accepted for violations of ius cogens, such 
as piracy and slavery, this law has initially been developed for private 
individuals. So further objections from the host state may arise, because it does 
not recognize the criminal liability of corporations at all. Although corporations 
do not have general legal personality under public international law, the idea of 
criminal liability and legal personality is accepted in many domestic legal 
systems today.343 That is why universal jurisdiction over TNCs acting abroad 
could be accepted by the majority of states and contradicting home state and 
host state law might be overcome. It could even be of some help that ius cogens 
breaches are the gravest breaches and most states will not be ready to let them 
go unpunished where punishment can be achieved. Secondly, the already above 
mentioned reproaches of disrespecting the host state’s sovereignty may arise. 
Yet as shown above, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Thirdly, and this can 
be a strength as just suggested, but also a weakness, ius cogens crimes are not 
exactly the typical human rights violation by a TNC, although it does occur that 
TNCs are involved, otherwise there would not be any ATCA cases sanctioning 
breaches of the “law of nations” at all. Yet in cases of environmental damage or 
violations of labour laws or other human rights that do not constitute ius cogens, 
the issue of universal criminal jurisdiction does not arise at all. That means only 
a limited number of cases fall under the jurisdiction of the home states via 
universal jurisdiction. However, as universal jurisdiction at least covers the most 
severe breaches of human rights law, universal jurisdiction and criminal 
prosecution is still a valuable tool in the TNC context, provided criminal 
liability of TNCs is accepted. 
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For the appropriate forum in criminal trials this means that when neither the 
victims nor the accused are nationals of the forum state and the protective 
principle is not applicable either, jurisdiction may only be obtained via universal 
jurisdiction in cases of ius cogens violations. 
 
B When suing host states 
Apart from suing TNCs, host states could be sued because, as mentioned above, 
every state has a duty to protect human rights within its territory and jurisdiction 
according to the rules of due diligence. 344 When a host state is unable or 
unwilling to exercise this protection with regard to TNCs acting within its 
jurisdiction, one could think of holding the host state or the respective state 
official responsible for this omission. Yet this means approaching human rights 
issues in a more indirect way via the host state duties and also on a more general 
basis than just controlling the human rights records of the state’s “own” TNCs. 
This is because it seems difficult to hold a state or state officials liable for not 
preventing human rights violations in subsidiaries of their own TNCs, while on 
the other hand for example allowing for human rights violations in other 
corporations. The action of the home state may be triggered by the human rights 
violation in their own TNC’s subsidiary, but it seems it can hardly be confined 
to it, as this would amount to discrimination against employees and 
neighbourhoods of other corporations. As the (potential) victims of the human 
rights abuses are usually not home state nationals and citizens, but host state 
nationals and citizens, the home state cannot ask for a special protection for 
these (potential) victims by some sort of consular protection or the like. The 
home state’s interest is rather to try to influence the parent company and to 
protect the (potential) victims itself due to the - although not generally in a 
legally relevant sense recognized - link of factual control created by the parent 
company in the home state. As just sketched, at first glance it would seem rather 
weird if a home state only criticized the host state for not controlling the human 
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rights observation of its own TNCs’ subsidiaries. On the other hand there might 
be more of an own interest of the home state for the protection of human rights 
by its own TNCs, which means the call for more control in its own TNCs’ 
subsidiaries could be considered less interfering than a general call for more 
human rights protection in all kinds of spheres which do not have any 
connection with the calling state.345 This again shows the special role of TNC 
subsidiaries acting abroad where factual control by the parent is actually given.  
 
1 Suing the host  state or its government as a whole 
One could think of holding the host state responsible before domestic courts of 
the home state by suing the host state or its government as an entity. However, 
this is not generally provided for in public international law. In contrast, the 
sovereign power to adjudicate, i.e. the facultas iurisdictionis, derives from the 
above mentioned sovereignty principle and is limited by the idea of state 
immunity based on public international law and the sovereignty principle 
itself.346 International laws specifically dealing with state immunity are The 
Brussels Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to immunity of 
state-owned vessels (1926), the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(1961),347 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963),348 the New York 
Convention on Special Mission (1969), the Vienna Convention on the 
Representation of States on their Relations with International Organizations of a 
Universal Character (1975), the European Convention on state immunity with 
additional protocol (1972)349 and the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity.350 
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Granting (absolute) immunity to foreign states is based on comity. It supports 
the friendly relations between the states, thereby preventing confrontations and 
conflicts a domestic court decision intending to bind a foreign state could 
trigger.351 This suggests that state immunity is not only a legal issue for example 
due to difficulties in enforcing the court decisions,352 but also a political issue 
and matter of foreign policy and diplomacy.353 This shows once more the 
interrelatedness of public international law, including human rights law, and 
policy. Today in many states state immunity is only granted in cases where a 
state is acting officially or as a sovereign, i.e. it carries out acta iure imperii,  
and not as a private person, performing acta iure gestionis.354 The differentiation 
means whenever a state carries out acta iure imperii, no domestic court may rule 
or decide on its actions.355 This shift from absolute to restricted or relative state 
immunity has mainly taken place in the second half of the 19th and in the 20th 
century356 for example in Belgium and Italy,357 Austria, Germany, Greece, 
Switzerland,358 the UK359 and the USA.360  However, restrictive immunity can not 
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(yet) be considered customary international law.361 In addition, the exact 
reasoning, benchmarks and ways of deciding on immunity may differ from lex 
fori to lex fori and therefore from state to state,362 though now the UN 
Convention on State Immunity could help to harmonize the different 
approaches.363 A further issue contradicting the general use of restrictive 
immunity is that a state which is willing to let its courts decide a case involving 
a foreign state on the grounds of restrictive jurisdiction is not necessarily also 
willing to submit itself to foreign jurisdiction in an equivalent case.364 However, 
even according to the 2004 UN Convention post-judgement measures, i.e. 
enforcement, can only be taken with the consent of the defendant state365 and 
there is no state practice that allows for the enforcement and pre-judgement 
attachment of decisions based on restrictive immunity without such a consent.366  
The following examples illustrate the inconsistent use of state immunity before 
domestic courts. Immunity was for example granted to Saudi Arabia in the US 
case Saudi Arabia v Nelson367 where the plaintiff brought an action against the 
Saudi Arabian government claiming damages for having been illicitly 
incarcerated and tortured. Immunity was also granted in the US in Joo v Japan368 
concerning damages for sexual slavery of women before and in World War II 
and in Sampson v Federal Republic of Germany,369 and Hugo Princz v Federal 
Republic of Germany370 where Holocaust survivors claimed compensation from 
Germany. In the UK case Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya 
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AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and others371 immunity was granted 
to Saudi Arabia in a case for damages because of torture. In contrast, immunity 
was for example denied in Rein v Libya,372 a follow-up of the Lockerbie disaster, 
due to the US Foreign States Immunity Act (FSIA) which does not grant 
immunity to states that sponsor terrorism. In Greece the Hellenic Supreme Court 
did not consider Germany to be immune in respect of compensation for wrongs 
in Distomo during World War II.373 
This short overview of different cases before domestic courts already shows that 
state immunity is not applied uniformly in different forums and even within one 
forum different rules may apply according to each individual case.374 The one 
aspect all these cases had in common is that they dealt with claims for damages, 
i.e. torts and not criminal prosecution.375 This is because one state criminally 
prosecuting another state would be even more contradicting the principle of state 
sovereignty than tort claims and furthermore - or because of that - domestic 
criminal law does not usually include the possibility of sanctioning foreign 
states.  
Concerning the case where the home state wants to hold the host state liable for 
allowing or not preventing human rights violations by private actors, a reproach 
of omitting a sovereign function is made. Therefore state immunity is provided 
for by public international law in those cases, ensuring that no domestic court 
may rule on a foreign state in those matters. An exception to the absolute 
immunity for acta iure imperii may be granted for acts of states violating those 
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erga omnes obligations that are ius cogens.376 This includes grave human rights 
violations or crimes against humanity where international or universal 
jurisdiction is accepted. In these cases a domestic court may also decide on acts 
of foreign states.377 However, to decide what exactly is ius cogens and when a 
violation of human rights is grave enough to be considered a violation of ius 
cogens is difficult. In addition, the ius cogens exception is not generally 
recognized or at least not used.378 That means as the performance of host state 
duties are the controversial subject in cases of TNCs violating human rights 
abroad, only in cases of a violation of ius cogens could there be the appropriate 
forum in the home state as the other cases are covered by immunity. Yet the ius 
cogens exception of immunity is not generally accepted and enforcement 
measures can only be taken when the host state submits to the home state forum. 
That leaves only a rather small scope of application to the rather indirect state 
option of holding host states liable for violations of human rights by home state 
TNCs. 
 
2 Suing host state officials 
Yet not only suing the host state itself or its government as an entity may be a 
state option for the home state to influence host state government behaviour and 
therefore indirectly the human rights record of their own TNCs, but also suing 
state officials of the host state in domestic home state courts. For a state to 
perform its political functions and to carry out the official duties of the state, 
heads of states and senior officials  are fundamental. That is why states are 
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reciprocally willing to grant foreign state officials immunity.379 Yet again an 
exception can be made in the case of violation of ius cogens, the most striking 
example being the Pinochet I case.380 However, the ius cogens exception is not 
generally accepted when suing host state officials either.381 There are some 
exceptions in civil and administrative cases according to art. 31 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). Yet, despite these exceptions it will 
be difficult to hold individual state officers liable for compliance in human 
rights violations committed or supported by TNCs. Firstly because of the idea of 
immunity itself, as holding the state official liable for neglecting or omitting the 
human rights protection a state is supposed to grant means holding him or her 
liable for not fulfilling his or her state duties. Yet the state duties and their 
fulfilment are the very spheres the immunity of foreign state officials is 
supposed to protect from foreign interference. Therefore immunity will usually 
be granted. Secondly due to the difficulties relating to ius cogens in general 
concerning its definition and accepting the exceptions it causes on immunity as 
already mentioned above. In addition, the individual state official has to be 
identified, his responsibility has to be proven and even if the host state 
government is willing to pay tribute to the decision, it may simply exchange 
personnel by replacing the blamed person with another one who will do the 
same all over again instead of changing its human rights protection policy.  
The following examples will provide an idea of the use of state immunity when 
state officials are sued in domestic courts. Immunity was granted to state 
officials in the already above mentioned Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-
Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and others382 
although ius cogens was violated by torturing the plaintiff as opposed to the 
Pinochet case383 where the former head of state was not immune due to the 
grave violations of human rights he had committed. Immunity was also granted 
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in the French criminal case SOS Attentat and Castelnau d’Esnault v Qadaffi, 
Head of State of Libya384 and in the Belgian case Belgium H. A. S. v Ariel 
Sharon, Belgium Court of Cassation.385 Immunity was even granted by the ICJ 
in Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium386 on a Belgian arrest warrant 
against the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of Congo – the warrant had 
to be cancelled because the ICJ held that ranking ministers were immune to 
criminal prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
during their terms in office. This decision was severely criticized, because in the 
Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials international law was already used to try state 
officials for ius cogens violations. 387 Due to a lack of legislation some state 
officials could not be tried for their offences as in 2001 in Habré,388 a case 
involving crimes against humanity and torture that had to be dismissed due to a 
lack of legislation in Senegal.389 In Bouterse390 the principle of no retroactivity 
hindered further criminal prosecution. However, there is a recent example of 
denying immunity even to a current head of state, namely the arrest warrant the 
ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo issued against Omar al Bashir, the current 
president of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in March 
2009.391 It is submitted that this approach might trigger a change in the states’ 
attitude towards granting immunity to state officials who committed 
international crimes. 
Yet as can be seen from the above-mentioned cases at the moment it is the 
exception for a state official to be tried before foreign courts and held either 
criminally or civilly liable392 at the moment. As Engle puts it: 
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Practically speaking […], Pinochet’s case, like that of Congo v. Belgium or France v. 
Khaddafy or Sharon’s cases or Habré’s case, is evidence of the great reluctance of 
states to subject the leaders of other states to personal liability for crimes against the 
law of nations.393 
This is even more evident in the TNC context as human rights violation like the 
ones mentioned at the beginning of this research usually do not amount to 
international crimes. 
 
II WHAT LAW TO USE - DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LAW 
As just seen the admissibility of a tort case in home state courts depends on 
various aspects and is not easily granted. Furthermore, even when a case is 
decided before home state courts, this does not necessarily mean that (only) 
home state law is applicable,394 because cases with a foreign or international 
dimension are not necessarily decided upon by using the domestic law of the 
forum. In fact in trans-border cases after deciding on the appropriate forum, the 
applicable law has to be found. Depending on the law of the forum state the 
applicable law can be its own, foreign domestic law or international law. Host 
state law can for example be applicable in cases where the private international 
law of the forum state refers to the law of the place where the harmful event 
occurred. Likewise, as the home state forum is hard to access, this does not 
necessarily mean that home state law is not applicable to a case before host state 
courts. The applicable law depends on the legal system, the domestic law of the 
forum state, the interests of the forum state.395 So the forum state has the most  
influence on the applicable law, as it uses its own rules to define the applicable 
                                                                                                                                                        
Frolova v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 380 (7th Cir. 1985) and 
Argentine Republic v Amerida Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989). 
393
 Eric Engle, “Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law”, (2005) 
ZERP-Diskussionspapier, 1 available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020453> 1 May 2014, 145, footnotes 
omitted. 
394
 For the example of US courts using European law to interpret US law and the issues that 
arise see Eric Engle, “European Law in American Courts: Foreign Law as Evidence of 
Domestic Law” (2007) 33 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 99. 
395
 Kirchner for example points out that  a relevant state interest to apply its own law in 
choice-of-law clauses is the protection of “certain groups of actors” Christian Kirchner, 
„Economic Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses“ in Jürgen Basedow and Toshiyuki 
Kono (eds) An Economic Analysis of Private International Law (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2006) 33, 35. 
 70
law. Some of the approaches to find the applicable law will be sketched in the 
following. 
As far as criminal cases are concerned, applying foreign law is not as common 
as in tort law. That means each state usually applies its own criminal law.396 
 
A  Legislation on the conflict of laws  
It was stated above that the home state forum will usually only be available 
where an action or omission of the parent company can be shown or actions of 
the subsidiary can be attributed to the parent, which is so far usually only done 
when they are not separate legal entities. Only in those cases can the home state 
therefore be considered the place where the harmful event was initiated or took 
place. Concerning the applicable law, things are similar. The applicable law for 
torts often is the law of the place where the harmful event occurs. This is the 
basic rule in for example Switzerland,397 Canada (Québec),398 Venezuela,399 
Italy,400 the UK401 and the EU.402 Yet the applicable law for torts may also be the 
law of the place where the harm was caused or inflicted, as is for example the 
basic rule in Austria,403 Liechtenstein,404Australia405 and Germany in cases where 
the places of the occurrence of the harmful event and the causation differ.406 
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Some states acknowledge both laws as applicable under certain circumstances. 
In Germany for example the plaintiff may according to art. 40 EGBGB choose 
between the law of the place where the harmful event occurred and the law of 
the place where the harm was inflicted or caused if those two places differ from 
one another.407 However, Rome II Regulation408 has substituted the EGBGB for 
most cases and in art. 4 it is stated that usually the law of “the country in which 
the damage occurs” is the applicable law. According to art. 7 Rome II 
Regulation409 the plaintiff may choose between the law of the country where the 
harmful event occurred and the law of the country where the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred in cases of environmental damages. 410 
The Peruvian Código Civil 1984 (Civil Code) for example states in art. 2097 that 
for liability in torts the place of action or in the case of omission the place where 
the action should have taken place, is decisive for the applicable law.411 Yet in 
cases with action or omission in more than one country it could be argued that 
the main action or omission is decisive, because this is where there is the 
strongest link. That means that not only compliancy or responsibility of the 
parent, usually by omission, has to be shown, but also that this was the main 
action causing the harm, which makes the application of home state law rather 
unlikely. 
In art. 32 the Venezuelan Ley de Derecho International Privado 1998 refers to 
the law of the place where the harmful event occurred as the applicable law in 
torts, yet it states that the victim may demand the application of the law of the 
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state where the tort was caused.412 The latter possibility includes using home 
state law if a home state responsibility can be shown. 
   
B Non-legislative ways to identify the applicable law (US approach) 
Apart from the legislative approach to private international law, the applicable 
law can also be defined by non-legislative approaches like in the US. The 
doctrine of international comity is an important basis for the domestic 
approaches in private international law,413 suggesting that “courts […] should 
apply foreign law or limit domestic jurisdiction out of respect for foreign 
sovereignty”414 and different approaches have shaped and changed it over 
time.415 Currie for example suggested an interest analysis approach which 
provides for the application of the law of the state which has an interest in its 
laws application.416 Yet to objectively decide which state has an interest in 
applying its law and which has not is at least difficult if not impossible in many 
cases and the results of the governmental analysis test are therefore far from 
being predictable or consistent,417 especially in international matters of private 
law where balancing private interests to achieve justice is the aim of domestic 
law rather than certain political or economic state interests.418 
A further idea is the “better law approach”, which suggests that the law is 
applicable which is better equipped to solve the very issue of the individual case 
or aim for certain ends such as protecting the weak, or both.419 Yet again, it is 
difficult to decide which law is “better”, especially when foreign law is involved 
as a thorough knowledge of the conflicting laws is necessary for such a 
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decision420 and again foreign states could feel neglected or disrespected when the 
forum law is considered to be the “better” one. There are many more ideas and 
suggestions on when to apply foreign law and how to decide on this patchy 
matter.421 To shed some light on the various ideas and approaches, Beale and 
later Reese tried to create rules and benchmarks for the applicable law on the 
basis of case law and the many ideas and approaches taken. Restatement First 
and Second, had little success either due to a rigid or too vague approach, while 
Restatement Third calls for more consensus on the topic than there is at the 
moment.422 US courts mainly use Restatement Second despite its obstacles and 
uncertain outcomes.423 
 
III  EASIER SAID THAN DONE - APPLYING DOMESTIC HOME STATE LAW IN THE TNC 
CONTEXT 
Being applied on trans-border cases is not the most established role of domestic 
law. Public international law has to be observed when creating and applying 
such law. That is for example why questions of forum and liability of host states 
and host state officials cannot be determined by domestic home state law, but 
are left to public international law. Concerning private actors that are not host 
state officials, home states are quite flexible in their rules determining the forum 
and applicable law in trans-border cases. Yet the content of the applicable 
domestic law has to be considered carefully. It should for example be kept in 
mind that (so far) home state law that could provide for parent liability is only 
applicable in cases where the place of causation of the harm is decisive for the 
applicable law and not the place where the harmful event occurred. Proving a 
neglect, omission of aid and assistance by the parent company may be rather 
difficult depending on the very design of the applicable law. However, enforcing 
judgements is easiest in the state where they were delivered and - even more so -  
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when also the liable party is situated there. That means holding the parent liable 
instead of the subsidiary makes it easier for the home state to handle the 
enforcement, because it does not have to rely on the contribution of a possibly 
unwilling or unable host state. Furthermore, the existing case law on TNCs’ 
human rights violations abroad suggests that reproaches of imperialism and 
protectionism seem not to arise as much where the parent is held liable in the 
home state. In the UK, Australia and Canada for example the “duty of care” 
principle is used to pierce the corporate veil to hold the parent liable for 
violations of human rights committed by subsidiaries abroad.424 According to 
this principle “[a] private actor will be liable if it is proved that it owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiffs, breached that duty, and the breach caused the injury 
complained of.”425 UK examples are Sithole and others v Thor Chemicals 
Holdings Ltd,426 Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc.427 and Connelly v RTZ.428 In these 
cases workers were exposed to harmful substances in Namibia and South Africa 
such as uranium, asbestos and mercury and suffered health damages. Although it 
is considered important under UK law that parent and subsidiary are separate 
entities, the veil was pierced in these cases and the parent was held liable for the 
harms caused. Whether the duty of care lies with the parent company depends 
on the control the parent has over its subsidiary, including financial control, 
whether the subsidiary repatriates its profits to the parent and the knowledge and 
contribution of the parent about the wrongs. That means  
[i]f the parent company was aware of the dangers caused by its practices, but took 
advantage of lower safety standards in other countries to expose people to greater risks 
than would be acceptable in the UK, this is a failure of due care on its part.429 
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Australian and Canadian Courts have decided in similar ways. The Australian 
case James Hardie & Co. Ltd. v Hall430 for example involved two subsidiaries of 
an Australian company one in Australia, the other one in New Zealand. A 
former New Zealand employee filed claim due to health damages caused by the 
asbestos he inhaled when working for the company, handling asbestos cement 
building products.431 In first instance the court ruled that due to the close 
relationship and control of the parent over its subsidiaries, the parent was liable 
for the harm caused, because parent and subsidiaries were to be treated as one 
single legal entity. However, this decision was reversed by the appeal court 
which held that parent and subsidiaries were separate legal entities.432 A further 
case, the BHP case,433 dealt with pollutions in Papua New Guinea caused by 
BHP, an Australian mining company.434 However, due to Papua New Guinea’s 
opposition to the case being filed in Australia because of sovereignty matters, a 
secret settlement was reached.435 Although this may not be a totally satisfying 
result, it shows that even when the host state does not want the trial to take 
place, victims may be granted a forum and at least some sort of settlement and 
compensation is possible on a case by case basis so that home states do not have 
to refrain from dealing with those cases before their courts just because they fear 
that in some cases host states might oppose. These examples show once more 
that holding the parent liable is an existing state option, as already sketched 
above when outlining the admissibility of cases before domestic courts in civil 
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law systems. The case law just mentioned seems to suggest that there is some 
acceptance to hold parent companies liable for their human rights violations 
abroad. 
 
Apart from the already above mentioned advantage of easier enforcement if 
such liability is approved, some voices even argue that in the human rights 
context it could actually be a state duty to create and apply human rights 
protection law extraterritorially.436 It is argued that domestic and regional law 
protecting individuals from human rights violations by other private actors 
already exists437 and the extraterritorial application of domestic law is not in 
general alien to public international law either.438 The idea of expanding state 
duties to protect human rights derives from the traditional viewpoint that states 
are primarily responsible for human rights protection,439 including the duty to 
prevent private actors from violating the human rights of others,440 which 
includes businesses. It is pointed out that although states already bear the 
obligation to protect individuals from human rights violations by other private 
actors TNCs can still violate human rights and it is difficult to hold them legally 
responsible or liable.441 It is therefore suggested that states “agree upon rules of 
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international law enabling states to exercise control anywhere, and not only on 
the territory where an NGO [or TNC] has its seat.”442 Otherwise - it is argued -   
going international is equal to avoiding national control and states lose this 
control over their TNCs.443 Having subsidiaries in states with lower human right 
standards or less enforcement mechanisms and control can be much cheaper for 
a TNC and is a good way to escape the home state human rights protection 
laws.444 To achieve broader and more effective protection of human rights also 
by TNCs acting abroad and to avoid legal loopholes, 445 it could therefore help to 
allow home states to directly apply their law beyond their borders onto “their” 
TNCs. The HRC and the ICJ have stressed the state duty not to violate human 
rights abroad and to prevent its private actors from doing so446 and John Ruggie 
observed that “[i]ndeed, there is increasing encouragement at the international 
level, including from the treaty bodies, for home States to take regulatory action 
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to prevent abuse by their companies overseas.”447 The - not undisputed - practice 
of  humanitarian interventions,448 as well as the UN Charter, especially art. 1 
and 55, both stress the importance of human rights protection and the obligation 
to protect human rights beyond state borders. As already mentioned earlier, the 
principle of universalism of human rights can lead to the assumption of 
universal obligations to protect human rights. And because states are the main 
addressees of duties to protect human rights, at least in current public 
international law, they would be in charge of such a universal protection as well. 
Thus, by using extraterritoriality to secure human rights against non-state actors, 
states might even fulfil their duty to ensure and secure human rights.449 It is 
claimed that due to their universality, human rights are “not a territorial 
concept” and that the state “obligations cannot be restricted to apply human 
rights protection laws only to people living within a state’s territory.”450 
Hausmann and Künnemann are of the opinion the principle of universality is 
even reflected in positive law in art. 2.1 CESC, which is not limited to the 
territory of the state party:  
A state has to meet its extraterritorial obligations either individually, in cooperation 
with the state of the possible victim, or in cooperation with other states, for example in 
the context of specialised UN agencies. While all states parties to the Covenant have 
the obligation to cooperate, cooperation is not a goal in itself but an instrument to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant.451 
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Krennerich stresses “the logical extension” of universal rights are 
“corresponding obligations [that are] universal as well” 452 and it cannot matter 
which state is violating the rights453 by omission of legislation or actions to 
prevent human rights violations by private actors. It is even suggested that the 
legitimacy of a government making decisions which harm the human rights of 
others may be doubted.454  
 
However, creating human rights protection law with extraterritorial application 
of effect is not easy. The existence of a state duty to do so is not exactly a 
majority opinion under public international law. The attempts of passing 
domestic laws with this very content have not been successful so far. Instead the 
laws were considered to be disrespecting the host states’ sovereignties and 
causing legal uncertainties. Yet this does not mean that creating such laws is not 
possible now or in the decades to come.  In fact, domestic laws that can be 
applied extraterritorially do already exist under public international law. The 
current requirements and conditions for such laws will be sketched now, before 
having a closer look at some legislatory attempts in the TNC context and their 
potential for possible future developments.  
 
A Extraterritoriality in public international law – basic ideas and concepts 
As already mentioned above, the idea of extraterritorial application of domestic 
law is not in general alien to public international law. Yet one of the principles 
and concepts of public international law is that all states, basically consisting of 
territory, people and power,455 are equal and sovereign456 and therefore each 
state must be able to exercise its power over its people on its territory in a 
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sovereign way without interference of another state,457 as explicitly laid down in 
the Montevideo Convention458 and the UN Charter459. That is why usually host 
state law is applicable to branches, subsidiaries etc in the host state like 
environmental and labour law, protecting for example health and safety of 
workers and the population - and therefore human rights. However, expanding 
the power beyond state borders always means touching another state and its 
sovereignty. That raises the question of whether there can be extraterritorial 
jurisdiction without violating international law. Universal jurisdiction is not 
generally accepted in public international law.460 However, the idea of 
extraterritorial application of domestic law is not alien to public international 
law and is slightly different from universal jurisdiction. Extraterritorial 
application of domestic law is generally accepted when there is a connection of 
the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction and the issue or person involved. In 
addition, the application of domestic law has to be reasonable.461 In cases such 
as Banković,462 Loizidou v. Turkey463 and Öcalan v. Turkey464 the ECtHR, for 
example, made clear that states and state actors can be bound by the European 
                                                 
457
 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007)125-6. 
458
 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933). 
459
  Art. 2 par. 7 Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
460
 See Olivier de Schutter, “The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights 
Violations in European Law” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights 
(Oxford: University Press, 2005) 227, 291. 
461
 See for example Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 126; Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 
of 15 March 2006 entitled “Human Rights Council”, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts” Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises A/HRC/4/035 (9 February 2007) 
Summary  par. 15. 
462
 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII – 
(12. December 2001) here the ECtHR decided that there was no sufficient link between the 
victims who were citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the acting 
NATO states to apply the ECHR, as the Convention was not applicable in the FRY. 
463
 Loizidou v Turkey, E.Ct.H.R. (28 July1998) here the ECtHR found that Turkey by acting 
abroad violated the human rights of those Cypriots who were forced to leave their homes 
during the Turkish invasion and wished to return to their homes in Cyprus later. 
464
 Öcalan v Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV – (12. May 2005) 
here the ECtHR ruled that Turkey was responsible for human rights violations that occured 
due to an arrest of a Turkish national at the Nairobi Airport by Turkish officials. In the 
particular case the way he was transferred back to Turkey and the circumstances of his 
detention there had amounted to inhuman treatment. 
 81
Convention outside their territories, using as the decisive factor the effective 
control exercised in the foreign territory.465 ICJ decisions also suggest the need 
for a genuine connection between the subject matter and the territory of the state 
seeking to exercise jurisdiction.466 Jurisdiction can for example be based on 
nationality, like in criminal law in cases in which the victim is a national or the 
perpetrator is a national of the applying state.467 Apart from connecting factors 
such as the territory, nationality or the effective control, jurisdiction is also 
accepted once vital interests of the state seeking to exercise the jurisdiction are 
affected, the so-called protective jurisdiction.468 So far these traditional links for 
jurisdiction combined with a reasonableness test seem to be the most commonly 
accepted way of extraterritorial application of domestic law.469 This is because 
the common perception is that despite the broadly accepted universalism of 
human rights, international law does not require states to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over business abuse, but - and this is important for this research - 
they are not prohibited from doing so either when there is “a recognized basis of 
jurisdiction […] and the actions of the home State meet an overall 
reasonableness test.”470 The most important bases to trigger extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for TNCs due to their special situation and connection to the home 
state are therefore protective jurisdiction, objective territorial jurisdiction and 
nationality.471 
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1 Protective jurisdiction 
Protective jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction deriving from the idea of protecting the 
vital interests of the applying state,472 is mainly mentioned in cases of tax 
avoidance by the parent company - but this is very debatable, especially when 
mere economic interests of the applying state are at stake.473 However, the case 
of human rights violations by TNCs abroad is not tackled by protective 
jurisdiction. Even when thinking of human rights as universal, it is difficult to 
argue that the home state’s vital interests as a state are at stake when human 
rights are violated elsewhere by its TNCs. Furthermore, such a line of 
argumentation would not be desirable either, as this would cause a lot of 
instability on the international level when taken seriously.474 
 
2 Objective territorial jurisdiction 
Objective territorial jurisdiction is given when a criminal offence is commenced 
abroad and completed within the applying state’s territory.475 The problems are 
different criminal laws in different states, criminalizing or not criminalizing 
different actions and the interpretation of the causal connection of completion of 
the crime.476 However, completing a commenced criminal offence in the home 
state seems pretty unlikely for TNC-linked human rights issues. The effects of a 
human rights violation would have to be produced in the home state.477 Apart 
from cases of goods and services that harm consumers’ human rights, it is 
thinkable to include cases where goods contain insanitary substances and 
therefore harm the workers’ right to health in the host country as well as the 
consumers’ right to health in the importing country, which may be the home 
state. The state option to implement corresponding domestic laws  is already 
accepted and a state may furthermore tackle such threats for its own population 
by its import regulations. For the rare cases of goods or services that violate 
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human rights in the home state, home state laws may therefore be applicable.  
Yet this option is neither confined to home states of TNCs acting abroad nor to 
TNCs as perpetrators of the human rights violation. However, for cases where 
human rights are violated abroad by TNCs acting abroad, this is not helpful. 
 
3 Nationality 
A more compelling commection could be nationality. In the cases of TNCs 
acting abroad, the nationality of the parent company could constitute the needed 
link.478 Although TNCs are not equal to private individuals in many respects as 
seen above, the nationality link seems applicable, especially since the Barcelona 
Traction decision.479 There is even a state practice in using domestic regulatory 
mechanisms on TNCs of their nationality in, for example, competition law, 
shareholder and consumer protection, 480 and through obligations imposed by 
international treaties such as the recent UN Convention against Corruption.481 In 
addition, all the industrialised states agreed to non-binding OECD Guidelines 
which are rules for TNC behaviour and are considered “guides as to best 
practice in relation to the corporate nationals of those states, wherever they are 
operating.”482 US law for example even allows for extraterritorial application of 
domestic law in trade matters in two cases, both linked to nationality: US good 
related regulations concerning re-imports and regulations concerning the person 
of the exporter. If corporations abroad are controlled by US natural or legal 
persons, US law may regulate their behaviour.483 In cases where the subsidiary 
of the TNC acting abroad is not incorporated and is therefore still of home state 
“nationality” home states may apply their human rights laws according to their 
legislation. Yet concerning foreign or incorporated subsidiaries, the link of 
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nationality of the parent can in fact be considered disregarding “the legal 
nationality of the subsidiary as a juristic person incorporated under the law of 
the host state.”484 Once a subsidiary is incorporated, the dilemma of 
contradicting legal rules emerges. Home and host state both try to impose their 
laws onto the party of the TNCs in the respective other state and the obedience 
to one legal system by the TNC can result in the violation of the other or maybe 
even standards are applied, which the other state’s law does not accept. This can 
result in serious political problems, as one state might appear to be treating the 
legal system of the other as inferior or its sovereignty is disregarded.485 Yet as 
far as human rights are concerned, most states at least formally share the same 
principles, so that contradicting laws will not exist in most cases, rather host 
states are too weak or unwilling to control compliance and to implement human 
rights obligations. However, host states may still feel they are treated as inferior 
or disrespected when home state law is applied within their jurisdiction. That 
means nationality of the parent company is only an accepted linking factor as far 
as unincorporated subsidiaries are concerned. Incorporated subsidiaries have a 
“nationality” of their own, namely that of the host state, which means the 
“nationality” linking factors cannot be applied. 
 
4 Additional link for TNCs: the factual control of the parent company 
As incorporated subsidiaries are not sufficiently linked to the home state of the 
TNC by the traditional linking factor “nationality”, as already mentioned in the 
beginning of this research, an additional linking factor could be used with regard 
to TNCs and their incorporated subsidiaries abroad. Such a link could be the 
factual control the parent company has over its foreign subsidiary.486 A similar 
approach is taken by the UN in different approaches to set up rules for TNC 
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behaviour.487 It is also for example accepted in art. 3 of the German model 
contract of bilateral investment agreements and different international arbitration 
cases in this context.488  It is also similar to the effects doctrine used in US law489 
and the effects theory (Wirkungstheorie) established in the aftermath of the 
Lotus Case490 where the ICJ decided that states were free to apply domestic law 
outside their territories unless this application violated public international 
law.491 According to this - not generally accepted - theory a state may apply or 
implement domestic law abroad when a foreign action or cause has an effect in 
the applying or implementing state,492 namely a serious, direct and predictable 
impact on the state wishing to apply its domestic law.493 However, the idea of 
the factual control as a linking factor is slightly different, as the impact on the 
home state is hard to find when TNCs as private actors of host state nationality 
are acting abroad. The home state is not affected as much, nor is the home state 
directly controlling the subsidiary incorporated abroad in a way that would 
create state responsibility or liability.494 Rather a link to the home state is given 
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as a “national” of the home state, i.e. the parent company, has factual control 
over its subsidiaries of a different nationality, which may ease and support home 
state law application. The link by factual  control of the parent company over the 
subsidiary in the host state would prevent TNCs from establishing foreign 
subsidiaries etc to avoid home state control and at the same time would make 
sure that separated entities are treated separately, whereas only formally or 
legally separated entities could still be treated as two separate but connected 
entities that are therefore linked to the home state jurisdiction.495 This control 
would have to go beyond the mere ownership of shares and could be similar to 
the approach developed by the EU when deciding on anti-trust matters 
according to art. 101 and 102 TFEU496 looking at the substance rather than the 
form of the corporate nationality.497 The US takes a similar approach, 
establishing economic links between the parent and the foreign subsidiary498 and 
moving from entity law towards an enterprise principle.499 However, although 
the approaches seem to become more liberal and more similar, much depends on 
the legal system and the legal culture involved when establishing the 
benchmarks for the necessary links of parent and subsidiary and there is no 
international consensus on such a connecting factor (yet). This means that the 
host state could still feel disrespected and humiliated when home state law is 
applied in spite of the link of factual control. Yet this does not exclude the state 
option of raising awareness and support for such a linking factor on the bi- and 
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multilateral level and introducing this approach to the balancing of interests, 
which could be a core element in finding a way to apply domestic law abroad as 
will be set out below. 
 
B Legislatory attempts 
Although the linking factors are limited as just seen, there have been some 
attempts by some domestic legislators to create laws, i.e. binding and 
enforceable rules to hold TNCs liable that are acting abroad. The three main 
attempts that will be sketched in the following are the Corporate Code of 
Conduct Act500 (US Bill) introduced as a bill to the US Congress in June 2000, 
2001 and again in 2006,501 the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill502 (AUS Bill) 
introduced to the Parliament in Australia in September 2000 and the Corporate 
Responsibility Bill503 (UK Bill) introduced to the UK House of Commons in 
2003. 
In sec. 2 (3) US Bill reference is made to a European Code of Conduct passed 
by the European Parliament, calling on European businesses to comply with 
European law abroad, yet this is no extraterritorial legislation.504 Dutch 
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intentions to create an equivalent law are also mentioned,505 yet no such law 
exists so far.506 
The US and the AUS Bill did not become law either, yet their intentions and set-
up deserve some attention, especially as for the AUS Bill there is a 
Parliamentary Report. 
 
1 US Bill 
The US Bill sets out the following requirement in sec. 3 (a): 
A national of the United States that employs more than 20 persons in a foreign 
country, either directly or through subsidiaries, subcontractors, affiliates, joint 
ventures, partners, or licensees (including any security forces of the national), shall 
take the necessary steps to implement the Corporate Code of Conduct described in 
subsection (b) with respect to the employment of these persons.507 
 
The set out Code of Conduct includes among other things providing a safe and 
healthy working place, ensuring fair employment and compliance “with 
internationally recognized worker rights and core labor standards.”508 
Environmental protection and minimum human rights standards are also 
mentioned509 and treaties and conventions are referred to in clause 3 (c).510 
Incentives to comply with the Code of Conduct are given in clause 4 as the title 
of this section already discloses: “Preference in award of contracts and provision 
of certain foreign trade and investment assistance”.511  This preferential 
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European Economic and Social Committee implementing the partnership for growth and 
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COM/2006/0136 final < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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treatment triggers reporting duties on the part of the business.512 The compliance 
with the Code can be investigated according to clause 5513 and depending on the 
compliance contracts and assistance can be terminated, withdrawn, suspended 
and preference can be limited.514 A civil liability for damages before US courts 
is granted in clause 8 (b) (2) to the aggrieved individual, “the heirs, estate or 
legal representatives of the individual.”515 
Despite the broad scope of the Bill,516 some authors doubt whether it was 
“robust”517 enough and suggest that it should have included an “adequate 
construction of core human rights standards in terms of the applicability to 
MNCs.”518 It should also have made some statements on parent liability, the 
adjudication and enforcement of orders and judgements, the forum non 
conveniens issue and the role NGOs, consumers and investors could play.519 As 
the Bill never became an Act, it could not be found out whether it was “robust” 
enough for its use in practice. However, at least some comment on forum non 
conveniens decisions and the enforcement of court orders and decisions seems to 
be a good idea, as forum non conveniens has played a major role in some cases 
in the US concerning corporations acting abroad as mentioned already.520 
Others point out that the Bill is only applicable to US “nationals” which again 
raises the question of how to treat legally separate entities acting abroad such as 
incorporated subsidiaries.521 In addition, they remark that the US bill is “more a 
carrot than a stick” as it uses incentives rather than negative consequences as 
means of enforcement.522 
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2 AUS Bill 
The Australian Bill523 is “[a] Bill for an Act to impose standards on the conduct 
of Australian corporations which undertake business activities in other countries, 
and for related purposes.”524 Its objectives are further laid down in art. 3: 
(1) The objects of this Act are: 
 (a) to impose environmental, employment, health and safety and human rights 
standards on the conduct of Australian corporations or related corporations 
which employ more than 100 persons in a foreign country; and 
 (b) to require such corporations to report on their compliance with the standards 
imposed by this Act; and 
 (c) to provide for the enforcement of those standards. 
(2) To avoid doubt, a body corporate to which this Act applies is not required to take 
any action to meet the requirements of this Act in respect of its operations in a foreign 
country that it would not be required to take in respect of its operations in Australia.525 
 
The Codes of conduct are stipulated in the following part, reaching from 
environmental,526 health and safety standards, - for both employees527 and 
consumers528 -  to employment standards including “minimum international 
labour standards”529  and human rights530 standards up to tax law531 obedience 
and trade practice532 standards. The corporations have an annually reporting 
duty,533 civil penalties may apply according to art. 16534 and compensation 
according to art. 17.535 Civil actions can be brought before the Federal Court of 
Australia by natural or legal persons aggrieved or pro bono publico.536 
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As Deva observes among other things, the human rights scope is narrower than 
in the US Bill, mainly referring to non-discrimination. On the other hand, the 
health and safety standards in the AUS Bill are better defined and, in contrast to 
the US Bill, not limited to the workplace.537 The AUS Bill is also wider in scope 
concerning the beneficiaries, as not only employees are included, but consumers 
and the public as well and even NGOs may take action.538 
Nevertheless Deva criticizes the same aspects and makes the same suggestions 
already mentioned above also for the AUS Bill.539 
 
3 UK Bill 
The UK Bill contains in clause 2 a rather broad request for TNCs to act in 
accordance with host state law and “international agreements, responsibilities 
and standards”, followed by an open list, referring to environment,  public health 
and safety, sustainable development, employment, human rights and consumer 
protection.540 Companies have to prepare reports541 and information access is to 
be eased.542 Parent company liability for compensation is provided for543 and the 
duties and responsibilities of the directs are set out.544 Stakeholders may 
complain to the Secretary of State if he or she thinks the company is in violation 
of provisions made in the Act545 and criminal liability is provided for in clause 
11.546 
In using criminal sanctions to answer any contravention of the Bill, the UK Bill 
is using criminal sanctions in a much broader way than the Australian Bill, 
which is only using them in connection with the reporting duty.547 Yet as the 
provisions in the Bill are pretty vague as far as the duties for TNCs under 
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international human rights law are concerned, these harsh consequences might 
be unreasonable.548 An advantage of the UK Bill is the treatment of TNCs not as 
different legal entities, but as a corporate group according to the Companies Act 
1985,549 which also allows for parent liability. By this approach, not only 
“nationals” are included, yet the scope is not as wide as in the AUS Bill.550 
 
4 Challenges faced by the Bills 
As already mentioned earlier none of these bills was passed as a law. Why none 
of the proposed bills was successfully passed will be outlined in this section to 
be able to find ways of creating and implementing domestic human rights 
protection law more successfully. Although only the Australian Parliament has 
commented on the Bill, most of the remarks of the Australian Parliament may be 
transferred to the US and UK Bills.551 
The recommendation of the Australian Parliament in its report was “that the Bill 
not be passed because it is unnecessary and unworkable.”552 As far as relevant 
for this research concerning the human rights obligations of TNCs acting 
abroad, the Parliament’s findings will be sketched in the following. 
The first, so to speak preconditional challenge is the willingness of a legislator 
to pass an extraterritorially applicable law. The Australian Parliament did not 
think such a broad extraterritorially applicable law was necessary, because 
common law was handling most cases already and there was no need for 
legislation as there was no “systematic failure” of the status quo due to the few 
numbers of human rights violations by TNCs.553 Yet it is doubtful whether 
legislators should wait until there is a “systematic failure”, because even small 
numbers of human rights violations should not occur, especially when there is a 
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possibility of preventing or at least sanctioning them by law.554 However, as this 
research is meant to reveal state options to control the human rights records of 
TNCs acting abroad, the willingness of states to act is, although necessary and 
sometimes instructive concerning underlying problems and concerns, not in 
itself subject to this research. Therefore, the other arguments put forward by the 
Australian Parliament will be focused on now. 
The Parliament pointed out that some terms in the Bill were vague555 and in 
some cases home state law could contradict host state law,556 which could both 
cause uncertainties as to which law to apply and how to interpret the applicable 
law. The latter case of contradicting laws was also seen as to possibly cause 
frictions with the host state, as the internal matters of another state are interfered 
with by Australian law.557 The applicability of the law even to foreign holding 
companies was also criticized as being too far-reaching,558 as well as the 
provision in the Bill that TNCs should observe the tax laws of the host state, as 
this would interfere with the state duties of the host state and therefore affect its 
sovereignty.559 In addition, to oblige TNCs to adhere to Australian law abroad 
would “be equivalent to encouraging Australian corporations to flout the laws of 
foreign jurisdictions”560 and “implying that local standards are inferior”561 and 
resentment would be even more likely due to the broad and generic scope of the 
law.562 
Furthermore, as McBeth rightly observes, all three Bills have in common that 
they impose international human rights duties on TNCs by only referring to the 
international treaties and conventions instead of tailoring specific duties and 
protection scopes to TNCs. Yet as these treaties and conventions are addressed 
to states rather than to private actors such as TNCs, the problem of the scope of 
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human rights duties for TNCs remains unresolved, especially with regards to 
positive duties of promoting and protecting human rights in the host state.563 
This issue cannot be resolved here,564 but it is important to note that the human 
rights duties of TNCs should be more specific in extraterritorially applicable 
laws and should not just be mere references to treaties and conventions dealing 
with state duties. Here, the already mentioned UN approaches could be of help 
for this task.565  
The described challenges faced by the Bills can be summarized as reproaches of 
imperialism, legal uncertainty and disrespecting sovereignty. As already seen 
earlier in this research these are typical challenges of human rights protection in 
the trans-border TNC context, especially when applying domestic laws 
extraterritorially. They will therefore be dealt with in a more generalized way in 
the following to find answers for more successful attempts in future. 
 
C Dealing with the challenges for future attempts 
To be able to make more successful attempts in future, the challenges of the 
reproaches of imperialism, legal uncertainty and disrespecting the sovereignty 
principle will be assessed now, followed by suggestions of how to deal with 
them in future cases of extraterritorial application of domestic human rights 
protection law. 
 
1 Understanding the challenges 
First of all the challenges - some of them have already been mentioned in the 
introductory chapter - will be described more closely within the context of 
public international law. 
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(a) Reproach of imperialism 
Related to the already sketched principles of sovereignty are reproaches of 
inferior treatment and disrespect when applying domestic law in or onto another 
state - it is claimed not only the sovereignty in this particular case concerning 
the foreign state’s territory is being disregarded, but the foreign state and its 
legal order and values are treated as inferior and are disrespected.566 This is a 
strong reminder of the reproaches of cultural and moral imperialism in the 
discussion on the universality of human rights.567 It has been pointed out that 
there have already been numerous extraterritorial applications of domestic law 
and that the imperialism reproach or rather the fear of the reproach is used as an 
excuse for not  controlling TNCs’ actions abroad.568 Although of course the fact 
that there have already been extraterritorial applications of domestic law does 
not mean they were in accordance with international public law or that there 
were no disputes or conflicts, it has to be taken into account that the host states 
are often too weak to control and enforce human rights compliance. In those 
cases home state law application concerning control and enforcement measures 
can be a means of cooperation rather than friction.569 
 
(b) Legal uncertainty 
As more than one state can be affected by the same situation570 and therefore 
claim authority over an issue,571 the applicable law may not always be clear. 
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Legal uncertainty may arise, because two states consider their laws applicable 
on the TNC subsidiary. It is not hard to imagine that home states expect  those 
within their territory to obey home state laws, including human rights protection 
laws, like environmental protection and labour law. The German Dismissal 
Protection Act572 for example is applicable on employees of subsidiaries of 
foreign companies in Germany, although organized as joint ventures by the 
foreign parent.573 Another example is the decision on Doc Morris pharmacies in 
Germany. German law requires that pharmacies are owned by pharmacists due 
to health protection - and therefore human rights - reasons. Foreign pharmacies 
operating in Germany via branches or subsidiaries have therefore to be owned 
by pharmacists as well.574 In the US branches and subsidiaries have to act in 
accordance with US federal and state law as well.575 The host states on the other 
hand expect the same from the subsidiaries on their territories and the TNC 
subsidiary cannot be sure which law it is supposed to obey. Different principles 
and standards might be applied by home and host states and the obedience of the 
one may even result in the violation of the other. This leads to legal 
uncertainties, for potential wrongdoers as well as for victims concerning the 
applicable law, legal decisions and law enforcement.576 In addition, even where 
it is clear which law is applicable, the law may be vague and cause a the fear of 
litigation.577 It seems that this issue cannot be solved as long as there are no 
accepted rules as to when and where domestic law of the home state is 
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applicable extraterritorially. Yet again one has to keep in mind that contradicting 
laws of host and home states will not exist very often as the same core human 
rights are broadly accepted and while host states may be unwilling or unable to 
control and enforce them, they are often not lacking the very human rights 
protection legislation. 
 
(c) Disrespecting the sovereignty principle 
The sovereignty principle is, as already mentioned above, an important principle 
of public international law. The prohibition of intervention is supposed to 
prevent states from affecting the internal affairs of another state by military 
force or other means of coercion and thereby protecting the sovereignty of any 
state.578 Applying domestic law on foreign cases within the territory of another 
state means interfering with the other state’s domestic law and its application. 
Not even the UN Charter allows the use of force to protect human rights outside 
one’s territory or jurisdiction.  In fact its original intent was “to forbid the use of 
force even to promote human rights or to install authentic democracy.”579 It is 
claimed that this original intent is still valid today and that international law 
cannot permit states to intervene “by force against the political independence 
and territorial integrity of another on the ground that human rights are being 
violated, as indeed they are everywhere.” 580  On the other hand it is rightly 
suggested that the prohibition of intervention and therefore sovereignty is not 
the overall principle to which all other principles and values have to be 
subordinated. It rather has to be read in context with the other principles and 
values of public international law. This approach reveals that 
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the norm of sovereignty itself is merely a part [of the values of contemporary 
international law], just like the prohibition of massive violation of human rights, 
genocide and crime against humanity are.581   
 
Yet as already pointed out above, in certain cases where there is a link between 
the facts of the case and the applying state, extraterritorial application of 
domestic law is accepted under public international law. The AUS Bill was, 
amongst other things, criticized for not providing for such a link as a 
precondition for the application of the law by including foreign holdings in its 
scope.582 However, the accepted linking factors for TNCs and home states are 
few in number and as all states are sovereign and they are basing their actions on 
this very quality, the “sovereignties” of two (or more) states may compete when 
internal affairs are affected. For this conflict public international law provides 
the limit up to which the action of a state is acceptable.583 Competing claims of 
sovereignty may for example occur in international commercial law concerning 
situations abroad a state wants to regulate such as anti-trust laws, merger control 
laws, tax laws and export control laws or as examined here human rights law. 
Similar to international environmental law these issues with their cross-border 
nature can only be effectively regulated by international cross-border or trans-
border legislation.584 Yet as such international trans-border legislation does not 
(yet) exist for human rights matters, all seems to come back to balancing the 
affected state sovereignties against one another. 
 
2 Approaches to tackle these challenges 
After having sketched the remaining difficulties of applying domestic law 
extraterritorially, possible approaches to solve them will be outlined in the 
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following section. These are a rather pragmatic approach, the shared values 
approach and the comity principle. 
 
(a)  Pragmatic approach 
As already explained above and mentioned again in connection with the possible 
conflict of sovereignty, a link or nexus between the facts of the case and the 
applying state, i.e. the home state, are of importance when applying law 
extraterritorially. When such a link exists it is not so much an interference with 
the other state’s sovereignty as the situations at issue are not absolutely 
foreign.585 Domestic legislation tackling these situations abroad could be 
considered to have extraterritorial effect rather than being “extraterritorial” to the 
core. However, despite such a link there can be conflicts between the home and 
the host state, especially where no broadly accepted link exists, as is the case for 
most situations when TNCs are acting abroad through incorporated subsidiaries. 
One solution to a conflict would be the consent of the host state concerning the 
application of home state law on the TNC subsidiary within its territory. Yet 
another solution to prevent legal uncertainty, the impression of imperial 
behaviour and disrespect of sovereignty is a “local law defence”. This means, 
although domestic home state law would be generally applicable to TNCs acting 
abroad and usually the higher human rights standard would be applied, conflicts 
caused in the rather rare cases of contradicting law could be solved by allowing 
the TNC to follow host state instead of home state law, where host state law 
explicitly contradicts home state law and a compliance with host state law leads 
to a breach of home state law.586 Yet the situation of explicitly contradicting 
legislation is rather the exception when it comes to the protection of human 
rights. Although there is an ongoing discussion on the issue of universalism or 
cultural relativism of “western” human rights and whether they emerged because 
of or despite “western” values and traditions, core human rights closely related 
to dignity can be considered global consensus and in cases of colliding cultural 
principles, a case by case examination seems more appropriate than denying the 
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general universalism of human rights and their protection.587 As grave 
contradictions are rather unlikely anyway, this approach seems workable and at 
the same time minimizes legal uncertainty as well as the appearances of 
imperialism and disrespecting the host state sovereignty. While it does not go 
beyond the accepted linking factors, it does provide for a local law defence, 
taking into account host state law as well as TNCs and their need for legal 
clarity and certainty. 
 
(b) Shared values approach 
A similar approach to the one just described above is the “shared values 
approach” originally suggested in international economic law.588 This approach 
was developed for courts to determine when they should consider mandatory 
foreign law, which is then applied extraterritorially, such as for example foreign 
bank secrecy law in US defence discovery orders.589 This means only those 
domestic rules are considered extraterritorially applicable that are based on 
shared values of both states. In such a case the (affected) sovereignty of the host 
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state should not be an obstacle to the application of the economic laws of the 
other state, yet this leaves problems to define the shared values and courts 
defining these shared values would have a wide discretion.590 Nevertheless, this 
approach could be transferred to the above mentioned shared universal core of 
human rights. Ius cogens,591 erga omnes592 rules593 and core human rights can be 
considered “shared values”. 594 Yet again the shared values of core human rights 
are the human rights obligations of states not of private actors. That is why not 
only the interest in the protection of core human rights has to be shared, but also 
the idea of protecting of human rights by TNCs. The more similar the ideas and 
domestic laws about the degree of human rights protection by TNCs are, the 
more evident are the shared values. Internationally developed standards such as 
the Draft Norms595 and the UN Guiding Principles596 vested with certain 
legitimacy due to their being drafted by a Sub-commission of the UN, the UN 
being almost an embodiment of global values that are shared,597 can be used. 
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They may help to define the shared values and provide a benchmark against 
which the values and national legislations can be assessed, at least once they are 
implemented by a majority of states598 and are shared values themselves. Yet the 
shared values approach does not only have to be transferred to human rights law 
to be applicable here, but also to legislation instead of court decisions. This 
means only those laws are applicable abroad and could be passed by home states 
for this purpose that are based on shared values of host and home state. In 
addition, the shared values approach would require that the home state interests 
are not “demonstrably inferior” to host state interests, otherwise home state law 
cannot be applied extraterritorially.599 Furthermore, a link between the facts of 
the case and the applying state must be given.600 Here the parallels to the 
pragmatic approach become evident: a link is needed and an exception for home 
state law application is given for certain cases. Yet this also shows the weakness 
of the approach, because home state interests could always be regarded as 
“demonstrably inferior” when the host state’s sovereignty is affected.601 
Nevertheless to a certain degree the shared values approach helps to determine 
the reasonableness of the use of home state law in the host state and may at least 
be used as a guideline when deciding on extraterritorial applicability of home 
state law. It creates the general rule of home state law applicability where shared 
values and a link exist, amended by an exemption clause where host state 
interests clearly outweigh home state interests. In addition, stressing the mutual 
principles and values as is automatically done when applying this approach, 
could even have a greater impact than just on the conflict in question.  
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(c)  The comity principle 
To tackle the problems caused by the extraterritorial application of domestic law 
the comity principle of public international law602 might help as well. The 
comity principle is a voluntary self-restraint in public international law that has 
been used in US American antitrust law.603 It derives from the non-interference -  
thus the sovereignty -  principle, 604 resulting in a balancing-of-interests test,605 
allowing the state with the greater interest in the issue to handle it.606 This 
voluntary restraint of a state’s own “right” on an international level always has607 
and still does derive from the changed or changing character of public 
international law, which is not only state coordination but also cooperation and 
this latter characteristic calls for broader considerations of interests of other 
states.608 This consideration is for example reflected in the way the interests are 
balanced according to the comity principle, as not only the particular state 
interests of the affected states at the moment of the conflict have to be 
considered, but the states involved also have to take into account the long-term 
consequences for the international system caused by the states’ own actions. 609  
However, it is not an easy approach, firstly because the comity principle is a 
voluntary self-restraint, therefore when domestic law is to be applied abroad and 
the sovereignty interests of two states have to be balanced, the host state would 
have to accept the comity principle and act according to it, otherwise it is of no 
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help. Secondly, difficulties remain because interests have to be assessed and 
benchmarks to be found, which allow for a certain degree of influence on 
another state whilst prohibiting intervention that jeopardizes the sovereign 
equality of states.610 The proportionality principle, which is a general principle of 
public international law in the sense of art. 38 (1) (c) Statute of the ICJ,611 is 
used to support the comity principle612 by confining the content of “domestic 
affairs” protected by the sovereignty principle individually in each case and 
thereby modifying the scope of exclusive regulation by one state.613 Yet it is no 
panacea either. Therefore although the comity principle may give some 
guidance as to how sovereignty conflicts may be solved, the dependence on state 
interests and proportionality only allows for case-by-case-decisions without 
noteworthy generalizable conditions. The traditional linking factors accepted for 
extraterritorial application of domestic law can be assumed to regularly 
outweigh the host state sovereignty claim where conflicts occur.614 Furthermore, 
although there cannot be general rules of precedence for further interests states 
may claim, the existing accepted linking factors can be used as a benchmark to 
assess and weigh these further state interests produced when balancing state 
interests according to the comity principle. As far as the above mentioned 
possible additional linking factor of parental control is concerned, the comity 
principle therefore only provides a mechanism for case-by-case decisions. 
However, when taking into account the long-term effects of the state’s actions 
for the international system according to the comity principle, international “soft 
law” instruments like the already mentioned UN approaches concerning TNC 
responsibility may be used as a guideline for universal standards, interests and 
aims of the international system. 
After all these considerations, one may conclude that in a given case the 
reproaches of imperialism and disrespect of sovereignty can be overcome by the 
mutual voluntary use of the comity principle by host and home state, as it 
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provides a tool for case-by-case decisions. Yet in general where there is 
contradicting law in host and home states, legal uncertainties for the parties 
involved, especially the TNCs, remain. The main advantage of the comity 
principle is therefore the ideas and benchmarks it is based on and uses, as they 
provide a general test for additional linking factors. In doing so it allows for 
links that go beyond the already accepted ones, which is important as most TNC 
subsidiaries are incorporated in the host state and the accepted linking factors 
therefore do not work. 
 
D Lessons from and outlook on extraterritorial application of domestic law 
Having assessed the possible ways to overcome the challenges faced by the bills 
mentioned above, it becomes clear that states could in fact act, yet they seem 
reluctant to do so. Therefore, after summarizing the findings of this chapter an 
outlook of further possible developments will be given in the following. 
 
1 Potential of  the approaches 
As promising as the pragmatic, shared values and comity principles approaches 
described above seem, they are no panaceas either and although they are 
minimizing the difficulties they are not completely solving the issues. Yet they 
can still help to solve possible conflicts. Together the approaches seem to 
complement one another: The comity principle may provide arguments and 
facilitate decisions on linking factors apart from the already accepted ones and 
the shared values approach may raise awareness that many states have many 
human rights principles and goals in common, thereby arranging for better 
relations between states on a bi- and multilateral basis while the pragmatic 
approach allows for specific solutions on the applicable law. Within all the 
approaches mentioned above international soft law instruments can also help, as 
they are providing a guideline for human rights duties of TNCs in accordance 
with public international law deriving from treaties and principles many states 
share and of course the more similar, i.e. harmonized and approximated 
domestic laws of the states affected are, the easier it is to apply them abroad in 
the other state. This is because the comity principle, shared values approach and 
pragmatic approach work best when at least the two states share mutual interests 
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and points of views on certain rights, principles and developments, as they are 
more likely to use the comity principle, apply the shared values approach or 
accept home state application with the exception clause of local law defence in 
such a case. And where the laws are more similar, the consequences of legal 
uncertainty and the impression of disrespecting the values of the other state are 
minimized. In addition, as far as human rights protection in cases of TNCs 
acting abroad is concerned, contradicting laws of home and host states will be 
the exception as in most cases similar human rights principles exist.615  
 
2 Possible future developments 
However, that the situation at the moment is not too supportive with regard to 
the extraterritorial application of domestic human rights protection law abroad 
does not mean that is has to stay this way. Especially because the discussion on 
expanding home state legislation is a vivid one and has increased during the last 
decade since the bills were introduced as can be seen from the quotes at the very 
beginning of the chapter. 
 
(a) Long-term development: further to full approximation 
It can be concluded from the examples and challenges just described that the 
most effective human rights protection in trans-border cases is given when host 
and home states agree on the same level of human rights protection and the same 
duty level of TNCs and their behaviour and the same enforcement mechanisms 
to pressure TNCs. However, as could also be seen, such general bilateral or 
international agreements will not be easy to reach.616 Yet it could also be seen 
that applying domestic law extraterritorially on a case-by-case basis seems to be 
a flexible solution, applicable already right now. As far as abstract domestic 
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laws dealing with TNC liability are concerned, it seems such laws could be 
passed already today, as long as they provide for the application of the comity 
principle, a balancing test, are taking into account linking factors and are based 
on shared values. These laws may not be applicable in all situations or vis-à-vis 
all states in the same way and acceptance and enforceability may remain 
difficult, but they have good chances to be applicable in many cases already 
today. Furthermore, even where they are not (fully) applicable, their mere 
existence may function as a catalyst for further developments of broader 
approximation and harmonization of human rights protection laws in cross- 
border cases, especially when TNCs are involved. Once this is the case, creating 
even broader domestic laws or binding international rules for TNCs will be 
easier. Yet whether and when such a development will take place cannot be 
predicted right now as too many small steps are still needed to even get close to 
such a situation. Therefore, the focus of home states has to be on the catalyst of 
domestic law. 
 
(b) Medium-term development: the new connecting factor of factual control 
Such domestic law could contribute to accepting a new linking factor. Whereas 
right now traditional connecting factors are still considered necessary to trigger 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, a comparison with other extraterritorial jurisdiction 
such as humanitarian law and international criminal law617 might shed some light 
on possible future developments of the topic of human rights protection in TNC 
cases.618 According to the Geneva Convention for example the traditional 
connecting factor of territorial or personal link is no longer needed to prosecute 
crimes committed by anyone, anywhere; it is replaced by the shared interests of 
the international community in preventing certain acts.619 As in human rights 
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law, universal values exist, as just mentioned, this “new wave” of extraterritorial 
application of national law is no longer purely based on national policy interests, 
but is also aiming for ensuring international goals.620 Several countries have for 
example at least extended their legislation concerning sex crimes and terrorist 
related activities committed by own citizens abroad. The prosecution of terrorist 
activity for example lead to the prosecution of the US incorporated company 
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. by US officials, because of the company’s 
subsidiaries’ cash payments to the illegal paramilitary group “Autodefensas 
Unidades de Colombia”, which had in turn provided “security services” to the 
company.621 Where commonly accepted shared principles and ideas are 
underlying such domestic law extensions, they are accepted more easily and 
may even be harmonized and developed further to advance extraterritorial 
application of domestic law. This leads to the conclusion that there is great 
potential in human rights law for similar changes and developments and it is up 
to the states how and when these changes may occur. Until this point is reached 
it should be kept in mind that compliance with extraterritorial obligations 
requires cooperation on the “closely interwoven” unilateral, bi- and multilateral 
levels622 and that developments on bi-and multilateral levels might lead to new 
non-binding instruments as well as international treaties etc. This once more 
shows the flexibility and viability of public international law. 
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(c) Short-term development:  maxing the potential of the link 
Even easier than establishing a new linking factor may be another - more 
innovative - way to go. This approach is also using the linking factor of factual 
control between the home state and the TNC subsidiary acting abroad, but by 
pressuring the parent company instead of openly and directly applying domestic 
law extraterritorially.623 This is similar to the just mentioned extension of 
liability of own citizens for example in the above mentioned Chiquita case. The 
interim solution until the link of factual control is more commonly recognized 
could be to apply home state law more broadly on the parent for aiding and 
abetting human rights violations by its subsidiary abroad or for neglecting its 
duty of care, especially when the parent has signed non-binding “soft law” 
codes.624 This way the subsidiary is pressured indirectly via the parent company 
to obey the home state human rights protection standards and by in fact 
“piercing the corporate veil”. This is not so far fetched, as in most cases parent 
companies have managerial and financial influence on their subsidiaries, for 
example by owing them (partially).625 In fact, this kind of indirect pressure on 
subsidiaries is more likely to actually happen within the next decade than 
accepting the additional linking factor of factual control in such an abstract way 
as considered above. This was for example also the line of argumentation in the 
Nestlé case already mentioned in introductory chapter where an NGO accused 
the parent company in Switzerland of negligence concerning the killing of a 
trade unionist, because Nestlé knew of his highly risky situation and had major 
influence on its subsidiary, but did not intervene. This was based amongst other 
things on the OECD Risk Awareness Tool as a benchmark for the TNC’s due 
diligence.626 The Tool was developed as an international standard already since 
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2000,627 which means it is the result of international discussion and 
development. Home states could easily contribute to the effective prosecution of 
such human rights violations for example by making the non-binding OECD 
Guidelines628 and Tool explicitly binding rules for home state TNCs.629 In doing 
so, due diligence  would be defined more precisely in a binding way for TNCs 
and negligence, omissions, etc could be proven more easily. 
 
Another way of using the link between parent and subsidiary on a case-by-case 
basis instead of abstract domestic law rules is including special human rights 
provisions in bilateral treaties. As far as TNCs working abroad are concerned it 
could be of help to include human rights clauses in BITs with host states, 
because these treaties are particularly restricted to the one foreign investment in 
question. As it seems rather unlikely, however, that the home state will simply 
call back its investment, i.e. the TNC subsidiary, when human rights violations 
occur, the treaties should contain choice of law and choice of forum clauses in 
favour of the home state forum and home state law to decide on human rights 
violation claims. In order to let the host state deal with its own matters first, the 
clause could contain time-limits in which the host state may solve the issue in its 
own courts using its own law before the home state is automatically taking over 
the case. Yet to prevent any undue delays, the time-limits have to be explicit, 
providing the limit in years and months without using any vague terms or 
expressions. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
This chapter revealed the flexibility of home state legislation when dealing with 
the TNC and human rights issue. However, it also showed that the current 
developments are not overwhelmingly promising when it comes to broadening 
extraterritorial application or effects of domestic home state law. 
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As far as the question of the forum is concerned, it could be seen that the forum 
rules are not definite, but can be altered and additional linking factors such as 
the factual control of the parent over the subsidiary may be created. Even laws 
providing for special actions such as ATCA or the Belgian law may be passed in 
order to create a forum for certain cases and so could legislation allowing 
foreign victims to sue the parent company in the home state forum. Factual 
control as a factor to facilitate attribution of subsidiary action to the home state 
parent could be an acceptable way to go for tort law. Yet at the moment with the 
Kiobel decision in the US and Regulation 44 /2001 also binding the UK, there 
seems to be a movement towards restricting the forum rather than broadening 
the admissibility of cases that occur abroad, including those involving TNC 
action. Criminal law approaches are not likely to go beyond the already existing 
links due to the stronger need for legal certainty and predictability. Yet the idea 
of universal jurisdiction at least for ius cogens violations by TNCs could be a 
state option to be taken, especially because the diplomatic tensions that might 
arise are far less than when suing state officials from the host state and even this 
has been done before.  
As far as suing host states and host states officials are concerned, immunity is 
the limit provided for by international law, yet nation states may still create 
legislation for universal jurisdiction in cases of ius cogens. However, this 
approach seems to be diminishing rather than growing as well, at least as far as 
states are concerned that made broad use of universal jurisdiction of ius cogens 
violations like Belgium and Spain. 
With regard to the application of domestic home state law and the creation of 
such law, the examples evidenced that it might have been too early to convert 
into abstract law what is already possible on a case-by-case basis as mentioned 
in the examples on parent liability above. Yet this also means that the case law 
could help to achieve some change in common as well as civil law countries, 
easing the path for the acceptance of factual control as an additional link and 
even for accordant legislation within the next couple of decades if a sufficient 
number of cases is to be decided. In any case, home states have to become 
braver when passing laws, whether they deal with abstract rules on 
extraterritorial application of domestic law or with rules of complicity and 
responsibility of the parent company within their own territory. The most 
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promising way to go is holding the parent liable, whether by extraterritorial 
applicable law like the UK Bill intended to or by maxing the potential of the 
link, using existing law. The extraterritorial effects when holding the parent 
liable are only of factual nature, therefore the usual reproaches are minimized,630 
while enforcement of judgements is facilitated, because they are enforceable in 
the home state and no host state cooperation is needed. 
So it seems to be a matter of political will rather than legal options that TNC 
(parent) liability under domestic home state law is not broadened. 
                                                 
630
 The German government for example expressed its fear that trade could be impeded by 
claims under ATCA against German corporations Daimler and Rheinmetall for human rights 
violations during the Apartheid Regime in South Africa, see Judith Raupp, ”Streit um 
Gerichtshoheit“ SZ  (13 March 2010) <http://newsticker.sueddeutsche.de/list/id/959668 > 1 
May 2014; on ideas how to solve contradicting laws of host and home state see Michael 
Ratner, “Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations” David Barnhizer (ed), Effective 
Strategies for Protecting Human Rights (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 
249, suggesting salvation clauses and diplomatic means. 
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CHAPTER III: POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO HOLD TNCS LIABLE  
 
As just seen domestic law solutions that could cover trans-border cases of TNCs 
harming or affecting human rights abroad are not easy to create, in particular 
because the role of TNCs does not seem to be defined yet: neither are they state-
like nor are they equal to private individuals. That is why using public 
international human rights law directly could be a more promising option, given 
that public international law provides for some sort oft TNC liability. This very 
issue will be assessed in the following, before sketching the use of public 
international law before domestic courts and international tribunals and having a 
look at the alternative option of holding the host state liable. 
 
V PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TNC LIABILITY - A GENERAL SURVEY 
To understand the current approach of public international law towards TNC 
liability it is important to have a look at public international human rights law in 
a more general way and to envision its role and intentions before moving on and 
assessing current developments. 
 
A Primary Role of human rights 
As flexible as human rights are, it is important to keep in mind that their origin 
is the protection of the individual against state interference and that therefore 
states are the primary addressees of human rights protection duties, as already 
mentioned in the introductory chapter. 
 
1 Protection of the individual against state intervention 
States were the original addressees of human rights protection.631 They were 
undoubtedly the most powerful entities, causing the biggest threat to individual 
                                                 
631
 See for example Sarah Joseph, “An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of 
Multinational Enterprises” in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds), Liability of 
Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000), 75. 
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human rights when human rights were first written down.632 This could, for 
example, appallingly be seen in Nazi Germany. Therefore, first of all human 
rights were meant to protect individuals against the state.633 Human rights were 
granted, so the state must not interfere with those rights nor may it violate them. 
Even individual liability for human rights violations was developed after World 
War II, but smaller in scope, restricted to international criminal law.634 Freedom 
from state actors and state control and interference was sought by the writing 
down of human rights. However, power and factual roles of states have changed 
over time; there are new threats to human rights now by new actors as already 
sketched above. One kind of the new actors are TNCs and the question remains 
whether and how human rights obligations can be imposed on these new actors.  
 
2 Protection by the state against violations by private actors 
In addition to the dimension of non-interference and non-violation by the state 
itself, there is also another dimension to human rights, another duty of the states 
apart from non-interference with and respect for human rights. This additional 
dimension is the state duty to protect human rights and is considered to cover 
not only protection against violations by the state itself, but also by non-state 
actors.635 This duty is explicitly mentioned in the UN Human Rights General 
Comment No 31 [80].636 Yet although the UN has formulated its view in clear 
terms, not all states share this opinion. The US for example only acknowledge 
the state duty to protect its citizens from invasion by private actors in very 
limited cases.637 So although there is a strong opinion in favour of such state 
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 See also John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights” (2008) 102 AJIL 1, 18-9. 
633
 See for example David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of 
Human Rights Responsibility for Corporations at International Law” (2004) 44 VA J. Int. Law  
931, 937. 
634
 See for example John H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights” (2008) 102 AJIL 1, 27-32. 
635
 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/17/31, (21 March 2011) <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf> 1 May 
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636UN General Comment No. 31 [80]: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), in particular par. 8. 
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 Jean-Marie Kamatali, “The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ 
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protection duties, basing future developments on it is ambitious. Nevertheless, 
as this enquiry deals with all sorts of state options and as there are strong 
defendants of this view, the ideas, views and developments acknowledging such 
a duty will not be left aside, but described in the following. 
 
Explicit examples of state responsibilities to protect human rights from 
violations of private actors can, for example, be found in the General Comments 
on the Convention of the Rights of the Child,638 which states that the Convention 
creates indirect obligations on private actors by imposing obligations on the 
states to ensure that non-state providers, including businesses, operate in 
accordance with the provisions.639 In addition, the CESCR stressed state duties 
with regards to the private business sector concerning the right to food.640 In 
regional developments, for example in the American Convention on Human 
Rights641 and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights642 there are 
special references to private threats to human rights643 and the Inter-American 
Commission has made clear that governments must prevent acts of violence 
whether committed by public officials or private individuals.644 This duty of 
“due diligence” to protect against non-state human rights abuses includes the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Companies: Is it Time for an ICJ Advisory Opinion?” (2012) 20 Cardozo J. of Int’l & Comp. 
L. 437, 446 wfr.  
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639
 Karin Lucke, “States’ and Private Actors’ Obligations under International Human Rights 
Law and the Draft UN Norms” in Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Bürgi 
Bonanomi (eds), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) 148, 155. 
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E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999). 
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 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (1969). 
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118. 
644
 Ibid. at 119. 
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protection against abuses by businesses.645 In Velásquez Rodriguez v 
Honduras646 for example the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that 
[t]he first obligation assumed by the States Parties under Article 1( 1 ) [of the 
American Convention on Human Rights] is " to respect the rights and freedoms " 
recognized by the Convention. The exercise of public authority has certain limits 
which derive from the fact that human rights are inherent attributes of human dignity 
and are, therefore, superior to the power of the State […]  The second obligation of the 
States Parties is to " ensure " the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the 
Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty 
of the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the 
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of 
juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of 
this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the 
rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the 
right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the 
violation. The obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights is not 
fulfilled by the existence of a legal system designed to make it possible to comply with 
this obligation - it also requires the government to conduct itself so as to effectively 
ensure the free and full exercise of human rights.  
 
The UN Human Rights Committee also stressed the state obligation to 
appropriately prevent and effectively investigate disappearances and killings 
under art. 6 ICCPR647 and the ECtHR ruled similarly for example in Timurtaş v 
Turkey648 and Ergi v Turkey.649 
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 Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 entitled 
“Human Rights Council”, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
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 Herrera Rubio v Colombia, Communication No. 161/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
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All this reflects the broad obligation of states concerning the protection of 
human rights at least within their own jurisdictions.650 Generally speaking, 
private actors do not have such a duty. Rather they are indirectly bound by the 
domestic law a state passes to fulfil its human rights protection duties.651 
 
B Developments in the field of human rights and TNCs 
However, the distinction between direct or state duties to protect human rights 
against violations by any kind of actors and the - under public international law -  
indirect duties for non-state actors to respect domestic human rights law is not 
an irrevocable one. Today it is claimed not only states bear obligations deriving 
from public international law any longer but also non-state actors, especially 
individuals and also TNCs.652 Ruggie even stressed that TNC duties and state 
duties are not defined as much by one another as it often seems when explaining 
that  
[t]he corporate responsibility to respect [human rights] exists independently of States’ 
duties. Therefore, there is no need for the slippery distinction between “primary” State 
and “secondary” corporate obligations - which in any event would invite endless 
strategic gaming on the ground about who is responsible for what.653 
  
He goes on pointing out that 
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influence [as in the term “sphere of influence”] can only be defined in relation to 
someone or something. Consequently, it is itself subject to influence: a government 
can deliberately fail to perform its duties in the hope or expectation that a company 
will yield to social pressures to promote or fulfil certain rights - again demonstrating 
why State duties and corporate responsibilities must be defined independently of one 
another.654 
 
The developments of human rights responsibilities for private actors and their 
protection duties will be sketched in the following. 
 
1 Human Rights and individuals as private actors 
There has been a development towards more human rights obligations also for 
private actors. As individuals have already been there long before TNCs have, 
the development towards human rights obligations is more apparent in this area. 
 
The ICJ made clear in 1949 that neither all subjects nor all legal personalities of 
international law have to bear the same rights and acknowledged legal 
personality for entities other than states.655 In addition, although it was long held 
that only states are international legal persons656 and that individuals and other 
private actors were mere objects in public international law, this perception has 
changed over the years. Individuals are bearing rights and responsibilities under 
public international law,657 for example with regard to slavery, piracy and 
genocide as could be seen for example in the Nuremberg Trials and the 1998 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.658 There is a consensus that 
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the status of the individual has moved from being a mere object to becoming a 
subject of international law - “a subject whose rights are different and lesser, but 
a subject nonetheless.”659 This is perfectly in line with the just mentioned 
decision of the ICJ on the different possible scopes of legal personalities and 
subjects to international law. 
In addition, international conventions and declarations contain duties for private 
actors to protect human rights. The Universal Declaration660 for example 
directly refers to private actors and implies human rights duties on them661 when 
providing in art. 30: 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.662 
 
This wording is also used in art. 5 (1.) of ICCPR663 and ICESC664 and is even 
supplemented by banning any limitations of the rights described that goes 
beyond those provided for in the document. Another example is the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child665 which expresses individual duties in art. 3.666 In 
CEDAW667 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination668 the responsibility of non-state actors is also recognized,669 but 
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only indirectly by imposing obligations on states to enact adequate legislation to 
protect individuals from violations by non-state actors.  
 
2  Human Rights and TNCs 
TNCs like individuals are part of the group of non-state actors, which is very 
diverse and far from homogeneous.670 As TNCs are relatively new actors on the 
international stage, new answers have to be found, because, as was stressed in a 
UN report:  
Of importance also is the fact that even though each TNC subsidiary is, in principle, 
subject to its host country’s regulations, the TNC as a whole is not fully accountable to 
any single country.  The same is true for responsibilities they fail to assume for 
activities of their subsidiaries and affiliates.  The global reach of TNCs is not matched 
by a coherent global system of accountability.671 
 
(a) Development of Voluntary Instruments 
As states were hesitant to imply binding duties on these new non-state actors, a 
wide range of voluntary law instruments have been developed over time. One of 
the more specific and most recent is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in 
Bangladesh which was already mentioned in the introductory chapter. The 
following section will focus on more general instruments. Since four decades 
there have been ideas of imposing voluntary or non-binding human rights rules. 
In addition to those rules and guidelines of international organisations sketched 
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below, a number of voluntary codes of conduct adopted by TNCs exist,672 
created by businesses themselves, NGOs, trade unions etc,673 which show that 
human rights and their protection are not alien to TNCs in general.  
 
(i) Draft Code of Conduct 
In the 1970s a Group of Eminent Persons gathered to study the role of MNEs on 
development and international relations and recommended setting up a UN 
Commission on Multinational Corporations and a UN Centre on Multinational 
Corporations to oversee and develop UN policy in this area. This led to the 
emergence of UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations), 
renamed in 1992 as TCMD (Transnational Corporations and Management 
Division), which is today part of the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development), founded to accelerate the New International Economic 
Order, which basically means giving more weight to interests of developing 
countries. An internationally agreed code of conduct which should back up 
national regulations to control abuses of TNCs in developing countries should 
be developed.674 A Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations was 
prepared by the UNCTC by 1992, but has failed to be adopted due to 
disagreements between industrialized and developing countries, in particular 
regarding the reference to international law and the inclusion of treatment 
standards for TNCs.675 
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(ii) OECD Guidelines 
The OECD Guidelines676 emerged from the same difficulties and disagreements 
between developing and developed states in the 1970s, when the “Group of 77” 
(developing) countries insisted on permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources and the developed countries feared restrictions for foreign investors - 
so the OECD adopted the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which have 
repeatedly been revised, to give some security to developing states and the 
independence of their political processes from MNE interference.677 The 
Guidelines are rules for TNCs which they are asked to adopt and obey by the 
member states. To give more weight to the human rights obligations of the 
TNCs, the OECD Guidelines impose a duty on the states to set up National 
Contact Points to promote the Guidelines.678  
 
(iii) Tripartite Declaration 
In addition, in 2000 the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy was adopted by the ILO,679 going 
even further than the OECD Guidelines in stating that even where certain core 
ILO instruments have not been ratified by the host State, they nevertheless 
should be “referred to” by these investors “for guidance in their social policy”.680 
Yet the Declaration is only a non-binding instrument, although the governments 
are to report quadriennially to the Governing Body681 and legal interpretation of 
the Declaration can be asked for.682 There is a specific reference to human rights 
as set down in the Universal Declaration and the corresponding international 
Covenants adopted by the General Assembly.683 However, both instruments, the 
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OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration are voluntary684 and non-binding and 
where they establish the obligation to create Contact Points or refer to 
Conventions they impose direct duties on the states rather than TNCs.685 
 
(iv) UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact,686 an initiative of 1999, voluntarily and based on 
shared values in the areas of human rights, labour and environment, gave the 
discussions about TNCs and their responsibility further momentum.687  It asked 
for support and respect of human rights by TNCs within their “sphere of 
influence”.688 The “sphere of influence” approach is linked to the three 
dimensions of human rights obligations to respect, protect and promote human 
rights689 mentioned above. In addition, the Global Compact uses the complicity 
concept of corporations contributing to someone else’s illegal acts690 by direct 
complicity, beneficial complicity and silent complicity.691 To avoid the latter 
form of complicity corporations need to raise human rights issues with 
governments.692  
 
(v) UN Draft Norms 
In 2003 the UN Sub- Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights693  drafted the Norms of Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
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and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (Draft Norms).694 
These Norms are not creating new binding rules,695 but are rather referring to 
already existing international guidelines696 like the Universal Declaration, the 
OECD Guidelines and the Tripartite Declaration. They are a restatement of 
international principles applicable to companies rather than a radically new 
approach, deriving their authority from their sources in treaties and customary 
international law.697 The Draft Norms contain the sphere of influence approach698 
as well as the concept of complicity by imposing direct obligations on TNCs. 
Generally speaking this means that TNCs which let human rights violations by 
others happen in their sphere of influence and know of it or could have known 
of it and do not end it, are responsible for these violations. Yet the Draft Norms 
are -  as their very name suggests - only a blueprint and have not been 
commonly accepted so far.699 
 
(vi) UN Guiding Principles/ UN Framework 
As the Draft Norms were not generally accepted, because governments and 
businesses hesitated to impose the same range of human rights duties on 
businesses than states held, a mandate for a Special Representative on the issue 
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Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Right: the International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rules 
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of Human Rights and businesses was established in 2005.700 John Ruggie held 
the office until 2011 and developed the UN Guiding Principles with the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (UN Framework) in a research-
based and consultative manner, engaging all stakeholder groups, which led to a 
widespread positive reception of the UN Framework.701 As explained in 
Ruggie’s final report 
[t]he Framework rests on three pillars. The first is the State duty to protect against 
 human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through 
appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should 
act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address 
adverse impacts with which they are involved. The third is the need for greater access 
by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. Each pillar is an 
essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and 
remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the 
international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is 
the basic expectation society has of business in relation to human rights; and access to 
remedy because even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.702 
 
The Guiding Principles do not create new or confine traditional international 
law obligations,703 but are a “common global platform for action, on which 
cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any other 
promising longer-term developments.”704 The Guiding Principles with the UN 
Framework are an important means in accelerating further developments, 
because they are a point of concentration and information at the same time and 
they are clearly stating that businesses do have human rights responsibilities and 
that these are independent of the human rights duties states may have.705 
 
                                                 
700
 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/17/31, (21 March 2011) <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf> 1 May 
2014, par. 2-f of the report. 
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 Ibid. at par. 3 and 8-10. 
702
 Ibid. at par 6. 
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 Ibid. at Annex: General principles of the Guiding Principles. 
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 Ibid. at par. 13 of the report. 
705
 See ibid., principle 11. 
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(vii) ISO 26000 
Another set of voluntary rules for social responsibility is the ISO 26000 from 
2010, launched by the International Organization for Standardization. Unlike the 
ISO management system standards it is not certifiable, instead it is supposed to 
offer guidance for all kinds of organizations.706 The beginning of clause 4.8 
reads: “Respect for human rights - The principle is: an organization should 
respect human rights and recognize both their importance and their 
universality”,707 more guidance on human rights contains clause 6.3, referring to 
the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESC and their optional 
protocols as well as the seven other UN human rights Conventions.708 The User 
Guide summarizes that “enterprises should consider their activities and efforts to 
avoid complicity in the violation of human rights. Moreover, enterprises should 
inform themselves about the social and environmental conditions under which 
purchased goods are produced”709 
 
(viii) EU CSR 
Since 2001710 the EU is also working on promoting corporate social 
responsibility, the latest step being the renewed EU strategy 2011-2014 
from 2011.711 It is based on the “global framework for CSR”712 consisting 
of the 
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Standardisation, NORMAPME User Guide for European SMEs on ISO 26000 (1st ed, 2011) 
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ten principles of the United 
Nations Global Compact, the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility, 
the ILO Tri-partite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights.713 
 
The improvements will be jointly monitored by the Commission and all 
stakeholders,714 yet the lead in implementing the rules is to be taken by the 
businesses, while “public authorities should play a supporting role”.715 
 
(ix) Valuing the Voluntary instruments 
All these instruments show once more that there is a need for rules applicable to 
TNCs. The soft law instruments are valuable, do make a difference and have 
risen awareness for TNCs as well as for politicians and the public concerning 
human rights in a globalized world and are therefore an important contribution 
to global human rights protection. In addition, they can set the pattern for the 
content and substance of  binding rules to come. Yet despite all these ideas and 
efforts, human rights have been and are still being violated by TNCs as 
mentioned earlier in this research. One reason might be that only the large 
companies with well-known brands will feel the need to comply when under 
consumer pressure.716 Yet as already mentioned also large and well-known 
companies like Nestlé are accused of human rights violations by NGOs. 
Therefore, in order to provide better protection for human rights the status quo 
has to change. The legal status and lack of direct human rights protection 
obligations of TNCs still seem to mismatch their factual role and influence. To 
achieve some change, the statement “[h]ow to comply is a management 
question; whether to comply is a legal one”717 has to be taken seriously, which is 
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 Ibid. at par. 5. 
715
 Ibid. at par. 3.4. 
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 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 183 wfr. 
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 Julie Campagna, “United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Right: the International 
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difficult when the rules and codes providing human rights protection duties 
remain voluntary and non-binding. 
 
(b) Developments concerning the legal status of TNCs 
TNCs as the new actors are challenging public international and human rights 
law, the latter being an inseparable part of the former.718 The traditional 
perceptions of human rights and public international law are changing when 
dealing with this challenge. To assess whether a person or entity has legal 
personality, the rights and duties it bears can be of help, because being a legal 
person means bearing rights and duties derived from international law.719 Yet, of 
course, circular reasoning720 should be avoided. Using the ICJ and ICC 
statements on private actors, TNCs can be assessed in this light, although this is 
a rather hypothetical assessment and caution is advised when generalizing the 
ICJ and ICC decisions and the developments they triggered.  
 
TNCs bear obligations deriving from international law as well as they are for 
example721 liable under the art. 9 Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment Through Criminal Law,722 the Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism,723 the Security Council Resolution 1373724 and - the 
most far reaching - under the Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and 
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 August Reinisch, “The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-
State Actors” in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: University 
Press, 2005) 37, 42. 
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 Dapo Akande, “International Organizations” in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 269, 272-3; Robert McCorquodale, “The Individual 
and the International Legal System” in ibid. 300, 301, referring for example to the 
international legal personality of the UN discussed in Reparations for Injuries suffered in the 
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Twenty-First Century” (2008) 14 Buff. HRL Rev. 129, 172. 
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(1998). 
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the Control of Transboundary Wastes within Africa, which according to art. 9 
(2.) in connection with art. 1 (16.) obliges governments to impose criminal 
penalties not only on natural persons but also on legal persons.725 Furthermore, it 
is claimed that they bear duties under the ECHR due to the horizontal effect or 
Drittwirkung of the Convention, necessary for its effective implementation.726 
TNCs can also even take part in international arbitration as the International 
Arbitration Tribunal found in 1978727 and file individual complaints under the 
ECHR according to its art. 34.728 All these provisions addressing corporate 
behaviour are much more than what was there at the time of the Nuremberg 
trials for individual liability and yet it was still acknowledged to exist729 and 
strengthened the acceptance of individuals as subjects to public international 
law.730 However, as the ICC does not have jurisdiction over “juridical persons” 
the possibility for TNCs to slowly achieve recognized legal personality in this 
way is not provided. Yet it is argued that although not companies but individuals 
where tried, international criminal liability of corporations was already 
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 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
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 David J. Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Colin Warbrick, The Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995) 19-22; see also Willem van 
Genugten, “The Status of Transnational Corporations in International Public Law” Asbjørn 
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Basel: Helbing Liechtenhahn, 2008) 257. 
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 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 251. 
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 See for the development for example Malcolm Shaw, International Law (4th ed, 
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acknowledged in the Nuremberg Trials Krupp731 and Farben,732 because the 
court applied the idea of corporate responsibility by referring to the tried 
conduct as the conduct of the corporation as such and only in a second step 
determined the guilt of the individual by assessing the individual’s knowledge of 
this conduct.733 There even seems to be a growing acceptance for the concept of 
criminal responsibility of corporations in domestic and international law 
today.734 Similar developments concerning liability and legal personality are 
taking place in different legal systems and an international consensus might be 
reached some day. In addition, it is also pointed out that the terms “any person” 
or “any individual” in the UN Conventions also include juridical persons and 
therefore TNCs.735 Furthermore, direct obligations for businesses to respect 
human rights are accepted by the UN Guiding Principles for  
at a minimum [those internationally recognized human rights] expressed in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights 
set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work.736  
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(1999) 25 Brooklyn J. of Int’l L.17, 25. 
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 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, 
A/HRC/17/31, (21 March 2011) <http://www.business-
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Yet as already mentioned above, the UN Guiding Principles are a mere non-
binding “soft law” instrument and do not intend to change the legal status of 
businesses in public international law.737 
 
For all the above mentioned reasons it is therefore claimed that TNCs are not 
legal persons of public international law in general. Their obligations under 
public international law are fragmented and rather specific. This becomes clear 
when, for example, considering that TNCs are criminally liable for their 
complicity in oil spills and under European law for anti-competitive behaviour, 
but not for complicity in slavery or genocide.738 The duties imposed on TNCs, 
like the ones mentioned above, remain sui generis,739 and although they can be 
considered indicators of international legal personality and even create 
international legal personality for particular purposes, they are not strong 
enough (yet) to create a general one.740 
 
VI TNC LIABILITY UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS 
As mentioned above, once the forum and the applicable law - in terms of which 
state’s law is applicable - are identified, the applicable law before domestic 
courts does not necessarily have to be domestic law. The applicable domestic 
law may also refer to international law. Therefore some courts also use 
international law to decide cases involving TNCs and human rights. An 
advantage when using international law is that it is more likely that there is a 
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consensus about the law and that the jurisdiction and judgements are therefore 
also accepted in foreign states, for example the host states.741 Again, these 
proceedings may involve TNCs or, because international law is applicable, 
states as parties and tort as well as criminal law may be used. 
As the TNCs are the ones violating human rights, they may be parties of the 
proceedings before domestic courts either under tort law as for example under 
ATCA in the US or under criminal law like in Belgium, Spain, France and the 
Netherlands. 
 
A Tort law (ATCA) 
As sketched above, TNCs have no general personality under public international 
law and bear no general international duties to protect human rights. Yet as set 
out above, there are reasons supporting the applicability of international 
standards and duties on corporations and nation states may impose this liability 
by according domestic law. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) is such a 
domestic law.742  
The ATCA743 was passed in 1789, but was not used very often until 1980 when a 
court decided in Filártiga v Pena-Irala744 that ATCA allows for private suits and 
customary international law of today may be applied on individuals.745 In Kadic 
v Karadžić746 it was further explained that no state action is needed for liability 
under ATCA, but private individuals could be liable for breaches of the “law of 
nations”, given of course that the respective crime can be committed by a private 
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person alone at all.747 From there it did not take long until corporations were held 
liable under ATCA. The first case against a TNC was Doe v Unocal748 in 1997. 
The defendant in this case was the US Union Oil Company of California 
(“Unocal”) which had a subsidiary in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, that 
was building a gas pipeline, using Myanmar military as security forces to 
control the area. While doing so, human rights violations occured. This case is 
linked to the Total case mentioned above, as Total and Unocal were both 
working on building the Yadana gas pipeline in Myanmar. The allegations were 
very similar. They included death of family members, torture, rape, assault, 
forced labour and the loss of homes and property. Although the case was 
dismissed later, the reasoning is of importance as corporations as private actors 
liable for violations of  ius cogens were generally accepted by the court and 
since then many similar cases were brought before US courts.749 The first 
Supreme Court decision on the new use of ATCA was Sosa v Alvarez-Machain750 
and it supported the new application.751 The case was about the US, hiring 
Mexican nationals to capture the Mexican national Alvarez-Machain in Mexico 
to bring him to the US because he was involved in the kidnapping, torture and 
murder of a US special agent and Mexico refused to extradite him. Alvarez-
Machain filed suit against the US under ATCA and although the case was 
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dismissed, because the “law of nations” was not found to be violated in the case, 
the Supreme Court decided that private actors of foreign nationality acting 
abroad could indeed be held liable under ATCA. So now ATCA is used to allow 
for private claims of aliens before US courts against state and private actors in 
cases of violations of the “law of nations” that occurred abroad. Yet as already 
seen above, cases are not admitted easily.752 Concerning the forum non 
conveniens test there has to be some kind of link with the US753 and a further 
requirement for admissibility in ATCA cases is the violation of the “law of 
nations”. Defining the breach of the “law of nations” by a corporation can be 
difficult in three ways - defining the “law of nations”,754 the degree of action or 
omission necessary for a breach and defining the actor able to commit this 
breach. 
“Law of nations” is generally considered to be ius cogens755 or customary 
international law,756 which means the prohibition violated must “rest on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized”.757 Yet the Supreme Court gave little advice on the exact specificity 
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or universality required.758 What can be derived from the decision is that ATCA 
is not a tool to provide broad human rights protection as it has to be interpreted 
narrowly, confined to only the gravest violations, accepted among all states. It 
cannot provide progressively new causes of action nor is the violation of any 
human rights Convention or treaty sufficient to be considered a breach of the 
law of nations.759 Heil for further definition of the term “law of nations” points 
out that the US Congress and courts  have made clear that for example  
torture, extrajudicial killings, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary 
detention, war crimes, physical and cultural destruction of peoples, systematic 
violations of human rights and environmental harms are to be covered under the 
ATCA as violations of the law of nations.760 
Concerning the required degree of involvement of a private actor in the violation 
of international law Judge Sprizzo concluded according to the restrictive use of 
the aiding and abetting liability demanded for by the Supreme Court in Sosa and 
the District court’s Flores v Southern Peru Copper761 that aiding and abetting a 
violation of the law of nations was not sufficient to constitute such a violation in 
itself.762 Yet some authors do not agree with this restrictive approach.763 
Furthermore, as already stated above, parent and subsidiary are considered 
separate legal entities, therefore it is often difficult to hold the parent liable 
under current law. This could for example be seen in 2010 in Bowoto v. Chevron 
Corp.764, dealing with the killing of protestors of Chevron Nigerian Limited 
(CNL) in Nigeria by Nigerian Government Security Forces called by the CNL. 
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The issue of parent liability was raised but a jury finally decided that Chevron 
was not liable, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.765 
 
As mentioned above, individuals and corporations have already been held liable 
under ATCA. Yet as far as the actor able to commit the breach is concerned it 
should be noted that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in 
September 2010 in Kiobel766 that ATCA was only applicable to individuals, but 
not to corporations.767 The defendants argued that corporations are not broadly 
accepted as possible violators of the law of nations under the very law of 
nations. The Supreme Court was expected to decide this very issue and to 
determine whether corporations can still be held liable under ATCA in future. 
Yet, as already mentioned above, the Supreme Court did not even get to assess 
the issue of corporate liability under ATCA, respectively the law of nations when 
deciding the case.768 It affirmed the judgement of the Second Circuit Court of 
appeals by arguing that ATCA was not applicable to extraterritorial cases with no 
further link to the US than corporate presence. The Supreme Court stressed that 
all parties and relevant conduct had no sufficient ties to the US, dismissing the 
case according to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
So while Sosa restricted the interpretation of the “law of nations”, Kiobel 
restricted the applicability of ATCA on foreign cases. Developments in the “law 
of nations” however might be able to once more broaden the application of 
ATCA. Over time more practices and human rights violations could become ius 
cogens and also more linking factors such as factual control or sphere of 
influence between parent and subsidiary could become internationally accepted, 
thereby shaping the law of nations and possibly causing a less restrictive use of 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. For the time being, however, the 
applicability of ATCA in cases involving TNCs has decreased. Yet, as already 
mentioned above when explaining the US approach to the forum non conveniens 
docrtrine,  also before Kiobel the different lower federal courts had been at odds 
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as to how ATCA has to be applied and when a case should be admitted,769 i.e. 
ATCA has never been an easily applicable remedy on foreign cases. However, 
the numerous ATCA claims showed and still show that there is a demand for 
remedies like ATCA. So - while restricted - ATCA is still one of the few existing 
ways to actually hold TNCs liable for wrongs committed abroad either by suing 
the subsidiary (sufficiently) linked to the US itself or the parent that neglected 
its duties vis-á-vis the subsidiary. ATCA is sometimes even presented as the only 
gleam of hope, especially where human rights violations of TNCs are 
concerned, because on the one hand in those cases immunity rules like the Act 
of State doctrine are not applicable and on the other hand it is often the only 
promising remedy there is.770 
 
B Criminal law 
As when applying domestic law, not only tort law can be used, but also criminal 
law. Engle for example points out that some wrongs are so grave, they deserve 
more than private law sanctions. According to him, grave human rights 
violations deserve criminal sanctions.771 Yet of course, as a corporation cannot 
be deprived of its liberty in the traditional understanding of criminal law, 
sanctions always remain economic in nature. However, criminal sanctions may 
go beyond mere payments and can even include closing the business. Therefore 
criminal sanctions are an important tool alongside the private law remedies to 
fight human rights violations.772 Yet it was already sketched above that 
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establishing a forum to hear criminal cases is not easy. Once cases have been 
admitted they have, as can be seen from the examples above, mainly focused on 
natural persons like heads of states, which also caused a reluctance concerning 
the use of universal jurisdiction and denying immunity.773 Yet it should be easier 
to hold corporate officers liable or even TNCs themselves where domestic law 
provides for criminal liability of corporations. Criminal liability of corporations 
is accepted for example in the Netherlands,774 France775 and Belgium776, but not 
in Germany777 and Spain.778 Using criminal law to hold corporations liable for 
grave human rights violations is therefore an existing state option, although of 
course in most cases no such grave violations occur. Furthermore, there seems to 
be a trend towards requiring a linking factor as could be seen above. In addition, 
the possibility of diplomatic political consequences should be kept in mind. 
However, these consequences are far less when only holding TNCs liable and 
not head of states or state officials of other states. 
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VII TNC LIABILITY UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
PROCEEDINGS, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPLAINTS 
After having examined the possibilities of using international law before 
domestic courts to hold TNCs liable, the following section will sketch the state 
options of holding TNCs or host states liable before international courts, 
commissions or councils such as ICC, ICJ, ECtHR, ECJ, IACtHR, ACHR and 
the UN.779 In contrast to domestic law and therefore usually also domestic courts 
and proceedings, there is no clear division in international law between civil and 
criminal law,780 therefore liability under international law could be seen as sui 
generis.781 Thus exceptions exist, these are the ICC782 and the Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda783 and the Former Yugoslavia784 with their prosecutors and 
international crimes according to the corresponding Statutes. The prosecutor, 
crimes listed and the legal consequences already show the similarity to domestic 
criminal law. 
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A Public international law and (host) state liability 
TNCs cannot be held liable by the ICC as it lacks jurisdictions over legal 
persons785 as already mentioned above and so do the Criminal Tribunals.786 
Neither can TNCs be held liable before the ICJ,787 ECtHR,788 ECJ,789 IACHR,790 
IACtHR,791 ACHR792 nor the UN complaint mechanisms793 either as only states 
or - in the case of the ECJ - EU organs according to art. 230 TEC, may be held 
liable in these proceedings. That is why this section focuses on other parties of 
the proceedings, namely host states.  
 
B (Host) states as parties before international tribunals 
As TNCs cannot be held liable in international proceedings, this leaves the 
indirect way of holding the host state liable. Again one could either think of 
holding the host state liable as a whole or holding individual state officials 
liable. The latter is only possible before the ICC under the Rome Statute and it 
could be possible before the Criminal Tribunals. Yet the above said is also true 
here - the amount of cases where the severe crimes listed in the Statutes have 
been committed by a state official by not preventing a TNC subsidiary from 
violating human rights is rather small. Furthermore, the individuals acting for 
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the TNC subsidiary can be held liable before the ICC and the Tribunals as well 
in these cases. So this double or rather triple indirectness by holding state 
officials liable for actions or omissions attributable to the state which led to 
human rights violations by TNC subsidiaries which are not themselves obliged 
to protect human rights under international law is, although possible, a weak 
state option. This leaves basically the, also indirect, approach of holding the host 
state liable. As Ruggie stresses concerning the UN treaties “[host] states that 
have ratified the existing human rights treaties […] have the obligation to 
protect individuals within their territory or jurisdiction from corporate-related 
human rights abuses."794 As already mentioned above795 this is also true for the 
other Charters and Conventions as can be seen from the following examples, all 
dealing with cases brought to Courts and Commissions by the victims of threats 
of violations or violations of their human rights by corporations and in which 
state liability for not preventing the corporations from threatening or violating 
human rights was affirmed. 
 
1 Africa 
This first example shows very well that different actors can be held responsible 
in different proceedings and by different actors for consequences caused by the 
same occurrence, at least when considered in a wider sense.  As mentioned in 
the introductory chapter, Shell was sued in the US and the Netherlands for 
harms inflicted on the Ogoni people and others in connection with the oil 
exploration in Nigeria. The African Commission796 held in the SERAC 
decision797 that Nigeria was liable for human rights violations by the private 
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actor NNPC-Shell consortium due to a lack of state protection. The Commission 
found that art. 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the Banjul Charter798 were 
violated, by not granting sufficient protection of for example the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, the right to a clean and healthy 
environment, the right to free disposal of wealth, the right to housing and 
protection from forced evictions and the rights to food, human life and integrity. 
The Commission found that Nigeria was liable, because it had not protected the 
Ogoni people from these violations caused by environmental damages and 
destruction of houses and villages by the NNPC-Shell consortium, but supported 
the consortium with Nigerian security forces in a repressive way. 
 
2 Americas 
In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua799 the IACtHR found 
that Nicaragua violated the right to judicial protection and property due to a lack 
of demarcation of the Awas Tingni Community’s land by granting a concession 
to the Korean corporation Solcarse that allowed logging on the communal lands 
inhabited by the Awas Tingni Community. As the logging did not take place in 
the concession area because the concession was cancelled due to formal reasons, 
not linked to the lack of demarcation, there was no violation of property rights 
by the corporation. Yet there was a threat of such a violation due to the failure of 
the Nicaraguan state to demarcate and protect the Community’s land and to 
provide for appropriate judicial protection. 
 
3 Europe 
There were also some cases before the ECtHR concerning state liability due to 
actions of corporations. One of them is Lopez Ostra v Spain800 where the court 
held that Spain violated art 8 ECHR, the right to private and family life, by 
allowing a plant for the treatment of liquid and solid waste to be built which 
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interfered with the complainant’s living conditions and health as it produced 
fumes, noise and strong smells. 
In Guerra v Italy801 the court similarly found that Italy had violated art. 8 ECHR 
by failing to protect the neighbourhood of a fertiliser factory from the flammable 
gases and toxid substances it released in its production cycle and the explosion 
that occurred at that factory, requiring that 150 people suffering from arsenic 
poisoning had to be hospitalised. 
 
VIII POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE TNC CONTEXT 
As TNCs are powerful actors on the international stage but not states nor legally 
state-like, not even possessing a generally accepted international legal 
personality, they cannot be held liable under international law in international 
proceedings (yet). At the same time expansive legally binding human rights 
protection duties will hardly be imposed on TNCs directly as long as there is no 
consensus on a changed legal role and status of TNCs in public international 
law.802 This is despite the fact that TNCs may have powers over certain 
individuals that are as great as the powers of a state. As there are only scattered 
duties to protect human rights imposed on non-state actors directly and 
indirectly, as already mentioned above, there is a heated debate going on 
concerning the scope of duties that can be imposed directly on TNCs as there is 
no clear rule concerning the degree of human rights responsibilities of non-state 
actors.803 On the one hand it is pointed out that the primary obligation to protect 
human rights lies with the states and that states cannot and must not shift and 
impose this obligation onto private actors.804 On the other hand it is claimed that 
the factual changes of power need to be recognized. TNCs, it is argued, should 
be responsible for the protection of human rights and some suggest relying on 
the factual participation and role of international actors rather than on traditional 
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categories of public international law like the public/private sphere and 
object/subject differentiations.805  However, over time and by adding up in 
practice and establishing an opinio juris of such a personality, the singular 
already existing duties could contribute to the creation of a general legal 
personality for TNCs.806 One strong indicator of such an existing or at least 
emerging opinio juris are the UN Guiding Principles with their clear affirmation 
of the already existing universal duty for businesses to respect human rights. 
When legal personality for TNCs under public international law is accomplished 
and the Rome Statute includes the jurisdiction over legal persons, TNCs will 
also be liable before the ICC. This discussion and suggested perspective seems 
to verify Goldtschmidt’s observation, although this time concerning the 
“legislators” of public international law, that “[i]n all the great matters relating 
to commerce, legislators have copied, not dictated.”807 Therefore, possible future 
ways of such a “copy” will be sketched in the following. 
 
A Enforceable Human Rights protection duties for TNCs 
One may therefore assume that one day TNCs can have general legal 
personality, but the scope and content of their rights and duties may - in 
accordance with the 1949 ICJ statement - differ from those of states and those of 
individuals, trying to match the special factual role outlined above that powerful 
TNCs play in public international law. Once again the UN Guiding Principles 
could play a leading role in creating legal persons bound by international human 
rights law, obliged to respect it, but not to protect individuals against violations 
by third persons. Yet whichever way more human rights duties will be imposed 
on TNCs, this may result in, or be consequence of, major changes in public 
international law. Public international law itself is flexible and always in 
progress, adapting to changing needs and realities. It has already moved from 
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being a “law of coordination” to being a “law of cooperation”808 and it is 
suggested to be developing now into being a “law of globalisation”809 or an 
“enlightened sovereignty”810 not giving up state cooperation, but accepting the 
new non-state actors on the stage of public international law.811 The shape and 
extent of these possible changes depend to a large extent on international 
consensus and therefore universal principles and international guidelines and 
agreements are highly influential. 
 
B Ways of implementing possible duties 
As already mentioned above, there are some direct human rights obligations 
imposed on TNCs, but no legally binding general duty to protect human rights 
can be derived from them. There seems to be basically one tool but two ways of 
how globally valid legally binding direct duties can be imposed on TNCs. The 
only tool to create legally binding duties on a global level is public international 
law; the two ways are by states alone or by including TNCs in the process. 
Hypothetically speaking, these two ways could reflect at the same time the 
possible order in which the general intentional legal personality of TNCs could 
be recognized. It could happen by either imposing a general duty to respect and 
protect human rights, causing the recognition of the international legal 
personality due to the very fact of the scope of the duties. Or the general 
international legal personality will be recognized first in an appropriate way, 
according to the ICJ decision - maybe as a new kind of legal personality on the 
international stage, and then the general duties will be imposed according to the 
new legal status, maybe even with TNC participation in the drafting process of 
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the obligations. Here becomes apparent again the rather circular nature of the 
arguments concerning subjectivity and legal personality of public international 
law, as human rights obligations of TNCs are used to demonstrate that such 
duties can be imposed on TNCs which in return is supposed to show the 
potential legal personality under public international law.812 
 
1 State centred approach 
The state option of imposing more human rights duties on TNCs and thereby 
possibly advancing a later recognition of their general legal personality, which 
does not necessarily mean equalizing them with states, is a state-centred 
approach. The latest attempt by the UN and therefore states, to impose direct 
general obligations on TNCs directly via an international and global approach 
are the Draft Norms as mentioned above. Although they were drafted together 
with TNCs, the latter were not considered state-like or having legal personality. 
Yet, although not legally binding and not radically new in either their content or 
their aim of imposing direct obligations on TNCs, the Draft Norms have been 
criticised for imposing direct obligations at all. It is claimed that, as the states 
are primarily responsible for the protection of human rights, TNCs should not 
and could not take their place. Yet the Draft Norms do acknowledge the primary 
duty of the states and apply the “sphere of influence” approach to assess the 
scope of human rights duties imposed on each individual corporation813 within 
the obligations to respect, protect, fulfil and promote human rights – the 
distinction set out in the Maastricht Guidelines.814 The vagueness815  of the term 
“sphere of influence” is reduced to some extent by linking both the liability and 
responsibility to the more limited816 concept of complicity817 deriving from 
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criminal law. The sphere of influence approach can be regarded as a 
compromise between the two facts818 already discussed in the previous sections 
of this research. On the one hand big TNCs are very powerful; their power may 
exceed the power of states and it is claimed it should therefore include 
obligations also in the field of human rights. On the other hand the role of TNCs 
is not equal to states despite the great power they may possess and they are 
therefore not primary addressees of human rights obligations,819 but can only be 
liable in their individual spheres of influence.820  These considerations put in the 
context of public international law which already accepts some fragmented 
human rights duties for TNCs, make the Draft Norms seem acceptable and 
appropriate to respond to the current factual situation.821 Furthermore, the 
general advantages of an international global approach by imposing direct rather 
than indirect duties on TNCs is mainly legal certainty due to one set of rules that 
would be, at least as a minimum standard, universally applicable, avoiding 
problems of “forum shopping” and those linked to the discretional decisions on 
forum non conveniens.822 
However, the classic reproach put forward so often against public international 
law can be made here as well: the implementation might be possible one day via 
treaty,823 but enforcement and complaint procedures and remedies in general are 
                                                                                                                                                        
817
 Jacob Gelfand, “The Lack of Enforcement in the United Nations Draft Norms: Benefit or 
Disadvantage?” in Olivier de Schutter (ed), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights 
(Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 1, 12, 313, 327; Olivier de Schutter, “The 
Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate Actors” in ibid. at 1, 13. 
818
 Olivier de Schutter, “The Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate 
Actors” in ibid. at 1, 12. 
819
 Ibid. 
820
 Ibid. 
821
  Andre J. Wilson, “Beyond Unocal: Conceptual Problems Using International Norms to 
Hold Transnational Corporations Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act” in ibid. at 43, 63. 
822
 For problems arising in connection with forum non conveniens decisions see Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (23 May 2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-2-addendum-23-
May-2008.pdf> 1 May 2014, Summary par. 89. 
823
 Jacob Gelfand, “The Lack of Enforcement in the United Nations Draft Norms: Benefit or 
Disadvantage?” in Olivier de Schutter (ed), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights 
(Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 313, 318-9. 
 148
not as developed as in domestic law.824 This is even more so when considering 
the above mentioned fact that TNCs are private actors and although TNCs can 
take part in some international arbitration procedures and there are individual 
communication procedures in public international law, the step to introduce 
either state-like legal personality of TNCs or international complaint procedures 
and arbitration between two private actors will probably not change in the near 
future.825 Therefore the UN Guiding Principles ask the states to provide for legal 
mechanisms and procedures, but they also contain ideas for non-state-based 
grievance mechanisms, yet they are limited to non-judicial ones.826 
So while states may impose more obligations of public international law on 
TNCs by treaties or conventions, these new actors are not and will most likely 
not be subjects of public international law for quite a while to come. 
 
2 TNC-based approach 
Another, less traditional and state-centred way to achieve direct TNC 
obligations to protect human rights would be to recognize their general 
international legal personality in whatever form seems appropriate827 and then 
negotiate their obligations with them, ultimately concluding a treaty or setting 
up a convention with TNCs as participants in the drafting process. Although to 
allow TNCs at the international table to draft the very norms that will bind them 
may sound strange at first, the concept is common in public international law 
and states are doing this all the time. In addition, TNCs are not generally 
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opposed to any human rights responsibility as can be seen by the numerous 
voluntary codes developed and adopted by them. So, although this is an unlikely 
scenario, this approach could still work. This does not have to result in TNCs 
bearing as many duties as states.828 It could for example be a duty level lower 
than those of states, but higher than those of individuals and designed to 
complement rather than replace positive state duties, for example by increasing 
TNC duties where the host state’s capabilities to protect are lacking or where 
TNCs engage in per se dangerous activity.829 Flexibility should also be given by 
leaving it up to the TNCs as to how to fulfil the protection duty, thereby granting 
adequate integration into private business models.830 As a basis negative 
obligations are suggested, such as refraining from transacting with states with 
negative human rights records and respecting the right of freedom of speech.831 
However, the reproaches concerning enforceability and remedies for victims can 
be made here as well. 
 
IX CONCLUSION 
The observations made in this chapter are not too promising concerning the 
imposition of human rights protection duties on TNCs under public international 
law. As the International Council on Human Rights Policy puts it: “Just as 
human rights law was initially developed as a response to the power of states, 
now there is a need to respond to the growing power of private enterprise, which 
affects the lives of millions of people around the world.”832 Yet there does not 
seem to be an international consent for such a response by public international 
law.  
TNCs can for example so far not be held liable in international proceedings. 
Thus, there are cases all over the world dealing with state liability when 
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 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: human rights and the 
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corporations harm human rights. The idea of holding host states accountable for 
violations of incorporated subsidiaries is therefore not farfetched. International 
remedies for the victims already do exist, although of course their use could be 
more frequent.833 Home states on the other hand may not be entitled to sue in 
many cases as only signatory states of the respective Charter or Convention or 
the victims may bring complaints before the courts and commissions.834 An 
exception are the UN state complaint procedures, yet no state has so far made 
use of this mechanism.835 A reason might be the fear of the political tensions and 
the fear that the mechanism could also be used against the home states. These 
fears could be minimized if TNCs could be parties of the proceedings, as there is 
not such a great diplomatic and political dimension as when suing state or state 
officials. Furthermore, it is a rather indirect and roundabout way to hold the 
corporation liable via the host state. Skogly for example criticized that in 
SERAC the Commission did not even consider direct liability of the corporation 
under the Banjul Charter.836 Yet as could also be seen, so far no general direct 
human rights duties for TNCs exist under public international law. 
However, the  issue is not alien to public international law and is vividly 
discussed. The idea of imposing human rights obligations on TNCs is said to 
expatiate837 and it is claimed that with the Draft Norms a “clear acceptance”838 of 
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the human rights responsibility of TNCs is expressed, although they have not 
been accepted. It is rather telling that after not achieving sufficient support for 
the Draft Norms a Special Representative  was established and it took him six 
years of research, consultation and dialogue to develop the UN Guiding 
Principles, of which the Special Representative himself says they are a starting 
point for “cumulative progress” rather than an exhaustive answer to the human 
rights challenges by businesses.839 Therefore, at the moment there is no 
international consensus in sight within the next decade to impose more human 
rights duties on TNCs or to even recognize their legal personality under public 
international law. That is why the examination of a possible increase of human 
rights protection duties on TNCs had to remain rather hypothetical. There could 
be such developments in future, and if so, the protectionism reproach should be 
considered, but such development will only take place if international consensus 
is reached. Imposing more direct duties onto TNCs is therefore not a short-term 
state option for individual states acting unilaterally but only for long-time 
multilateral and global efforts. However, those efforts could be initiated by 
individual states on the international stage. Not least because states, in particular 
home states, can still be considered powerful enough to face new challenges 
such as new powerful actors on the international stage.840 A gain of power and 
influence by one actor does not automatically derive another actor from its 
power. In addition, not all (host) states are weak or willing enough to let TNCs 
take the lead when negotiating about the conditions for their subsidiaries and 
assets in the host states.841 Furthermore, the thought of TNC responsibility is not 
alien to TNCs themselves and various attempts have been made to create at least 
voluntary codes. That is why home states could use international law in their 
courts to hold TNCs liable at least in the restricted cases of the most grave 
violations of human rights where public international law allows for such action, 
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i.e. in cases of ius cogens violations. Such a course of action could operate as a 
catalyst for developments on the international stage as already mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. However, even where such domestic law exists, there seems 
to be no tendency towards expanding admissibility at the moment. This could be 
seen from the developments in Belgium and Spain842 and when assessing current 
ATCA cases, where admissibility was restricted by stricter “law of nations” 
interpretations and a rather broad forum non conveniens interpretation, both 
allowing for dismissing foreign cases more easily. Therefore, as was already 
pointed out in the previous chapter – it seems legal potential exists, though is not 
used. 
 
                                                 
842
 See above Ch. II. 
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CHAPTER IV: POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL SANCTIONS TO HOLD TNCS AND HOST 
STATES LIABLE 
As shown so far, legally binding human rights obligations for TNCs do not 
generally exist in public international law and although the application of 
national human rights protection laws onto TNCs acting abroad is possible, it 
remains difficult in practice and there does not seem to be the political will to 
create such domestic law right now. Yet in the flexible and manifold sphere of 
human rights as described in the introductory chapter, there might be other tools 
than (domestic) legislation and judiciary. As human rights law is part of public 
international law and therefore closely connected to international politics, tools 
of politics and foreign affairs might also be a way to influence TNCs acting 
abroad. This could be a promising home state option at least in cases of grave(st) 
human rights violations. No plaintiffs would be needed and no court decisions, 
but political action within the legal frame of public international law. Whether 
this is indeed a way to go and which measures may be taken will be examined in 
this chapter. After giving an overview about sanctions and their use in 
connection with human rights, their applicability in the TNC context under 
public international law will be assessed. Economic sanctions as trade sanctions 
will not be addressed, as this complex issue is dealt with in chapter V. 
 
I THE TERM “SANCTION” 
The term “sanction” is used in a broad way today and its link to human rights 
protection may not be apparent at first glance. However, a first mutuality is that 
just like human rights, “sanctions” are an ever-changing tool with many facets 
and applications. It is therefore essential to understand what is meant when it is 
used in international law context and how it is used in this enquiry to assess the 
possible home state options to control TNCs abroad. Therefore a short overview 
about the term’s background and development will be given in the following, to 
ease the understanding of its different uses in different contexts, its different 
connotations and manifold meanings, before the term “sanction” will be defined 
for this enquiry. 
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A Background and development of the term 
The noun “sanction” originates from the Latin term “sanctionis” which means 
“cure, threat of punishment”, concerning law “penalty provision” and 
concerning alliances and treaties “clause, reservation”.843 
Turning away from the different meanings,844 the term became the technical 
term we basically still use today in the beginning of the 20th century.845 Yet the 
term did- similar to human rights and public international law in general- change 
and develop over time. Some alterations have for example been made since after 
World War II the possibilities of the use of military force under public 
international law was restricted and sanctions did not include war any longer.846 
However, the exact meaning and definition of the term “sanction” is still used 
with slightly different connotations today.847 
 
B Meaning and definition in public international law today 
So what is a “sanction” in public international law today? Sociologists define 
“sanction” broadly as the societal response to a behaviour that is either in 
conformity with norms or deviant.848 Some consider any response to a behaviour 
- whether advantages or disadvantages are imposed on the actor - as a sanction, 
no matter whether the behaviour was according to norms or violating them.849 
This broad understanding of the term sanction in sociology also forms the basis 
of the term sanction as it is used in public international law context.850 Within a 
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legal system sanctions can be described as negative measures, because unlike 
other systems of norms the legal system works with a firmly established 
apparatus of sanctions to control the compliance with its norms.851 Examples are 
criminal prosecution and punishment, but also punitive damages granted under 
tort law for example in the US as assessed above. Public international law, 
however, has no such firmly established apparatus of sanctions as there is no 
global police or prosecutor. Some of these obligations are transferred to the UN 
Security Council, but at least in non-security matters the law enforcement 
remains difficult or at least different from the one in domestic law as already 
mentioned earlier.852 The definition of sanctions is therefore different in public 
international law and for example positive measures working as inducements 
can be considered sanctions although they are not linked to punishment and 
prosecution. However, in spite of the frequent use of the term “sanction” there is 
no clear or uniform definition of it in public international law today. 853 Instead, 
there are many different definitions, mostly given to confine the meaning of the 
broad term to achieve some clarity. Due to the many different definitions, 
however, the term “sanction” can be used as a rather collective term for many 
kinds of political actions that one state imposes on another for very different 
reasons and pursuing very different aims. 
 
1 Different kinds of political action 
As far as the different kinds of political action are concerned, a sanctioning state 
can either be influenced by its own interests and impose “selfish” sanctions to 
achieve its own aims of foreign policy854 or it can impose sanctions as a means 
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to protect common interests of public international law, for example to protect 
core human rights.855 Home states imposing sanctions on host states to improve 
human rights protection in the host state are using sanctions as a means of public 
international law as an international behavioural system and - at least not only - 
as a means of foreign policy.856 Yet, of course, sanctions are often triggered by a 
mix of motives, involving the protection of own interests and the interests of the 
international community as a whole, because states more easily impose 
sanctions to protect the common interests of public international law when this 
is also supporting their own interests.857 This is also true for the TNC and human 
rights context examined in this enquiry. There is also a “selfish” motive 
triggering the sanction, because as the subsidiaries of own TNCs are involved  
public attention and awareness may operate as pressuring factors and the home 
state would not impose sanctions if it was not for the rather “personal” link of 
home state TNC subsidiaries. However, it is the very international behavioural 
system, namely human rights and their protection, that is (also) aimed at by the 
sanction. The protection of human rights in the host state as far as the own TNC 
is involved may become a foreign policy interest so to speak, yet in most cases  
this foreign policy interest of protecting (core) human rights will generally equal 
the interests of the international community as a whole. However, the 
sanctioning state should carefully examine its aims and motives and in particular 
adhere to the proportionality principle and the equal treatment of equal matters 
when imposing a measure in order to use sanctions in the least “selfish” way. As 
already seen above pressuring the host state can easily be considered as 
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imperialist or disrespecting the host state’s sovereignty. In addition, sanctions 
used to defend international human rights standards are sanctions used as an 
(additional) enforcement measure for those human rights standards. However, as 
seen above, some consider these very standards to be “Western” only. 
Furthermore, some suggest equivalently to the controversy on the universalism 
of human rights standards, that the very idea of punishing international wrong-
doers by imposing sanctions is a foremost “Western and liberal phenomenon” 858 
due to the perception of the universal validity of “western” standards, and that 
other states impose sanctions “as a response to an injury of their national 
interests”.859 Yet again, as so many states have at least formally accepted many 
international human rights standards, wherever they derive from, the observation 
of the implementation of these standards seems justified. Observing and 
implementing human rights standards does not generally exclude the tool of 
sanctions, yet of course the requirements for sanctions provided by public 
international law have to be met. 
 
2 Reasons for sanctions 
The reasons for which sanctions are imposed are closely linked to the different 
kinds of political action. They can for example be triggered by a threat to peace 
and security by the target state, a breach of public international law or a breach 
of a bilateral treaty. In this enquiry a breach of the host state’s human rights 
obligations vis-à-vis its own population, i.e. the duty to protect its citizens from 
violations by private actors such as TNCs, is what triggers the sanctions. Human 
rights treaties, however, are no bilateral treaties but multilateral treaties and the 
obligations owed are not reciprocal.860 The obligations are not owed to other 
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states but to the state’s own citizens and as far as erga omnes obligations are 
concerned to the international community as a whole.  
 
3 Different aims pursued 
The different aims861 pursued with the sanction reach from mere symbolism, 
punishment, deterrence and retribution862 to compellence to achieve a change in 
behaviour of the target state863 as was for example the aim of the sanctions 
against South Africa and Libya.864 When a home state aims at stopping human 
rights violations in the host state and improving the overall human rights 
situation as far as their TNCs are concerned, a behavioural change of the target 
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state is the long-term aim,865 while punishment and retribution may also be 
objectives. The aims as well as the motives behind the different political actions 
described above are intertwined and often a bundle of aims and motives triggers 
a sanction. When imposing negative sanctions to achieve a change in behaviour 
of the targeted state, retribution, punishment and symbolism are usually already 
achieved when the sanction is imposed and are therefore so to speak “underlying 
guaranteed secondary aims” of a sanction aimed at behavioural change. 
  
4 Definition used in this enquiry 
To be able to examine the possibilities of home states to protect human rights by 
using sanctions and because exclusively “selfish” sanctions are unlikely in this 
context as sketched above, a broad understanding of the term “sanction” is used 
in this enquiry. It is meant to include positive as well as negative measures no 
matter whether the latter are per se lawful or their wrongfulness has to be 
precluded.866  A sanction in this enquiry is therefore a measure imposed by one 
or more states onto another state or ruling élite to influence the target’s 
behaviour concerning international human rights standards. By defining the term 
like this a broad understanding of sanctions as applied today, i.e. against states, 
is used. Whether sanctions can also be imposed on TNCs will be assessed later 
on in this chapter. 
 
II EXAMPLES OF SANCTIONS APPLIED 
After having defined the term sanction, some examples of sanctions and their 
effects will be provided for in the following to get an idea of the effectiveness, 
the advantages and disadvantages of sanctions. Some sanctions are well-known, 
vividly debated and many have influenced the fate of states by some means or 
other. Well known current examples are sanctions against terrorism since the 
9/11 attacks. Resolution 1373867 of the Security Council for example obliges 
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states to effectively implement the Convention on the Financing of International 
Terrorism by binding states to take the necessary measures to criminalize acts of 
financing international terrorism and to freeze and seize funds used for 
terrorism.868 In doing so, financial businesses are also affected by the sanctions, 
which shows that sanctions can even affect corporations when they are targeted 
at states. That private actors, including businesses are affected by the sanctions 
imposed can also be seen from the examples closely linked to human rights that 
will be sketched now. 
 
A Rhodesia 1960s 
The denial of free elections, respectively hindering them by a declaration of 
independence from Great Britain by the white governing minority was what 
triggered the sanctions in the first place in the 1960s.869 Great Britain and later 
the UN imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia which at first hit the 
Rhodesian economy - and therefore also corporations - hard, but the economy 
recovered and resulted in even being blooming.870 Yet the country was more and 
more internationally isolated, the standard of living of the white governing élite 
was reduced and finally the governing élite agreed on free elections.871 With UN 
Resolution 232872 the situation in Rhodesia was declared to be a threat to peace 
and Okafi-Obasi notes that “for the first time the Security Council linked the 
legitimacy of a regime to its human rights practice.[…] Yet other factors also 
contributed to the declaration of the regime as illegitimate.”873 The independent 
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states of Africa and the Soviet Union for example both pushed for international 
action.874 Generalizations have therefore to be drawn with great care. 
Nevertheless, in this case the consequent application of sanctions as a 
supplement to the military and political struggle for freedom within the country 
were an important means that helped accelerate the change and thereby 
minimized suffering.875 
 
B South Africa 1980s 
In South Africa racial discrimination, which constitutes a violation of human 
rights, was not only tolerated but firmly fixed and regulated in many domestic 
apartheid laws. Military assaults on neighbouring states threatened international 
peace.876 By Resolution 569 of the Security Council877 states were encouraged to 
place embargos against the South African Regime to help change the system878 
and end apartheid.879 This resolution was not based on art. 41 or 42 of the UN 
Charter, but the reprisals taken were considered to be justified by the resolution 
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itself.880 Manifold sanctions were imposed, negative and positive ones. 
Economic and travel sanctions, meant to affect private actors, namely those of 
the ruling élite, were imposed by the Northern states while the neighbouring 
states of South Africa were supported to decrease their dependency on South 
Africa. Furthermore, contacts to South African opposition groups were 
intensified.881  Sports and cultural sanctions were imposed, also affecting private 
actors, and had some effect on South Africa’s regime.882 TNCs were also 
affected and involved, as already mentioned in the introductory chapter, because 
disinvestment by selling or closing down TNC subsidiaries in South Africa was 
supposed to have great impact on the South African economy.883 However, often 
the goods remained available on the South African market and after selling 
subsidiaries, these were no longer bound by the arms embargo. Furthermore, 
once they were South African corporations they were able to officially support 
the apartheid regime.884 This once more shows hat treating parent and 
subsidiaries as separate legal entities makes it hard to hold TNCs liable. 
International banks were also reluctant to cut off the relations to South Africa 
and argued that they did not intend to pursue political goals.885According to 
Kürschner-Pelkmann the biggest grey area of the imposition of sanctions in 
South Africa by Germany were subsidiaries or German corporations that were 
located in South Africa and produced and provided military resources in the 
broad meaning of the term.886 Many of them infringed upon the arms 
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embargo,887 at least one acted against domestic criminal law by exporting 
military goods to South Africa without the permission according to the Foreign 
Economy Act.888 The consequence was a criminal court decision against 
managers of the corporations, but the sentences were suspended.889 Furthermore, 
the case only reached the courts in the first place because the manager violated 
domestic criminal law as an individual. Not the corporation was sentenced, but 
the acting manager, which reminds of the conflict in the application of domestic 
law described above. 
 
C German Reunification 1990 
A striking example of a positive sanction, although not primarily linked to 
human rights, but influencing world politics and even the fate of many nations is 
“the historical deal that lead to the reunification of Germany in 1990”. 890  In this 
deal Germany promised large economic support, once more affecting 
businesses, including housing in Russia for returning soldiers and in return the 
Soviet Union agreed to the reunification, thereby allowing for a change of a size 
that usually is only achieved by wars, conquests or pressure. However, positive 
sanctions by themselves are no panacea and do not  guarantee for major changes 
and generalizations may once more only be drawn very carefully from this 
case.891 Poland or Russia for example didn’t consider real changes concerning 
border revisions in exchange for positive sanctions.892  
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D Sanctions against Haiti in the 1990s 
Yet sanctions are not always encouraging human rights protection. To the 
contrary, they may even worsen the human rights situation. From 1991 onwards 
for example, sanctions were imposed on Haiti to restore democracy893 after the 
democratically elected president of Haiti Jean Bertrand Aristide had been 
overthrown, forced to exile and appealed for help from the OAS and the UN.894 
The sanctions against the de facto regime in Haiti are particularly connected to 
human rights because it was vividly discussed whether the sanctions imposed 
did not thoroughly and inappropriately affect - in this case i.e. worsen - the 
human rights situation for the population in Haiti.895 It was for example reported 
that many poor could not receive sufficient food or medicine from relief 
agencies due to the lack of fuel, because the sanctions included a fuel 
embargo.896 A controversial study of the Center for Population and Development 
Studies in the School of Public Health at the Harvard University suggested that 
the sanctions against Haiti had caused 100,000 deaths, but this claim was 
withdrawn later.897 However, the claim that the sanctions caused hundreds of 
people to drown when they tried to flee Haiti in leaky and overcrowded boats to 
escape the situation caused by the increase of sanctions, was not withdrawn.898 
Whether a link between the worsening human rights situation was proven or not, 
the case of Haiti raises awareness for negative human rights consequences that 
can be caused by sanctions. It graphically demonstrates that human rights can be 
severely harmed by sanctions and especially when the aim is the protection of 
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human rights, as is the case when discussing sanctions as a state option in this 
enquiry, human rights consequences and side effects have to be considered 
carefully. 
 
E  “Helms-Burton Act” in the1990s 
A famous example of sanctions aimed at third parties, including private actors 
such as officers of corporations, is the so-called “Helms-Burton Act” of March 
1996.899 By the Helms-Burton law the US tried to prevent foreign private actors, 
including corporations, from trading with Cuba by threatening them with so 
called secondary sanctions so that they had to choose between either trading 
with Cuba or with the USA.900 After the US reduced and finally stopped the 
importation of Cuban sugar due to the close relations of Cuba and the Soviet 
Union in 1960, the latter trading oil for Cuban sugar, Cuba nationalized all US 
properties, which was followed by a US embargo of US goods in 1961. To 
intensify the sanctions against Cuba, companies that maintained dealing with 
Cuba through subsidiaries where threatened with sanctions and ships coming 
from Cuban ports were denied the use of US harbours.901 The sanction 
legislation culminated in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(“Libertad”) Act, the already mentioned “Helms-Burton law”902. The law 
strengthened the existing embargo by prohibiting any investment of private 
actors in Cuba involving confiscated property and prohibiting “trafficking” with 
confiscated property. It even allowed US citizens to sue against anyone who 
“trafficked” with confiscated property, no matter what his or her citizenship was 
and when the confiscation had taken place.903 
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In Europe and the Americas, the law was heavily criticized and confronted. The 
law was considered to violate legitimate interests of US trade partners and to 
violate international conventions by its extraterritorial character. In 1996 the EU 
Council adopted a regulation against the application of the Helms-Burton law904 
and the Mexican Official Register passed a law to protect trade and 
investment.905 In addition, Mexico for example claimed that the Helms-Burton 
law violated Mexican sovereignty, punished countries that did not share the US 
foreign politics concerning Cuba and was not in accordance with international 
law in its extraterritorial intent.906 The Inter-American Juridical Committee also 
presented an Opinion to the Council stating that the Helms-Burton law was not 
in conformity with international law.907 Furthermore, opponents claimed that 
international agreements were violated, such as art. VIII and IX IMF 
Agreement908, art. II and XI of Inter-American Development Bank documents,909 
the entire juridical and trade basis of NAFTA and the scope of the WTO.910 As a 
consequence, in the beginning of 1997 legal steps were taken within the new 
WTO by the EU, claiming that the Law violated WTO principles.911 The US 
declared that the Helms-Burton law dealt with matters of national security and 
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was therefore not of concern to the WTO,912 but covered by art. XXI GATT, 
leaving such issues to the member states.913 The matter was finally not decided 
by WTO panels, instead the US offered a readjustment of the law in exchange 
for the withdrawal of the WTO suit brought by the EU and the EU commitment 
to discourage the investment in confiscated US property in Cuba.914  
The Helms-Burton law affected private actors in particular by travel restrictions 
implemented on the officers and their families of companies that “trafficked” in 
confiscated US properties. The denial of entry into the US was carried out for 
example against the manager of the Canadian corporation Sherritt and the 
president and his family of the Mexican Grupo Domos.915 This means private 
individuals were aimed at and affected by secondary sanctions, particularly  the 
responsible individuals and their family members, creating a kind of “kin 
liability” to change the corporation’s behaviour towards Cuba. Yet corporations 
as private actors were also affected more directly by freezing corporation assets 
abroad (i.e. in the US) or preventing foreign investors from investing into 
confiscated US property in Cuba and allowing US citizens and former Cuban 
citizens to sue them.916 
Despite or maybe because of, its width which gave rise to so much criticism and 
so many confrontations, the success of the law is doubted,917 thereby granting all 
parties involved the opportunity to claim some success.918 Yet “[t]he points of 
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view can also be summarized as two poles of frustration”,919 the EU stating that 
Fidel Castro’s power was not diminished and the US blaming Europe, its 
indecisiveness and demand in the WTO.920 In addition, also US companies are 
growing impatient “over economic sanctions that interfere with trade.”921 
It is somewhat ironic that the very situation the law was supposed to prevent - 
namely other states not joining the sanctions against Cuba and US foreign policy 
- prevented the law itself from being fully implemented.922 This reminds of the 
shared values mentioned above923 that are forming an acceptable consensus for 
the extraterritorial application of domestic law; to force others to act according 
to one’s values is more likely to fail when the values - in this case the foreign 
policy concerning Cuba - are not shared. And when they are shared force should 
not be necessary, because negotiations and mutual acceptance are (more) likely 
to lead to the goal. 
 
F “D’Amato Act” in the 1990s 
Another example similar to the Helms Burton Act is the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act,924 also called “D’Amato Act”. This law also provided for 
secondary sanction measures aimed at corporations. 
The US imposed sanctions on Iran to prevent it from strengthening its power 
supply industry, because the money earned that way was supposed to support 
international terrorism and the attainment of weapons of mass destruction.925 In 
the wake of the sanctions, Iran invited European and Asian corporations to 
Teheran to court new investors.926 Therefore the D’Amato Act was introduced, 
that allowed for secondary sanctions against corporations which helped Iran to 
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develop its power supply industry. Due to this law many big corporations did 
not travel to Teheran and fewer corporations than originally intended attended 
the conference.927 That means similar to the situation under the Helms Burton 
Law, secondary sanctions aimed at individuals were imposed and secondary 
sanctions were implemented against third parties, states or private actors and 
like the Helms Burton Act the law was  criticized for not being GATT 
consistent.928 
Libya was the second target state of the newly imposed US sanctions to force it 
to extradite the alleged criminals of the bomb blast that caused a PanAm plane 
to crash over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.929 The sanctions included the ban on 
goods and services of US imports from Libya and on the export of goods, 
technology and services from the US into Libya with some humanitarian 
exceptions concerning food, cloths, medication and medical equipment.930 
Similar to the Helms-Burton Act the D’Amato Act, provided the possibility of 
secondary sanctions to pressure those foreign private actors who did not obey 
the investment ban imposed by the USA.931 Corporations which did not act 
according to the US sanctions had to face, amongst other things, the denial of 
export licenses and export investment, denial of credits from US banks that 
exceeded 10 Mio US$ and were not allowed to import their products into the 
US.932 Once more Europe did not support this approach,933 and although 
concerning Iran the European states intensified their laws of export control in 
1993934 the D’Amato Act generally strengthened the European determination to 
take counter measures against the - what they considered - extraterritorial 
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American laws.935 Faced with the serious rejection of the secondary sanctions by 
the EU, the US, refrained from imposing secondary sanctions when French 
Total invested in Iran’s gas development.936 
 
G Sanctions against Zimbabwe beginning 2002 
An example of human rights-linked sanctions are the sanctions against 
Zimbabwe from 2002. Among other countries937 the EC/EU sanctioned 
Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe because of its massive human rights 
violations.938 As the Cotonou Agreement939 effective between Zimbabwe and the 
EC/EU contained human rights and good governance clauses, financial aid and 
development assistance, suspension could be based on art. 96 Cotonou 
Agreement.940 Also other measures, not covered by the Cotonou Agreement, 
were imposed on private actors, like freezing assets of government members.941 
 
H Sanctions against Syria from 2004 onwards 
The US imposed economic sanctions against Syria in 2004 and renewed them in 
2009, because they considered Syria a threat to the US interests.942 They claimed 
Syria was “supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and 
missile programmes, and undermining U.S. and international efforts with respect 
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to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq”943 The imposed sanction measures 
included prohibitions of arms exports to Syria and - more interestingly in the 
context assessed in this research - “block[ing] Syrian airlines from operating in 
the United States”.944 In doing so once more a corporation was affected by 
sanctions imposed on a state. That the sanctions hit the airline severely is proven 
by the fact that the airline had to reduce its operational fleet from 15 to 6 
aircrafts until 2008.945 Furthermore, in 2008 and 2011 due to the human rights 
abuses that had occurred additional sanctions were imposed against those 
supporting the Assad regime and other countries followed the US example.946 
The EU for example imposed sanctions as well, including measures affecting 
private actors, like freezing assets, including those of corporations, and travel 
bans.947 In June 2013 the US eased the sanctions, “allowing the importation of 
equipment and technology into liberated areas of Syria.”948 
 
III SANCTIONS APPLICABLE IN THE TNC-HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT 
As already seen in the examples given above, sanctions may be used in different 
ways. They can be imposed as negative or positive sanctions, as primary or 
secondary sanctions, unilaterally or multilaterally, affecting the target state’s 
economy, diplomatic relations or any other sphere. Some of these measures or 
ways of imposition may be more promising than others in the TNC-human 
rights context and some may require further and more particular consideration. 
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Therefore, the different means and their use for the home state to achieve control 
over the human rights records of its TNCs acting abroad will be outlined now. 
 
A UN sanctions or unilateral sanctions? 
As could be seen above, sanctions imposed in order to promote and protect 
human rights can be multilateral UN sanctions. However, the sanctions imposed 
by the UN Security Council according to art. 41 and 42 UN Charter949 require a 
threat to international peace or security according to art. 39 UN Charter. In 
situations of human rights violations caused by TNCs, this will hardly ever be 
the case as only particular and singled-out human rights violations by one 
private actor, respectively the omissions to act in response or prevention of that 
violation by the host state, are the basis for the sanction. Improving the human 
rights protection by the home state’s TNCs acting abroad is an issue of much 
smaller scale than threats to peace or security. Sanctions answering the latter 
have to be based on more general grounds than the failure of the host state to 
provide sufficient human rights protection in one specific context to remain 
proportional.  
Yet the UN also deals with non-security matters, including human rights in its 
General Assembly. Non-binding950 resolutions calling member states to impose 
sanctions on a target state can be passed. However, these resolutions of the 
General Assembly are rather aimed at fighting gross and systematic violations of 
human rights than at answering specific singled-out human rights violations in a 
rather inter-state context. The latter situations are a basis too confined for UN 
action to be appropriate. The issue of the home state tackling human rights 
violations in the host state triggered by TNC behaviour is a rather bilateral set-
up which other UN member states are usually neither affected by nor interested 
in.  
That leaves unilateral sanctions by the home state the only way to go, including 
the possibility for the home state to convince other states to join the sanctions 
against the target state in order to improve the effectiveness of its own sanctions. 
As the UN hold the monopoly for sanctions using force, the individual states are 
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restricted to the use of “non-violent” sanctions,951 such as economic measures, 
which are the most often used method when unilateral sanctions are imposed. 952 
The different kinds of those unilateral sanctions will be outlined now. 
 
B Positive sanctions 
As economic measures, or plainly put money, are supposed to be an effective 
measure to influence someone’s behaviour, they work in both directions - 
denying and promising economic advantages, i.e. as negative and positive 
sanctions. Most positive sanctions are imposed in an economic way, for example 
by promising financial aid for the compliance with certain international 
standards.953 Yet they may also be imposed in a non-economic way, for example 
by holding out the prospects of participation in international organizations, 
although this may not be an option when rogue states are targeted.954 The 
advantage of positive sanctions is that they do not have grave side effects on 
human rights in the target state, they do not cause hostility towards the 
sanctioning state, they do usually not cause shortages of goods and third states 
cannot undermine the sanctions as easily as for example unilateral trade bans.955 
The more targeted and tailored the positive measures are to those in charge in 
the targeted state and their interests, the more effective they are.956 As the host 
state has an interest in home state investments in TNC cases, as shows the mere 
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fact that TNC subsidiaries are in the host state, incentives in the respective 
treaties can be a possible way to go.957 
Including human rights clauses in treaties concerning trade and development aid 
are for example economic inducements to promote and protect human rights.958 
The EU, the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD are for example taking into 
account human rights issues when concluding treaties.959 The EC/EU Lomé IV  
Convention960 with ACP states concerning the cooperation in the fields of 
economics, finances, culture and development, for example contained a human 
rights clause for the first time and even the preamble referred to individual 
freedoms, human dignity and their importance.961 The Cotonou Agreement962 
replacing the Lomé Convention is dealing with human rights in an even broader 
way, providing for a consultation procedure in art. 96963 that can be invoked 
when human rights obligations are not fulfilled. That is why the suspension of 
development assistance and financial aid for Zimbabwe in 2002 could be based 
on art. 96 Cotonou Agreement as sketched above. The World Bank, although 
neutral to political issues, is taking into account human rights issues through the 
back door of economic interests and the direct and obvious effects they cause for 
the World Bank.964 The US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is another 
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example of protecting human rights, in this case labour rights, in developing 
countries by inducements. The GSP grants custom-free imports into the US as 
long as the importing state observes labour rights or at least takes steps to 
improve their observance.965 The EC/EU also had a, although lesser used,966 
GSP,967 providing for tariff reductions according to the development level of the 
exporting state and the protection of labour rights in their domestic laws.968 
However, these approaches are not unchallenged, because of the way they are 
invoked and because they do not necessarily treat all like states alike.969 The new 
EU GSP model therefore uses internationally recognised standards and 
mechanisms such as expertises and monitory and review systems of the ILO and 
UN agencies in its conditionality model.970 As far as TNCs acting abroad are 
concerned, the just mentioned treaties and agreements taking into account the 
overall human rights record of (host) states and other issues, such as economics, 
rule of law, etc, are too broad.971 Human rights clauses in the TNC context 
should therefore rather be included in the bilateral treaties dealing with the very 
TNC abroad. However, there are still various challenges that have to be faced. 
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Firstly, positive sanctions are working best in favour of the promotion and 
protection of human rights when they are granted under the condition of the 
promotion and protection of human rights so that they can be denied when this 
aim is not pursued or not reached in an adequate amount of time.972 Yet as the 
home state is usually interested in investing in the host state, the former will 
hardly be willing to include conditionality clauses obliging it to withdraw its 
investments, e.g.  a whole TNC subsidiary, because of human rights violations 
in the host state.973 Secondly, a conditionality promoting and protecting human 
rights threatening with the denial of further aid and investment equals 
threatening with the imposition of negative sanctions. The cut off of positive 
sanctions has therefore to be considered carefully to avoid causing more 
hardship and human rights violations for the population as is already taking 
place.974  
Another possible way to provide positive (indirect) economic sanctions is 
providing know-how, for example regarding environmental protection and the 
instruments and means needed for an effective protection, which helps 
protecting the right to health. Such measures provided to increase the protection 
of human rights by training, education, etc in areas important for human rights 
protection are helping the host state to help itself, not creating dependencies and 
are more targeted than positive economic sanctions. Yet such “practical” aid 
cannot for example replace investment, but is rather an additional way of 
providing aid and only in rare cases an alternative able to replace solely 
economic measures. Practical aid and investments linked to certain conditions 
seem to be measures that can also work in the TNC and human rights context as 
TNC subsidiaries abroad are investments in the host state and treaties are 
concluded anyway before subsidiaries are established. Essential for the 
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credibility and success of positive sanctions, however, is the fair and equal 
imposition of conditions and possible cut offs.975 
 
C Negative sanctions 
The opposite to positive sanctions are negative sanctions imposed to change the 
target state’s behaviour by compellence. Embargos for example are negative 
sanctions in the economic sphere, but any other sphere can also be aimed at or 
affected by negative sanctions as described above. 
According to the “naïve theory”976 negative sanctions were supposed to create 
an “internal-opposition-effect”977 by causing sufficient hardship for the 
population of the target state to create riots and an overthrow of the government 
from within, because the population was supposed to blame its own government 
for the misery the sanctions are causing. However, there is no empirical proof 
for this theory and often the people, instead of overthrowing their government, 
felt neglected by the sanctioning state and the rally-round-the-flag syndrome 
made the population support their government and blame the sanctioning states 
for the misery rather than carry out an overthrow.978  The rally-round-the-flag 
phenomenon may be increased by the latent distrust in the “West” and powerful 
states by small states and those not part of the “West” as already mentioned 
above. This is supported by the facts that sanctions have mainly been imposed 
from the North upon the South, may create grave harms for the civilian 
population, are hard to end and it is feared that some world powers use them 
according to their own advantage according to their hidden agenda and they 
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have impacts on neighbouring states.979 The variety of different aims and 
motives may advance this fear by suggesting that sanctions are not imposed 
evenly onto all wrong-doers as the potential sanctioners have different interests 
of their own.980 Yet when using sanctions in a transparent way, treating like 
cases alike, many of the concerns just mentioned can be diminished. However, 
this does not mean that the naïve theory is working when these suggestions are 
followed. Nevertheless, negative sanctions are still used a lot as could be seen in 
the examples given above, albeit today the focus is on directly pressuring the 
government rather than the people to achieve change.  
 
1 Negative side effects 
One reason for this shift of focus are negative side effects. Although negative 
sanctions may be the first means that come to mind when thinking about 
effectively answering a violation of human rights because they contain 
punishment and retribution as their guaranteed underlying secondary aims, their 
major drawback are the very effects they may have. Since it is known that the 
naïve theory is not working, the population is not the primary aim of the 
hardship any longer. Therefore the negative effects sanctions have on the 
population are mainly side effects. Some of these negative side effects were 
already mentioned above when sketching the sanctions against Haiti and it 
became clear that negative sanctions may cause severe human rights violations 
themselves.981 Sanctions can for example increase the marginalization of 
economies,982 which can lead to a collapse in infrastructure that in turn may give 
raise to disease and malnutrition or even death, but it can also cause mass 
unemployment and impoverishment983 which may give raise to civil and 
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domestic lethal violence.984 Yet sanctions may not only affect the human rights 
of health and life. They can also affect the right to education as they cause brain 
drain, a lack of scientific materials by banning imports and by affecting the 
infrastructure.985 The groups most affected by sanctions and their negative 
impacts are infants, children986 and women, as it is the latter who line up for 
food, and have to care for the children who are affected by shortages of health 
care, education, etc.987 By causing human rights violations themselves,  negative 
sanctions imposed to end human rights violations “more often than not end up 
punishing entirely the wrong people”,988 causing a ‘double punishment’ for 
them, imposed by their own government and the sanctioner(s).989 As Vázquez 
puts it  
[…] sanctions thus treat human beings as pawns in a geo-political game. They violate 
the Kantian injunction that persons be treated as ends and not means, a principle that is 
arguably the foundation of much of modern human rights law.990  
 
Due to the negative effects sanctions may have, the UN condemns the use of 
unilateral sanctions.991 Some scholars even suggest that the effects of sanctions 
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can be as grave and disastrous for the civilian population as war.992 Some 
authors even go one step further, claiming that well-aimed military strikes using 
accurate weapons may not only be more effective but also less harming to the 
civilian population.993 Yet - if at all - this is rather true in cases where the 
sanctioner intends to replace the government or change a regime, but not in 
singled-out human rights violation cases caused by TNCs and host states. 
Nevertheless do these comparisons to war and military strikes reflect the lively 
discussion about the negative effects of sanctions. 
 
2 Smart sanctions 
Due to the considerations about the grave negative impacts negative sanctions 
may have and as it is known today that the naïve theory is not working, so-called 
“smart sanctions” have emerged.994 They are similar to targeted positive 
sanctions and are selective in their means and targeted only at those in charge of 
the situation or violation that is to be changed. In doing so they are trying to 
change the government’s behaviour, whilst harming the civilian population as 
little as possible. Sanctions may not only consist of economic measures like 
freezing assets,995 but may also affect other spheres within the host state996 as 
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already seen in the examples above. Cultural or diplomatic sanctions or travel 
bans997 leave the poor predominantly unmolested.998 Although this seems to be 
the perfect middle course, it is of course difficult to exactly predict a sanction’s 
effects and there may not always be effective means to be used as smart 
sanctions in an effective way.999 In addition, smart sanctions are also affecting 
human rights, although not necessarily (only) those of the average 
population.1000 Yet if foreign assets of the ruling élite are frozen, they could e.g. 
try to compensate this by taking more from their citizens.1001 In other words - 
smart sanctions are no panacea either. Some criticize them for being too 
confined to bring about large changes1002 and consider them to be partial 
solutions only.1003 However, as this enquiry deals with the particular issue of 
TNCs violating human rights abroad, sanctions imposed by home states are not 
supposed to bring about “large changes”. Changing whole regimes, like the 
sanctions against South Africa and its apartheid regime were supposed to, is not 
aimed for. Instead particular singled-out situations are meant to be improved. 
Harming the population of the host state to achieve more human rights 
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protection by the host state and the TNC in these particular situations only, 
seems rather disproportionate. In addition, Poeschke when examining smart 
sanctions and their effectiveness simply observes that there is no prove that 
smart sanctions are generally more effective that other ones.1004 However, he 
does not suggest that they are less effective either. In addition, Schneuwly 
suggests that threatening with negative sanctions in order to achieve an 
improvement in labour rights protection can be promising when the overall 
circumstances are supportive.1005 Due to these considerations it is submitted that 
although smart sanctions may not be the best answer to all kinds of human rights 
violations and to achieve any sanction aim, they are at least the best negative 
sanctions available in the TNC-human rights context. 
 
D Secondary sanctions 
Another kind of “sanctions” already mentioned above when sketching the 
examples are secondary sanctions. These are of particular interest for this 
enquiry, because they are the only ones so far not only targeting states, but also 
directly targeting corporations. The idea of secondary sanctions is to withhold 
other actors from counteracting a state’s primary sanctions.  As UN sanctions 
can hardly be used in the human rights-TNC context, unilateral sanctions remain 
as a tool as seen above. That is why the question arises what possibilities exist 
for the home state to force third states or other actors to sanction the target state 
as well in order to make its own sanction more effective. An additional reason 
for secondary sanctions in the case of economic sanctions is those third states 
may “fill in” where the home state does not trade with the host state any longer 
and may thereby even economically benefit from the home state’s sanctions.1006 
Secondary sanctions were not included in the definition developed above, 
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however, because they are different to primary sanctions in several respects. 
Firstly they are not directly targeted against the actor violating public 
international law, in this case human rights, but against actors weakening the 
effect of the primary sanction for example by trading with the boycotted host 
state. They only indirectly pressure the primary target state by depriving it from 
the advantages it enjoys by dealing, e.g. trading, with the secondary target. 
Secondly, the use of secondary sanctions often focuses on private actors, mainly 
corporations, rather than states, which is understandable as they are often easier 
to target for example by travel restrictions or asset freezes than a whole state. 
That makes secondary sanctions a means to make a state change its behaviour as 
long as it is targeted at a third actor that is a state. Yet it makes it a means to 
change the behaviour of a foreign private actor in the cases it is targeted at a 
private actor. Applied in the former way, however, it is no means to change the 
behaviour of the very state violating human rights. Applied in the latter way 
secondary sanctions often are a means of domestic law rather then of foreign 
policy as could be seen above at the Helms Burton and D’Amato examples of 
travel restrictions concerning the US, denying ships to enter US harbours, etc. 
Due to the differences to primary sanctions just sketched, secondary sanctions 
are no “sanctions” in the traditional meaning of the term and the meaning used 
in this enquiry. While they are targeted at third parties including corporations 
and are therefore of particular interest for this research, they are on the other 
hand facing additional obstacles for the same reason. As was already sketched 
above when outlining the D’Amato Act and the Helms Burton Act, the main 
criticism by third nations was that the secondary sanctions were violating public 
international law due to their extraterritorial character.1007  Blocking statutes 
were passed and the effectiveness of the secondary sanctions was weakened. 
                                                 
1007
  See for example Joaquín Roy, “The Helms-Burton Law: Development, Consequences 
and Legacy for Inter-American and European- US Relations” (1997) 39 J. Interam. Stud. & 
World Aff. 77, 78 and 92; on secondary sanctions see for example Almut Hinz, Sanktionen 
gegen Libyen (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2005) 185-6 wfr; Kinka Gerke, “Die unilaterale 
Versuchung: Die Sanktionen der USA gegen die Handelspartner Kubas, Irans und Libyens 
und ihre Auswirkung auf das Welthandelsregime” (1997) 2 HSFK-Report 1, 50-7; for 
opponents of the US point of view that extraterritorial application (concerning reexports and 
exporters controlled by US persons) is allowed under public international law unless there is a 
specific prohibition see Almut Hinz Sanktionen gegen Libyen (Frankfurt a M: Peter Lang, 
2005) 186 wfr. 
 184
Meyer1008 examined this argument and came to the conclusion that it is not the 
extraterritorial effects that violate public international law, but that the US went 
too far when providing for enforcement mechanisms against third state 
nationals, i.e. corporations in the Helms Burton Act. He suggests that 
“terrinational” secondary sanctions are more likely to be in accordance with 
public international law.1009 That means a state may prohibit its own nationals 
within its own territory to trade with the targeted state and with states or 
corporations that trade with the target state, but the sanctioning state may not 
directly prohibit actors of foreign nationality or within foreign territory or both, 
to trade with the target state. By stopping own companies within the sanctioning 
state’s own territory from trading with foreign companies the latter are of course 
affected, but this is, according to Meyer, not by itself violating public 
international law, because any bilateral treaty and any primary sanction may 
have negative effects on third parties.1010 By not (directly) applying the domestic 
law of the sanctioning state on corporations of third states, the problem of 
different domestic laws applying to the same corporation is excluded as well, as 
already mentioned earlier in this research. These considerations concerning 
jurisdiction do not, however, answer the question whether secondary sanctions - 
or their effects - might be violating obligations or other public international 
law.1011 Yet while primary sanctions consisting of measures violating public 
international law can be justified when applied as countermeasures, i.e. targeted 
at the state violating public international law itself,1012 secondary sanctions are 
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not targeted at the violator of public international law itself but at third actors 
and therefore there is no such justification or exemption in public international 
law. That means to be lawful secondary sanction measures have to be in 
accordance with public international law per se. That rules applied 
extraterritorially face certain challenges has already been discussed earlier in 
this research. Concerning secondary trade sanctions it is suggested that they 
violate international trade rules of WTO/GATT by many authors1013 and 
states,1014 including the US when the Arab League boycotts against Israel were 
concerned.1015 As in the TNC context the aims are not primarily security driven, 
                                                 
1013
 As far as Arab league boycotts and Helms Burton and D’Amato secondary measures are 
concerned, the question arises whether security exceptions or foreign policy exceptions exist 
in public international law that would preclude examining these measures concerning their 
WTO/GATT consistency, see for example Eugene Kontorovich, “Reconciling Political 
Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade: The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: 
Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?” (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 283 wfr who 
convincingly argues that such exceptions do not exist. More relevant for the TNC context that 
is not primarily concerned with security matters or general foreign policy concerns are 
secondary boycotts due to production methods, see for example Kinka Gerke “Unilateral 
Strains in Transatlantic Relations: US Sanctions against Those Who Trade with Cuba, Iran 
and Lybia, and their Effects on the World Trade Regime” (1997) 47 PRIF Report (Summary) 
<http://hsfk.de/Publications.9.0.html?&no_cache=1&L=1&detail=193&no_cache=0&cHash=
15c3b213e5> 1 May 2014, 2 referring to the GATT Panel Reports United States - Restrictions 
on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R - 39S/155) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) GATT Panel Report, not 
adopted, 3 September 1991 and United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS29/R) 
(“Tuna-Dolphin II”) GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 16 June 1994, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the following chapter of this enquiry. 
1014
 WTO/GATT members were of the opinion that the Arab League boycott harmed 
WTO/GATT rules and Saudi Arabia even agreed to suspend the secondary measures to ease 
its accession to WTO/GATT, see Eugene Kontorovich, “Reconciling Political Sanctions with 
Globalization and Free Trade: The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign 
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?” (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 283, 295 and Martin A. 
Weiss, “Arab League Boycott of Israel” (2006) CRS Report for Congress (19 April 2006) 
Order Code RS22424, available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22424.pdf> 1 May 2014, 
4; however, the United Arab Republic joined GATT while boycotting Israel, including 
secondary and tertiary sanctions, see Eugene Kontorovich, “Reconciling Political Sanctions 
with Globalization and Free Trade: The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can 
Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?” (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 283, 296 and 
Bashar H. Malkawi, “Anatomy of the Case of Arab Countries and the WTO” (2006) ALQ 
110, 124; see also WTO, Legal Affairs Division, WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law 
And Practice (3rd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e.htm> 1 May 
2014, 602-03 where it is stated that several members of the working party considered the 
Arab measures political and not commercial. 
1015
 Patrick Clawson, “Iran” in Richard N. Haass (ed), Economic Sanctions and American 
Diplomacy (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998) 85, 96 wfr, see also Martin A. 
 186
two, although not adopted,1016 GATT Panels Gerke points out are of special 
interest.1017 These GATT Tuna Panels1018 have answered the GATT-accordance 
of secondary embargos in the negative in the case where the US banned imports 
from third states that did not impose the primary embargos the US had 
imposed.1019 In the Tuna Panel cases the US wanted to ban the import of 
yellowfin tuna that was not caught in a dolphin protecting way as provided for in 
the US law for the protection of Marine Mammals.1020 Yet the US did not only 
ban the imports of the states not harvesting yellowfin tuna in accordance with 
the US dolphin protection, but also the import of yellowfin tuna products from 
third states which refrained from banning the import of yellowfin tuna from the 
primarily sanctioned states. The secondary boycott or “intermediary embargo” 
was supposed to support the direct embargo so that the latter could not be 
nullified by importing indirectly via third countries.1021 Making primary 
sanctions more efficient by targeting third states, not directly able to change the 
objectionable behaviour, because it is committed by the primary target, is the 
very aim of secondary sanctions as already set out above. Third states are 
pressured to act in accordance with the primary sanction to increase the pressure 
on the primary target and thereby enhance the chances of a behavioural change 
by the primary target. This was also seen to be the aim of the intermediary 
embargoes in the Tuna Panels.1022 Due to all these considerations it can be 
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concluded that secondary trade sanctions are usually violating WTO/GATT.1023 
Furthermore, the rather loose link between the violation of public international 
law, i.e. the violation of human rights by the host state, that triggered the 
primary sanction and the target of the secondary sanction, i.e. foreign 
corporations trading with the host state, makes the measure disproportionate in 
most cases.1024 This is because the suitability of the secondary measure, i.e. for 
example pressuring business partners of the host state, to achieve the primary 
sanction’s aim, i.e. the change in the host state’s behaviour, is very doubtful due 
to its indirectness. The latter derives from the fact that the secondary sanction is 
used to make the third actor support the primary sanction which in turn is 
supposed to make the host state change its behaviour. Only in cases where there 
is a link between the third actor’s action and the host state’s behaviour that 
triggered the primary sanction, the secondary measures are less indirect and less 
disproportionate. Those are for example cases where the third actor targeted by 
the secondary sanction is contributing to the human rights violation of the host 
state in some way. This is the case in the situation assessed in this research of 
home state TNCs violating human rights abroad. However, proportionality is 
particularly fragile in the singled-out human rights issues in the TNC context 
where not a whole regime is to be changed, but only some particular government 
behaviour. 
Yet as there has to be a certain link between the violation by the primary target 
and the third actor, i.e. the secondary target, for proportionality reasons and at 
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the same time the secondary target is not or cannot be included into the primary 
sanction measures, only a small scope of application is left for proportionate 
secondary sanctions. This scope is further confined by the requirements of 
terrinationality and per se accordance with public international law. All this 
leaves only a rather narrow scope for secondary sanctions in the TNC context. 
The home state may only prohibit its own corporations within its own territory 
to deal and trade with those actors, i.e. states and corporations, supporting or 
supplying the TNC subsidiary in the host state if this support and supply can be 
considered as contributing to the human rights violation committed by the TNC. 
As far as host states are concerned a contribution to human rights violations 
could for example be given due to neglect or omission. Furthermore, the primary 
sanction has to be in accordance with public international law as well. 
 
E Evaluating the different kinds of sanctions 
As could be seen various means considered as “sanctions” can be chosen in the 
TNC and human rights context. Unilateral measures are the ones home states 
may use. The unilateral measures may be positive and negative sanctions, yet 
both should be imposed as targeted or smart sanctions to be effective and to 
avoid undue hardship for the population. Furthermore negative sanctions, 
whether per se lawful or not, should preferably be combined with positive 
sanctions, particularly to enable the host state to take steps for the promotion and 
protection of human rights connected to the TNC without causing a withdrawal 
of resources elsewhere in the host state. Even secondary sanctions, which are 
measures not covered by the term “sanction” used in this enquiry, can be used 
when they are per se lawful and proportionate and where a primary sanction that 
is in accordance with public international law exists. However, the conditions 
concerning addressee and situation that allow imposing sanctions have to be 
met. Therefore the host states and TNCs as addressees of sanctions and the 
requirements to impose sanctions are assessed in the following. 
 
IV HOST STATES - TRADITIONAL ADDRESSEES OF SANCTIONS 
As could already be seen from the examples provided above, the sanctions 
imposed, whatever kind the might be, may affect corporations, but are primarily 
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aimed at states. In addition,  those “sanctions” targeting TNCs so far, i.e. 
secondary sanctions, can only be imposed when primary ones are used as well. 
As already outlined above when giving the definition of “sanction” used in this 
enquiry, it became clear that sanctions are means to influence a state’s 
behaviour. In the TNC context this of course means a rather indirect approach 
towards controlling the human rights records of TNCs acting abroad, because 
the host state is the one to be pressured to in turn increase its control over the 
human rights record of the TNC subsidiary. This somewhat remains of the naïve 
theory, according to which the population was pressured to change the 
government, which turned out to be a rather unreliable approach as already 
described above. Pressuring the host state to pressure the TNC subsidiary may 
work better as it is the host state’s duty to control the behaviour of the subsidiary 
and to protect human rights from the violation of private actors. It is similar to 
the approaches of suing the host state or host state officials sketched earlier.1025 
The requirements for the imposition of sanctions on the host state will therefore 
be assessed in the following. 
 
A Requirements for unilateral primary sanctions 
Unilateral sanctions can be implied as positive or negative sanctions and 
negative sanctions may contain means per se lawful under public international 
law and means that have to be justified to be lawful.1026 Depending on these 
different ways of imposing sanctions, different requirements have to be met by 
the sanction in order to be in accordance with public international law and not 
for example constituting an intervention violating the host state’s sovereignty in 
an unjustified way.1027 However, ius cogens and core human rights must not be 
affected by any of the sanctions and lex specialis is overriding the general rules 
set out here.1028 
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1 Positive sanctions 
Positive sanctions are lawful acts and not like negative primary sanctions or 
countermeasures wrongful acts that have to be justified or where the 
wrongfulness has to be precluded in order to make them lawful under public 
international law.1029 Therefore, they do not have to meet the same conditions as 
negative primary sanctions. In fact, they can be imposed any time.1030 Yet of 
course, they too have to meet the standards of international conventions1031 and 
proportionality.1032 Furthermore, when cutting them off, for example because 
human rights conditions in the host state are not as high as agreed upon and the 
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host state is not making sufficient effort to achieve the standards possible in the 
individual context, this cut off may cause severe consequences and therefore 
equal negative sanctions.1033 
 
2 Negative sanctions by using lawful measures 
The distinction between measures that have to be justified and those that are per 
se lawful may be difficult and depend on the particular context.1034 Yet measures 
that can be considered per se lawful like calling home ambassadors for 
“consultation” or visa restrictions1035 are similar to positive sanctions, because 
they do not violate public international law. Therefore they can be applied any 
time. However, as positive sanctions, they have to meet the basic standards of 
public international law,  e.g. proportionality.1036 Schachter for example suggests 
that reasonableness and good faith should be adhered to exclude inappropriate 
reactions to minor offences.1037 Regard should also  be given to host state 
particularities and resources to avoid demands and the application of high 
“western” standards the host state simply cannot fulfil. The basic ideas on 
proportionality are the same as for those measures that have to be justified and 
will be outlined below. They should be applied on lawful measures accordingly. 
 
3 Negative sanctions by using means that have to be justified 
As described above, negative primary sanctions are only one type of sanctions 
according to the broad meaning of the term used here, but they are an important 
and a rather delicate one. Furthermore, they are often the primary sanctions 
secondary sanctions are meant to support. As just mentioned, negative sanctions 
have to meet some requirements. These general requirements will be set out in 
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the following. Yet they can still be replaced by leges speciales. 1038 As far as 
negative sanction measures that are not always lawful are concerned, the main 
conditions to be met are that the sanctioning state does usually not only have to 
be “affected”, but “injured” and the sanction has to be proportional. 
 
(a) “Injured state” requirement 
Firstly the sanctioning state has to be harmed by the conduct of the target state 
to prevent sanctions from being triggered by imperialist or protectionist motives 
only.1039 Concerning human rights obligations the “injury” is a rather difficult 
issue, because due to the lack of reciprocity the obligations are not owed to 
another state in the same way bilateral treaty obligations are owed and violating 
them does therefore usually not mean that another state is legally injured or 
suffering any harm.1040 
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Yet another state might be entitled to impose countermeasures when erga omnes 
obligations are violated by the target state. Whether in those cases an injury of 
all states of the international community is assumed1041 or erga omnes 
obligations violations are considered an exception1042 from the rule that only the 
injured state(s) is/are entitled to impose countermeasures has no effect on the 
result. In either case the home state might be entitled to impose countermeasures 
or reprisals on the host state. Reasons and arguments in support of this approach 
are numerous and not undisputed. One of the main opposing arguments is the 
subjectivity of countermeasures and in cases of state responses to erga omnes 
obligation violations the sanctioning state decides on the violation unilaterally 
without an organization or collective opinion making. Due to the unilateral 
decision on countermeasures when answering erga omnes obligation violations 
it is claimed that the particularly collective character of the erga omnes 
obligations is not taken into account, but rather degraded to bilateral or 
                                                                                                                                                        
enforcement measures Karl Zemanek, “The Unilateral Enforcement of International 
Obligations” (1987) ZaöRV 32, 39; however, his opinion about art. 60 para. 5 VCLT is not 
undisputed, see Mohammed M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of 
Breach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) 112; see on the special issue of human rights 
violations, external pressure and sovereignty issues also Martin Nettesheim „Die ökologische 
Intervention“ (1996) 34 Archiv des Völkerrechts 167, 193 referring to Economic and Council 
Resolution (“ECOSOC“) 1235 (1967) and 1503 (1970), which limit the competence of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, only allowing it to hear human rights complaints 
where a pattern of gross and documented human rights violations exists. 
1041
 Zemanek for example considers a violation of erga omnes obligations a violation of the 
common purpose of  the according treaties and additional protocols, i.e. a violation of the 
common purpose and therefore of all contracting parties, see Karl Zemanek, “New Trends in 
the Enforcement of erga omnes Obligations” (2000) 4 Max Planck UNYB 1, 5-6. 
1042
 The ILC Draft Articles “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” 
(2001) UN A/RES/56/83 Annex treat this case as an exception, see art. 48: “Any State other 
than the injured State is entitled…” and Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 
(Vol II, Part 2, New York, Geneva: UN, 2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) 
Commentary on Part Three, Chapter I par. 2 p. 116: “Indeed, in certain situations, all States 
may have such an interest [in invoking responsibility and ensuring compliance with the 
obligation in question], even though none of them is individually or specially affected by the 
breach” referring to Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, 
Judgement (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, par. 32-3 which paraphrased erga omnes 
oblogations as “obligations towards the international community as a whole”; In Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 2001 (Vol II, Part 2, New York, Geneva: UN, 2007) 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) Commentary par. 12 on art. 48, p. 127 is further statet that  
“[i]n case of breaches of obligations under article 48, it may well be that there is no State 
which is individually injured by the breach, yet it is highly desirable that some State or States 
be in a position to claim reparation, in particular restitution.”. 
 194
bilaterisable multilateral obligations.1043 Yet as Tams observes: “…the real 
question in not whether international law should incorporate a requirement of 
collective conduct, but whether practice suggests that it actually does.”  Yet 
neither when examining countermeasures taken to answer erga omnes obligation 
violations by uninjured states nor when considering the famous Barcelona 
Traction Judgement1044 could such a requirement be found.1045 The Barcelona 
Traction case was the case that for the first time dealt with erga omnes 
obligations, although in an obiter dictum only.1046 It was about a Canadian 
corporation, doing business in Spain, owned mainly by shareholders from 
Belgium. As the corporation was declared bankrupt in Spain, Belgium sought 
reparation from Spain, because Spain had caused the bankruptcy by violating 
international law. Yet the Court held that Belgium was not entitled to do so, 
because the corporation was of Canadian nationality, and causing the 
bankruptcy was an act committed against the rights of the corporation rather 
than the shareholders. According to the court, diplomatic protection of the 
Canadian corporation was only possible by Canada, because it was only 
Canada’s right to protect the Canadian corporation. The Court declared that 
there were obligations towards the international community as a whole, but 
diplomatic protection was not one of them.1047 Yet the decision of the Court did 
not go any further and did not concern sanctions. There are many pragmatic and 
“political” arguments supporting the idea that states may impose 
countermeasures in cases of erga omnes obligation violations. It is for example 
claimed that in cases of the most sever wrongs, i.e. when violating erga omnes 
obligations, there would be no state authorized to impose countermeasures 
                                                 
1043
 See Daniel Bodansky and John R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility 
Articles” (2002) 96 AJIL 773, 786; James Crawford, “The Relationship between Sanctions 
and Countermeasures”, in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United Nations Sanctions and 
International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001) 57, 60 and 64. 
1044
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgement 
(Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970.  
1045
 Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 240 and 173-6. 
1046
 See Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) Chapter 1. 
1047
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgement 
(Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970 par. 33-4 
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whereas when bilateral or “bilateralisable”1048 obligations beneath erga omnes 
character are violated, countermeasures may be imposed, which is considered 
inappropriate.1049 Furthermore, supportive arguments are based on the ILC Draft 
Articles,1050 which in art. 48 provide for the possibility of uninjured states to 
invoke responsibility of another state when erga omnes obligations are violated. 
Yet as can be seen directly from art. 48 par. 2, invoking responsibility in the ILC 
Draft Articles does not mean being entitled to impose countermeasures, but to 
claim cessation, non-repetition and “performance of the obligation of 
reparation… in the interest … of the beneficiaries of the obligation in breach”, 
which in case of human rights violations would be the individuals violated.1051 
However, whether countermeasures1052 may be imposed by uninjured states is 
not answered by the ILC Draft Articles.1053 This can be seen in art. 54, which 
reads: 
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article , paragraph 
1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that 
State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State 
or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.1054 
 
The commentary does not provide an answer either. Instead, the issue os 
deliberately left open to further development in public international law.1055 
According to Tams the current status of this development in public international 
law can be assumed to be in favour of individual states imposing 
countermeasures in cases of gross and systematic erga omnes obligation 
                                                 
1048
 Examples of bilateralisable obligations deriving from multinational treaties exist in 
diplomatic and consular law, extradition etc, see Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations 
Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 45 wfr.  
1049
 See Denis Alland, “Countermeasures of General Interest” (2002) 13 EJIL 1221, 1239. 
1050
 ILC Draft Articles “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (2001) UN 
A/RES/56/83 Annex. 
1051
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 (Vol II, Part 2, New York, 
Geneva: UN, 2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) Commentary par. 3 on art. 33. p. 95 
concerning the ultimate beneficiaries and referred to in Commentary par.12 on art. 48, p. 128 
fn 734. 
1052
 In the ILC Draft Articles the term “countermeasure” is used as a synonym for “reprisal”. 
1053ILC Draft Articles “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (2001) UN 
A/RES/56/83. 
1054
 Art. 54 ILC Draft Articles Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001) UN A/RES/56/83 Annex. 
1055
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 (Vol II, Part 2, New York, Geneva: 
UN, 2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) Commentary par.6 and 7 on art. 54. 
 196
violations abroad, including human rights violations.1056 Tams reaches this 
conclusion after an in-depth analysis of international practice1057 and the fact 
that the commentary on art. 54 ILC Articles in par. 3 and 4 is based on the same 
cases.1058 Yet the ILC also points out the uncertainty concerning the current 
situation.1059 This is where Tams does not agree for “ the case of systematic or 
large-scale breaches of international law”1060 and in contrast argues that in those 
cases “there seems to exist a settled practice of countermeasures by States not 
individually injured.”1061 When examining the counter-arguments he 
convincingly points out that there has been an increasing number of states 
adopting countermeasures although they were not individually injured since the 
Barcelona Traction Judgement. In addition, the violations triggering these 
countermeasures were erga omnes or in some cases “obligations that count 
among the candidates most likely to have acquired erga omnes status.”1062 These 
obligations also include other human rights than for example the prohibition of 
racial discrimination, torture and genocide, which are already included in the 
recognized erga omnes obligations.1063 He convincingly argues that this practice 
is neither too selective nor too “western” to reflect the overall development in 
                                                 
1056
 Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 230, 249-251. 
1057
 Ibid. at 207-251. 
1058
 Examples from international practice examined ibid. 210-230. 
1059
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 (Vol II, Part 2, New York, Geneva: 
UN, 2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) Commentary par.3, 4 and 6 on art. 54, p. 137-
9. 
1060
 Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 231. 
1061
 Ibid. 
1062
 Ibid. at 233. 
1063
 Ibid.; also, although reluctantly, stating that human rights could become part of the erga 
omnes obligations is Jochen Abr. Frowein, “Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht 
und ihre Durchsetzung” in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, 
internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 1983) 241, 245-6; see also Robert J. Currie and Hugh M. Kindred, 
„Flux and Fragmentation in the International Law of State Jurisdiction: The Synecdochal 
Example of Canada’s Domestic Court Conflicts over Accountability for Interntational Human 
Rights Violations“ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of 
International and National Courts and the (De-) Fragmentation of International Law 
(Oxford, Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012) 217, 232, arguing that at least the freedom 
from torture, “if not the whole body of human legal protection” are obligations erga omnes. 
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public international law.1064 Tams also stresses that an accompanying opinio 
juris exists and cannot be excluded only because the acting states may also be  
influenced by political considerations, when explicitly acting to defend 
international law and responding to a breach of international law.1065 It can 
therefore be concluded for this research that in cases of large-scale or systematic 
breaches of erga omnes obligations uninjured states are entitled to impose 
countermeasures.1066 Yet of course the further requirements for countermeasures 
have to be met. 
 
(b) Proportionality 
The second requirement a primary negative sanction, whether lawful or to be 
justified, has to meet to be in accordance with public international law is 
proportionality. The proportionality principle is deeply seated in public 
international law1067 and is therefore also to be considered when implying 
sanctions1068 to exclude their exaggerative and disproportionate use. Yet 
                                                 
1064
 Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 234-7 and 249. 
1065
 Ibid. at 239. 
1066
 This is also in line with Tim Brune, Der Fall Österreich (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, 
Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang) 169; see also Jost Delbrück, 
Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System, (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot,1995) 152-3; Wilfried Fiedler, Eckart Klein, Anton K. Schnyder, Gegenmaßnahmen, 
(Bericht der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, vol.37, Heidelberg: Müller, 1998) 51 
wfr; Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht  (5th ed, München: C. H. Beck, 2004) § 59, Rn. 46; Jochen Abr. 
Frowein, “Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung” in Rudolf 
Bernhardt (ed) Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, 
Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1983) 241, 
246-250; Wilhelm Wengler, Völkerrecht (vol. 1, Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg: Springer, 
1964) 580; Elisabeth Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies (Dobbes Terry, New York: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 1984) 113-8;  
See also Klaus Bockslaff, Das völkerrechtliche Interventionsverbot als Schranke 
außenpolitisch motivierter Handelsbeschränkungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987) 145-
6, stating that the affectedness (he means “harm” in the sense used here) needed to impose 
sanctions is given when the aim of the sanction is to achieve compliance with erga omnes 
obligations. 
1067
 Klaus Bockslaff, Das völkerrechtliche Interventionsverbot als Schranke außenpolitisch 
motivierter Handelsbeschränkungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987) 141. 
1068
 See for example see Tim Brune, Der Fall Österreich (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, 
Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang) 169, 175 and 177 wfr; Enzo Cannizzaro, 
“The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures” (2001) 12 EJIL 
889, 910-1 suggesting that “weak” sanctions may be imposed on slight breaches of public 
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proportionality is a rather vague term, an indefinite legal concept needing more 
specific clarification to be applicable on a case-by-case basis. Concerning 
sanctions the proportionality principle can even be used twice.  
 
(i) Violation-answer proportionality 
Firstly, the relation between the violation of public international law by the 
target state and the measure taken to answer the violations by the sanctioning 
state has to be proportionate, which generally means the graver the violation the 
broader or more severe may be the response. Yet although using a quantitatively 
equivalent act for answering a wrongful act may be sufficient for retributive 
sanctions, such means may not be sufficient to achieve a change in the target 
state’s behaviour. For the latter it may rather be necessary to impose measures 
quantitatively exceeding the violation by the target state, but qualitatively lower 
than the breach committed to induce the target state to change its behaviour.1069 
This is also in line with art. 51 ILC Draft Articles.1070  
 
(ii) Means-ends proportionality 
Therefore, secondly, the relation between the aim focused on by the sanctioning 
state and the measure taken in order to achieve this aim has to be proportionate, 
too. As just set out, the means has to be proportionate to the end the sanctioning 
state is trying to achieve. To be proportionate, end and means have to be 
appropriate.1071  In human rights violation cases the aim is appropriate, as the 
promotion and protection of human rights is an aim in accordance with public 
                                                                                                                                                        
international law and grave sanctions as an answer to grave braches; Sascha Werthes, 
Probleme und Perspektiven von Sanktionen als politisches Instrument der Vereinten Nationen 
(Münster, Hamburg, London: LIT Verlag, 2003) 75, examples given in Annex II, pp. 182-6. 
1069
 Enzo Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International 
Countermeasures” (2001) 12 EJIL 889, 910. 
1070
 According to this article countermeasures must be proportional, taking into account the 
injury suffered, but also the harmed right in question and the gravity of the wrongful act, 
which is “partly independent of the question whether the countermeasure was necessary to 
achieve the result of ensuring compliance.”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
2001 (Vol II, Part 2, New York, Geneva: UN, 2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1(Part2) 
Commentary par.10 on art. 51, p. 135, in par. 2 and 3 (p. 134) wfr and examples. 
1071
 Enzo Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International 
Countermeasures” (2001) 12 EJIL 889, 897-9. 
 199
international law. This is even more so in cases where an erga omnes obligation 
was violated and a particular singled-out situation is focused on to achieve a 
change in behaviour. As far as the appropriateness of the means is concerned, 
things seem slightly less obvious. The means has to be suitable to achieve the 
aim.1072 Yet although there is an ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of 
unilateral sanctions,1073 it cannot be concluded that unilateral sanctions are per 
se not suitable to achieve a change in behaviour. Hufbauer, Scott and Elliott 
have examined unilateral US sanctions and found that the success of unilateral 
sanctions is enhanced when, amongst other things, (1) the political goal is 
defined clearly and the sanctions are aimed at this goal, (2) the sanctioner has 
substantial economic leverage on the target state and the target state cannot 
substitute the denied good, which includes a fast implication of the sanction on 
the target state so it cannot adapt its economy to the new situation,1074 (3) the 
target state and the sanctioning state had good relations in the past, (4) there are 
about to be domestic riots and civil commotions as well as domestic economic 
difficulties in the target state and (5) the sanction costs for US corporations is 
not as high as to strengthen the opponents of the sanctions within the US so that 
the political support for the sanction diminishes.1075 Of course there are many 
more factors influencing the effectiveness of (unilateral) sanctions, some of 
them beyond the sanctioning state’s reach like the reaction of third states1076 or 
                                                 
1072
 Ibid. at 899. 
1073
 See Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Trends in Economic Sanction Policy“ in Peter Wallensteen 
and Carina Staibano (eds), International Sanctions (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005) 3, 
8 table 1. 2 suggesting that unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US between 1970 
and 1999 were less successful than multilateral ones; Olaf Poeschke, Politische Steuerung 
durch Sanktionen? (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 2003) 58-9. 
1074
 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, (vol. 1, Washington D. C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1985) 81-106; Sascha Werthes, Probleme und Perspektiven von 
Sanktionen als politisches Instrument der Vereinten Nationen (Münster, Hamburg, London: 
LIT Verlag, 2003) 58. 
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 Kinka Gerke, “Die unilaterale Versuchung: Die Sanktionen der USA gegen die 
Handelspartner Kubas, Irans und Libyens und ihre Auswirkung auf das Welthandelsregime” 
(1997) 2 HSFK-Report 1, 35-6; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, (vol. 1, Washington D. C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1985) 81-106. 
1076
 For motives of non-great powers to support or not support unilateral sanctions imposed by 
other states see Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing, Sanctions in Canadian & Australian 
Foreign Policy (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 15, 19, 21, 23; 
see also Paul Conlon, Die rechtliche Problematik von UN-Sanktionen als Mittel zur 
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the political system of the target state,1077 but unilaterally imposed  sanctions 
cannot be considered unsuitable per se.1078 Furthermore, it can neither be said 
that negative sanctions are not working when trying to achieve behavioural 
change. 1079 In addition, Drezner points out that the success rate of sanctions in 
many studies appears to be lower than it in fact is. This is because in those cases 
where the imposition of negative sanctions is most likely to succeed, the 
sanctions do not have to be imposed at all. In fact, a credible threat to impose a 
sanction is sufficient to change the target state’s behaviour in those cases. The 
success rate of the “threatening phase”, however, is difficult to examine and has 
therefore not been included in most research.1080 That means in spite of the 
discussion concerning the effectiveness of sanctions they can be an appropriate 
means to achieve the aim of a behavioural change of the host state. 
After examining their aim and means and their appropriateness in particular for 
the TNC-human rights context, the last condition for the means-end 
proportionality is the relation between means and end.  This relation is usually 
measured either by a “necessity” test, asking whether the means is necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Durchsetzung des Völkerrechts (Walther Schücking-Kolleg 19, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 
1996) 25-7 referring to art. 50 UN Charta and its issues; Almut Hinz, Sanktionen gegen 
Libyen (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2005) 97; the reaction of the minorities from the target 
state in the sanctioning state as Prévost describes them in Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing, 
Sanctions in Canadian & Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994) 26 wfr, are no great factor in TNC cases where the target is not 
pressured in order to achieve a regime change. 
1077
 Sanctions work best when imposed by democracies on targets with a democratic structure 
of government, because they are only applied when there is a high chance of success, their 
legitimate reasons can be explained and therefore they do not automatically harden the dispute 
between the states; in addition the opposition within the target state in favour of the changes is 
supported, see Olaf Poeschke, Politische Steuerung durch Sanktionen? (Wiesbaden: 
Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 2003) 115. 
1078
 Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Trends in Economic Sanction Policy“ in Peter Wallensteen and 
Carina Staibano (eds), International Sanctions (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005) 3, 8 
table 1. 2 showing that there have been some successful unilateral economic sanctions 
imposed by the US between 1970 and 1999. 
1079
 Positive and negative sanctions are said to have similar effects as far as the change of 
behaviour in the target state is concerned, because the concessions a state is willing to make in 
order to stop or avoid negative sanctions and those it offers to gain economic benefits may be 
rather similar, see Peter Wallensteen, “Positive Sanctions” in Peter Wallensteen and Carina 
Staibano (eds), International Sanctions (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005) 229, 236; on 
the topic of positive sanctions and their effectiveness see also Eileen M. Crumm, “The Value 
of Economic Incentives in International Relations” (1995) 32 JPR 318. 
1080
 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion” (2003) 57 IO 643 yet he 
refers to economic sanctions only. 
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achieve the aim, i.e. that there is no other way to achieve it,1081 or the idea that 
the “least intrusive means” is to be used, suggesting that there is more than one 
means that can achieve the aim.1082 As sanctions may have severe side effects as 
already sketched above, it is submitted that the least intrusive means able to 
achieve the aim of human rights protection through a behavioural change of the 
host state is to be used. Thereby consequences or effects caused that are 
inconsistent with the aim of human rights protection are reduced.1083 This means 
negotiation and other means than sanctions will usually be the way to go.1084 
However, even where sanctions are considered to be the least intrusive means, 
the least intrusive sanction has to be chosen. These will often be diplomatic 
sanctions as the “weakest” sanctions to be used.1085 Yet where more intrusive 
sanctions are considered appropriate, for example because all other less intrusive 
means have been unfruitful,1086 the measures to use will be smart sanctions, 
avoiding side effects on the population as far as possible, while pressuring those 
in charge and those supposed to change their and/or the state’s behaviour. 
However, as the sanctioning states themselves choose the aim and the measure 
to achieve it, the means-end proportionality seems to be a rather useless 
condition to protect the target state from disproportionate sanctions, as this 
would allow for the most severe sanctions as long as the aim is far-reaching or 
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 Math Noortmann, Enforcing International Law (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2005) 
58-9 wfr Noortmann is treating the requirement of “necessity” separately and not within the 
requirement of proportionality. 
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 See for example Thomas M. Franck, “On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law” (2008) 102 AJIL 715, 744- 751, providing WTO examples of DSU and 
SCM. 
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 See also Enzo Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International 
Countermeasures” (2001) 12 EJIL 889, 910. 
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requirement Jenny Schultz and Rachel Ball, “Trade as a Weapon? The WTO and Human 
Rights-Based Trade Measures” (2007) 12 Deakin L. Rev. 41, 62. 
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 On diplomatic sanctions in general see Klaus Bockslaff, Das völkerrechtliche 
Interventionsverbot als Schranke außenpolitisch motivierter Handelsbeschränkungen (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1987) 141; Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in 
Globalized Relations (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 36; Kim Richard Nossal, Rain 
Dancing, Sanctions in Canadian & Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994) 3 wfr. 
1086
 Less intrusive means have to be taken  before using the more intrusive ones, see on ILC 
Draft Articles Karl Zemanek, “The Unilateral Enforcement of International Obligations” 
(1987) ZaöRV 32, 37. 
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ambitious enough.1087 This is why - additionally - the proportionality between 
the means taken and the violation caused by the target state, is considered, but 
not in terms of equivalence due to the considerations sketched above, but in 
terms of appropriateness.1088 Thereby the proportionality, i.e. appropriateness, of 
the response, may function as a corrective for the rather unlimited means-end 
proportionality needed to determine the means to be taken in order achieve the 
specific aim of behavioural change. The breach-response corrective is of special 
importance when either the aim or the side-effects of the least intrusive means 
are out of proportion to the breach committed by the target state. That allows for 
answering milder breaches of public international law as well, although by 
means less harmful than the means used when answering serious breaches of 
essential collective interests, but the aim pursued can still be coercion to achieve 
a behavioural change.1089  
 
(c) Further requirements 
Closely linked to the proportionality principle are the requirements of giving 
notice to the target state that sanctions will be implied and only imposing the 
sanction as long as the violations continues or in the case of the aim being the 
payment of reparations or another action, as long as the action has not been 
completed.1090 This means when the human rights violation does not exist any 
longer or the behavioural change is provided for example by more protection or 
prosecution in the specific circumstances criticized, the sanctions has to be 
lifted.1091  
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 Denis Alland, “Countermeasures of General Interest” (2002) 13 EJIL 1221, 1235; Enzo 
Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures” 
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B Requirements met in the TNC context? 
After having sketched the requirements of unilateral negative sanctions in the 
human rights context, it will be assessed now whether these are a workable 
home state tool in the human rights-TNC context. 
 
1 Erga omnes breaches by the host state 
As outlined above, human rights violations can usually only be answered by 
sanctions when they violate erga omnes obligations. In the TNC-human rights 
context, violation of obligations erga omnes by the host state will rather be the 
exception, as already seen above. Working conditions amounting to slavery as 
acknowledged under ATCA are the exception and the concept is not (yet) 
acknowledged in public international law. Usually “small-scale” human rights 
violations or violations concerning those obligations only “candidates” for erga 
omnes obligations are violated, for example when denying the freedom of 
association, harming the rights to health and life, etc.1092 Furthermore, in many 
cases the host state is violating the obligations by omission or neglect, because it 
is not providing sufficient protection or prosecution, usually not amounting to 
large-scale human rights violations.1093 Yet this does not mean that the 
development in public international law cannot be supportive of an increased 
protection of human rights via countermeasures. Additional human rights, such 
as the right to life, are already said to be possible candidates for becoming 
subject to erga omnes obligations.1094 In addition, public international law could 
allow for countermeasures in more cases of erga omnes obligation violations, 
including those that are not systematic or large-scale.1095 Although this seems 
                                                 
1092
 On labour rights and their erga omnes status see Jeroen Denkers, The World Trade 
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resolutions to protect human rights and sanctions by the collectively acting UN General 
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far-fetched at first glance, it has to be noted that the ILC Articles were supposed 
to contain the possibility of any state taking countermeasures to answer serious 
erga omnes breaches.1096 This was even approved of, but then art. 54 was only 
included last minute1097 due to the concerns of some governments, while the 
majority of governments had accepted the possibility for countermeasures in 
cases of serious erga omnes obligation violations.1098 That means there was no 
general rejection of the idea of allowing rather broad countermeasures in cases 
of erga omnes breaches.1099 Furthermore, the erga omnes concept and ideas of 
its possible development does not stop there. Other contexts of erga omnes 
breaches have to be considered as well. Standing before the ICJ in cases of  erga 
omnes breaches has developed since the Barcelona Traction case,1100 suggesting 
that a broad approach has emerged, allowing all states to “institute proceedings 
against States principally responsible for violations of obligations erga 
omnes.”
1101
 This is also in line with the parallel development of provisions in 
several international treaties involving human rights, which are “recognising the 
right of States to institute inter-State proceedings irrespective of individual 
injury”1102 as for example  in the Banjul Charter1103 or CEDAW.1104 It is 
therefore claimed that the broad approach concerning reactions to erga omnes 
braches  have become the rule in treaties protecting general interests.1105 After 
having sketched these developments, it becomes clear that although 
countermeasures are not the same as the standing before the ICJ  and Barcelona 
Traction did not include countermeasures in its judgement,1106 the general trend 
towards a broader approach concerning reactions to erga omnes breaches 
triggered by Barcelona Traction cannot be denied. Be it treaties, ICJ decisions 
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or countermeasures when systematic or large-scale erga omnes braches 
occurred, there has been a development since the 1970s. All these developments 
that have already taken place make an even broader approach in the context of 
countermeasures that does not only depend on large-scale or systematic 
violations more likely than not. 
 
2 Proportionality issues 
Even when erga omnes breaches by host states are given, proportionality issues 
are a further challenge, also in the TNC context. 
 
(a) Means-end proportionality 
In the context of human rights and TNCs the latter means that the measures 
taken by the home state have to be appropriate for achieving a change in the host 
state behaviour to increase the human rights protection from violations by 
TNCs. As far as sanctions in response to erga omnes obligation violations are 
concerned, no mere “selfish” sanctions are imposed, as already explained above. 
Instead the aims of coercion or compellence are of interest to the international 
community as a whole. That makes them per se more appropriate than the same 
aims in a solely bilateral context.1107 To assess the appropriateness further, most 
of the above mentioned factors that enhance the success of unilateral sanctions 
are also applicable in the TNC context. Although the forth criterion of domestic 
riots and civil commotions shows that the sanctions examined by Hufbauer, 
Scott and Elliott were aimed at regimes as a whole rather than particular singled-
out issues like in the TNC and human rights context, the other criteria can be 
used in the TNC context as well and seem to be rather promising. This is 
because the goal of ending human rights violations or increasing human rights 
protection in singled-out situations can be defined rather clearly. In addition, the 
costs involved for the sanctioner’s own corporations are usually focused on the 
parent1108 and even where this is not the case, there may be some support for the 
sanctions as human rights protection is an issue of public interest. If, in addition, 
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 Enzo Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International 
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 For example when the products are exported to the home state to be used by the parent 
company for further manufacturing. 
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the target state is economically dependent on the sanctioner in some way and the 
two states had good relations in the past, unilateral sanctions can therefore be 
quite promising. 
 
(b) Corrective of apprioprateness 
Like in other any case, the aim or the side-effects of the least intrusive means 
can also be inappropriate in relations to the breach of the target state. In the TNC 
context, when the home state is imposing smart sanctions to achieve a change in 
the host state’s behaviour with regard to the compliance of erga omnes 
obligations connected to the TNC subsidiary as an answer to a violation of erga 
omnes obligations in connection with the very TNC subsidiary, the corrective 
might usually not be needed. Yet the singled-out cases may call for a corrective 
in spite of the seriousness of the breach the host state committed in some cases, 
because the approach via the host state is a rather indirect one to control the 
TNC as already set out above. Disproportionate side-effects may be caused by 
the least-intrusive means in different ways in the TNC-human rights context. 
Where resources to protect human rights are scarce, be it know-how, tools and 
materials or personnel, pressure from the home states to increase control in the 
TNC subsidiary context may e.g. entail withdrawal of control from other places 
in the host state to be able to provide the requested control in the TNC 
subsidiary’s surrounding. This, however, may worsen the overall human rights 
situation in the host state and effects inconsistent with the aim of human rights 
protection are caused, which can render the measures disproportionate to the 
violation as well. A similar example can be seen where child labour is fought 
without providing for income alternatives for the children’s families in need so 
that the children are then working in areas not getting so much attention by the 
importing “western” countries or in the black economy under even worse 
conditions.1109 Whether court decisions, sanctions or other pressure from the 
home state, a host state that is not unwilling but unable to enforce its human 
rights protecting laws properly needs help, i.e. for example positive sanctions, 
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 See Philippe Schneuwly, “Sind Handelssanktionen ein geeignetes Mittel zur 
Durchsetzung von Arbeitsnormen?” (2003) Aussenwirtschaft 121, 139 wfr. 
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and not pressure in order to improve its human rights protection.1110 In these 
cases the corrective for primary negative sanctions may be the use of positive 
sanctions as a supportive means. 
 
V TNCS AS POSSIBLE DEVELOPING ADDRESSEES? 
As already pointed out earlier in this enquiry, controlling TNCs abroad via the 
host state is a very indirect way of control entailing problems of applicability 
and effectiveness This can for example be seen in the more radical inter-state 
measures examined, i.e. suing the host state, its officials and using negative 
sanctions that have to be justified, which require jus cogens or erga omes 
breaches to justify the violation of the host state’s sovereignty. In addition, it 
may worsen the overall human rights situation in a host state when the state is 
pressured to improve the situation in a TNC subsidiary and its neighbourhood 
and scarce resources are withdrawn from other parts of the host state. Pressure 
on host states in singled-out cases of home state interests are therefore at least 
problematic. Due to these considerations more direct ways of control of TNCs 
abroad seem preferable. Yet as seen above, primary sanctions are inter-state 
measures that one state imposes on another state as a means of self-defence or 
enforcement. However, an intra-state dimension has been added by including 
ruling élites, rebel groups, etc as possible targets due to their similarity to 
governments in that they “reign” over certain territories. Furthermore, private 
individual actors have been targeted by sanctions as well, for example members 
of government by visa restrictions or freezing of their assets. The non-
governmental opposition in the host state can be supported by positive 
sanctions.1111 Corporations have also felt the consequences of sanctions as could 
already be seen above. The home state assets of corporations can also be frozen 
and travel restrictions might affect corporate officials as well. However, all the 
measures imposed on private actors as sanctions, be they negative or positive, 
are imposed to change the host state behaviour, to change the behaviour of the 
government, not of the private actors themselves. They are only a tool to achieve 
the government change much like the population is according to the naïve 
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theory, the difference being that those pressured are closer to the government 
and the decisions needed to achieve the required change. That means private 
actors may be affected by primary sanctions, but the target of the sanction is the 
host state and its government. However, this does not mean that it has to stay 
this way. As TNCs are gaining power and have more power and influence and 
may therefore affect human rights in many situations, as outlined above, it 
seems their behaviour should also be targetable by sanctions. The home state 
could for example directly aim at changing the TNC’s behaviour abroad, 
sanctioning the TNC subsidiary and pressuring the parent at home. Yet should it 
really be possible to directly target TNCs by primary sanction such as the 
freezing of assets, travel bans and trade restrictions? Or put differently- could 
sanctions be used to change the behaviour of private actors themselves as well? 
This second question already provides the simple answer, at least for the next 
couple of decades: no. This has to do with corporations’ legal status under 
public international law as described earlier in this research. They are not treated 
as states yet, not even as private individuals and this is not likely to change 
within the next few years. A state intending to change another state’s behaviour 
uses public international law containing the rules for sanctions as set out above, 
because public international law is governing the relation between states, 
international organisations and other subject of public international law.1112 Yet 
as already discussed above, TNCs are no such subjects (yet). The very idea of 
countermeasures as a means of states set out above derives from the underlying 
principles of public international law of the equality of states, i.e. equality of 
actors using sanctions and being possible targets of sanctions. Closely linked to 
the equality principle is the fact that no enforcement mechanisms for public 
international law exist that are comparable to domestic law mechanisms. 
Countermeasures are filling this gap to some extent. TNCs, however, are no 
state-like equal actors, as seen above. TNCs have neither a territory nor a people 
and - plainly put - they cease to exist when they stop doing business. Their great 
power and influence is purely economic-based and dependent. Whether they can 
violate erga omnes rules at all is still disputed, which can for example be seen 
from the latest ATCA cases before the US Supreme Court. The answer to this 
questions once more depends on the understanding of the legal personality and 
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status TNCs have under public international law as assessed earlier in this 
research and where it was concluded that no broadly accepted base for holding 
corporations internationally liable exists (yet). To be able to apply sanctions 
directly at TNCs, a whole different system of sanctions would have to be 
introduced. Yet that this will happen soon is rather unlikely, because as could be 
seen above, the legal status of corporations under public international law is 
highly disputed, binding rules for them could not be established and there are 
easier ways more likely to be implemented to hold TNCs liable. International 
enforcement measures like these new sanctions could only be created and used 
once international direct obligations are created, which is not likely to happen, 
as set out above.  
In contrast to influencing state behaviour, a state intending to change the 
behaviour of private individuals uses its domestic law. That means the home 
state may create laws and regulations to influence the behaviour of private 
actors, yet, of course, only as long as these laws and regulations do not violate 
public international law. The latter is of particular importance in cross-border 
situations like the TNC context as already examined above. This once more 
shows the complexity of the issue and the unsatisfying situation of TNCs acting 
globally without corresponding enforceable rules. The home state may use its 
criminal, private and administrative law to influence the behaviour of private 
actors, yet not exceeding the confinements provided by public international law 
like ius cogens, jurisdictional rules and WTO/GATT. In other words, public 
international law is the limit instead of being the base for measures targeted at 
private actors at the moment and the next decades to come. In chapters II and III 
the restrictions of criminal liability of foreign private actors acting abroad was 
already sketched, concluding that only when ius cogens is violated the home 
state could claim jurisdiction over the foreign private actor. In private law the 
scope was a little broader as the example of ATCA showed, as court and 
Congress interpreted and developed the “law of nations” so that it already now 
includes more than ius cogens only. The freezing of assets of the foreign 
subsidiary when a lawsuit is filed for example could be regulated in the 
domestic law of the home state and although ius cogens violations of TNCs will 
be rare, domestic criminal sanctions could include travel bans and trade 
restrictions as far as consistent with WTO/GATT. Travel bans or visa restrictions 
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and trade restrictions for foreign TNC officials or TNC products could also be 
created by administrative law in cases of violations of core human rights, yet 
again public international law like WTO/GATT has to be observed. Where the 
parent has factual control over the subsidiary acting abroad, it is not precluded 
that assets of the subsidiary exist in the home state, that officials of the 
subsidiary want to enter the home state for meetings and conferences with 
officials of the parent or that products of the subsidiary are imported into the 
home state to be used by the parent for manufacturing its own products. 
Therefore even small-scale measures like travel bans and the others just 
mentioned are not necessarily lacking any effectiveness. Yet they cannot be 
applied on TNCs under public international law. 
 
These findings of sanctions being a tool for inter-state relations only is perfectly 
in line with the definition of the term “sanction” provided above as being a 
means of states to change the behaviour of other states with regard to 
international human rights standards. Furthermore, it is also in accordance with 
the idea of secondary sanctions provided above. When imposed against private 
actors secondary sanctions have to be terrinational, because they are often 
measures governed by the domestic law of the sanctioning state which is of 
limited jurisdiction depending on the links of territoriality or nationality. 
However, when secondary sanctions are imposed on states to change the 
behaviour of the state targeted by the secondary measure, further requirements 
have to be met, because secondary sanctions are not targeted at the violator of 
public international law. The measures are only lawful when public international 
law like diplomatic law or WTO/GATT law is met. It is therefore submitted that 
TNCs may be affected by primary sanctions and targeted by measures according 
to the domestic law of the home state, which again is limited by public 
international law. These findings are of course also valid for positive sanctions, 
which means that for changing a TNC’s behaviour incentives may for example 
be given directly to the subsidiary or be granted in a treaty concluded between 
the home state and the subsidiary, whereas treaties concluded between the home 
and the host state on development aid, etc, are intended to influence the host 
state’s behaviour and not addressed to the TNC. 
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VI CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK CONCERNING SANCTIONS AS A HOME STATE 
MEANS TO INFLUENCE TNC BEHAVIOUR ABROAD 
As outlined in this chapter, sanctions can be applied for different reasons to 
pursue manifold aims and in selfish ways as well as serving more common 
interests like the protection of human rights. Targeted positive as well as smart 
negative and “secondary sanctions” may be applied unilaterally in the TNC 
context. All sanctions have to be in accordance with public international law. 
For positive and lawful negative sanctions that basically means that they have to 
be proportionate and in accordance with international conventions and of course 
ius cogens. For unlawful negative measures that have to be justified or of which 
the wrongfulness has to be precluded this means they are restricted to situations 
where the target state violates erga omnes obligations. Furthermore, this 
violation has to be systematic and large-scale according to current state practice, 
yet chances are that other serious violations of erga omnes obligations are 
included in this requirement as well within the next decades. In addition, the 
measures have to be proportionate as well in the sense of appropriate concerning 
the breach committed by the host state and suitable and appropriate in order to 
achieve the intended change of behaviour of the target state. Often a “sticks and 
carrots” 1113 combination of targeted positive and negative measures might be 
best apt to effectively change the host state’s behaviour without causing too 
many negative side-effects while still increasing effectiveness.1114 However, the 
indirectness of sanctioning the host state for its neglect or omission concerning 
the human rights violation caused by the TNC acting abroad is rather 
unsatisfying. TNCs on the other hand can only be affected, but not targeted by 
the sanctions used against states as they are neither states nor international 
organisations but private actors and it is not very likely that their status under 
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public international law is going to change soon as assessed earlier in this 
enquiry. This means their behaviour is to be governed by domestic law instead 
of public international law. Yet this does not mean that domestic law cannot 
provide for similar consequences for private actors as sanctions do for states or 
ruling élites. However, the limits for domestic law, especially when applied on 
foreign nationals acting abroad, is public international law. The issues that arise 
when applying domestic law in such a way have already been sketched in the 
preceding chapters. So due to the confined measures that are per se lawful and 
the unlikeliness of serious breaches of erga omnes obligations by host states in 
the TNC-human rights context, the scope of application for negative sanctions is 
rather confined. This makes secondary sanctions rather unusual as well. Only 
positive sanctions regularly remain applicable in a broader scope as their 
proportionality is not as restrictive, because incentives are granted rather than 
restrictions made. This suggests that negative sanctions are not exactly perfectly 
apt for tackling the TNC-human rights issue, which is in line with the usually 
broader use of sanctions as measures to for example secure or restore peace and 
security, overthrowing regimes, etc. It affirms once more the impression that 
sanctioning the host state is too indirect a means to be satisfying and that other, 
more direct or at least less coercive, ways as outlined in the preceding chapters 
are preferable and more likely to (soon) be already applicable. However, less 
invasive, more corporation-targeted and therefore “smarter” measures in the 
TNC context than sanctions could be trade bans, directly affecting TNCs. This 
option will therefore be assessed in the next chapter of this research. 
 
 213
 
 CHAPTER V: POTENTIAL OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS TO HOLD TNCS LIABLE 
As just mentioned, the more direct and more trade-centred and therefore also 
TNC-centred approach of trade restrictions as a means to control TNCs acting 
abroad will be examined in this chapter. The underlying idea is the imposition of 
trade restrictions on products manufactured by the TNC subsidiary that is 
violating human rights abroad. This means referring to the product itself as well 
as the production and processing methods (PPM) applied by the subsidiary. One 
sort of trade restrictions affecting TNCs was already assessed in the preceding 
chapter when examining economic sanctions.1115 As seen above, smart sanctions 
aimed at ruling élites and governments are not suitable for TNCs, because TNCs 
cannot be the targets of sanctions and even when sanctions are used that affect 
TNCs, smart sanctions do not seem capable of affecting TNC subsidiaries in a 
well-tailored way. Therefore some kind of “smart” or “tailored” measures 
affecting TNCs more severely have to be found. These could be so-called 
“tailored trade restrictions” or “tailored sanctions”,1116 which “apply to goods 
where [human rights] violation occurred during production”.1117 Yet it is 
important to note that the measures assessed in the present chapter are not equal 
to “sanctions” as defined earlier in this enquiry, but an additional, more flexible 
and easier applicable means to tackle the human rights and TNC issue for cases 
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where the subsidiary exports its goods to the home state.1118 This means they are 
supposed to be a home state option to take unilateral approaches to answer 
violations of human rights that do not amount to breaches of ius cogens or 
obligations erga omnes. So while the preceding chapter focused on public 
international law on sanctions as a means, this chapter will focus on trade law, 
particularly WTO law.1119 It is submitted that not only violations of labour 
rights1120 can be answered by tailored trade restrictions, but a broader scope of 
human rights violations linked to the production of the particular goods, such as 
the violation of the right to health caused by the production, but affecting not 
only the workers, but also other people, for example in the neighbourhood of the 
TNC subsidiary. Even supporters of positive measures like the clauses in GSPs 
mentioned above, acknowledge that trade restrictions imposed directly on the 
goods manufactured in a way that violates human rights, can be more effective 
than GSP incentives (alone).1121 To examine this home state option some 
examples of trade restrictions affecting TNCs will be given. These will once 
more show the close relation to sanctions as assessed in the previous chapter, yet 
regarded from the trade law angle. As WTO law provides limitations for the use 
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of trade restrictions, the relationship between the flexibile, shifting and always 
developing areas of human rights and WTO law will be examined in more detail 
in the following sections, pointing out developments in the WTO system. 
Possible solutions for the tensions between human rights and trade law will be 
presented after giving reasons why human rights and trade law should be linked. 
  
I EXAMPLES OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS AS A MEANS TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE 
TNC BEHAVIOUR 
Any corporation manufacturing goods for export is affected when its goods are 
not allowed into an importing state, e.g. because of its production methods or 
where labelling is required. By banning the import of (unlabelled) products that 
are not produced in accordance with human rights standards abroad, home states 
could therefore directly influence the human rights records of their TNCs acting 
abroad. Yet of course for the topoic assessed in this enquiry this approach is 
restricted to TNCs manufacturing goods for exportation into the home state. 
 
There have been approaches to protect certain rights by using trade restrictions 
before. Concerning the global issue of environmental protection there have been 
different trade restrictions. The best known ones of GATT/WTO are the partly 
already mentioned Tuna-Dolphin1122 and the Shrimp-Turtle1123 cases dealing 
with environmental issues, which will be assessed in further detail below. Yet 
there is also an early example concerning social standards for workers. In 1906, 
i.e. far pre-GATT, the manufacturing and importation of matches produced with 
white phosphor, a substance that caused grave lunge diseases among workers, 
was prohibited.1124 All these cases have in common that states want to protect 
certain standards globally and do not want to indirectly participate in violations 
of these standards and rights. As already mentioned earlier in this research, core 
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human rights can be considered universal standards. Their global protection 
should therefore be possible. 
 
However, assessing the “human rights options” under GATT/WTO law faces 
some difficulties, because WTO law does not provide for a general “human 
rights exception”. What is does offer, however, are several possible connections 
for human rights exceptions.1125 So while there is only limited case law 
concering “human rights” exceptions to free trade, the underlying arguments of 
the existing cases in which GATT and WTO Panels have dealt with possible 
conflicts between WTO law and other areas of public international law are of 
importance for this enquiry.1126 Furthermore, the other ares of public 
international law assessed by the Panels include areas of human rights law, as 
for example environmental law.1127 Therefore, these existing cases will be 
summarized in the following as they present an important base for the 
relationship of WTO law and those human rights they deal with, as well as for 
the discussion of the relationship between other human rights and WTO law. 
The relevance and impact of these cases on developments in WTO law will be 
assessed in more detail below. 
 
A  Cases of existing trade restrictions 
In the following some of the cases dealing with the protection of (certain) 
human rights or other interests protected by domestic law will be sketched in 
chronological order. Most of the cases are dealing with environmental and 
human and animal life and health issues. 
 
                                                 
1125
 Frank J. Garcia, “The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human 
Rights Principle” (1999) 25 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 51, 79. 
1126
 See also Sarah Joseph, Blame it to the WTO? A Human Rights Critique (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 50-5. 
1127
 On the issue of environmental law as part of human rights law see for example Berta 
Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Stephen J. Powell, Just Trade: A New Covenant Linking Trade 
and Human Rights (New York, London: New York University Press, 2009) 85-8, stating on p. 
87 that “a healthy environment is certainly as much a human right as are prevention of torture 
and assurance of religious freedom.” 
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1 Tuna - Dolphin I and II 
One of the most well-known cases concerning the protection of environmental 
issues under GATT are the already above mentioned Tuna-Dolphin decisions.1128  
 
In Dolphin-Tuna I the US imposed import bans on tuna that was not caught 
dolphin-friendly and the US “dolphin-safe” label was challenged by Mexico. 
Although this pre-WTO decision was not adopted1129 and has therefore no legal 
status in the WTO, it is still relevant for guidance in new disputes and therefore 
for the development of WTO jurisprudence.1130 
 
In its decision the Panel rejected the application of art. III:4 GATT, which reads 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
 
The Panel argued that art. III:4 did not cover production and processing methods 
(PPM), but only product regulations. It based this interpretation of art. III:4 on 
the parallel to art. III:2 GATT1131 and the Ad Art. III GATT, which explicitly 
only refer to regulations, requirements, etc concerning the product, not the non-
                                                 
1128
 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R - 39S/155) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) 
GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 3 September 1991; United States - Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna (DS29/R) (“Tuna-Dolphin II”) GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 16 June 1994. 
1129
 On this issue and the adoption procedure before and under WTO see Helge Elisabeth 
Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2000) 34. 
1130
 See Joseph Robert Berger, “Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the World's Living 
Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough For the GATT in the WTO Sea Turtle Case” 
(1999) 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 355, 368; these unadopted reports have the status of soft law, 
see Mary E. Footer, “The (Re)Turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO 
Law” (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int’l L.241, 247. 
1131
 Art. III:2  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1947): 2.”The products of 
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any 
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or 
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” 
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incorporated PPM.1132 The Panel went on setting out that the US Act for the 
protection of sea mammals (MMPA), was a PPM-based act and even went 
further stating that even when the MMPA was considered to be product-based, 
tuna caught dolphin-friendly and tuna that was not caught dolphin-friendly were 
“like products” and therefore unequal treatment was not permissible under art. 
III:4 GATT. The Panel held that art. XI GATT (General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions) was applicable and violated by the import bans. 1133 It 
also found that the import bans were not justified under the general exceptions 
of art. XX GATT. It argued that regulations, although consistent with an 
objective named in art. XX GATT, were not permissible under GATT when they 
were establishing rules valid outside the regulating state’s territory, because 
otherwise any state could determine the standards for the protection of the 
objectives in art. XX GATT for its imports and thereby force its standards upon 
other states. This would cause legal uncertainty and deprive the GATT of its 
multilateral character.1134 The Panel also argued that the measures were not 
“necessary” in the sense of art. XX (b),1135 because the US had not sufficiently 
tried to negotiate a multilateral solution with the other states involved.1136 In 
addition, the measure was not sufficiently predictable as the amount of 
incidental takings of US fishermen was decisive for the import ban, yet this 
amount could not be known by Mexican fishermen.1137 
 
In Dolphin-Tuna II , which was also not adopted, the EC/EU and Netherlands 
challenged the US import bans on tuna from third states that did not themselves 
impose the US import ban on tuna that was not caught according to US 
regulations to protect dolphins. These “intermediary nation embargos” or 
                                                 
1132
 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R - 39S/155) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) 
GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 3 September 1991; Ad Art. III GATT, available at WTO 
Website “The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947)” Annex I 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_03_e.htm#annexi> 1 May 2014. 
1133
 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R - 39S/155) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) 
GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 3 September 1991. 
1134
 Ibid. 
1135
 Art. XX (b) GATT deals with the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. 
1136
 On the decision, including the issue of negotiations see for example Steve Charnovitz, 
"Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules: Recent Developments and New Opportunities" 
(1993) 27 JWT 37. 
1137
 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R - 39S/155) (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) 
GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 3 September 1991 par. 5.28. 
 219
“secondary sanctions” were already mentioned in the preceding chapter and it 
was already sketched there that such measures are highly disputed and their 
accordance with international trade law was questioned by many states. The 
Panel held that art. XI GATT was violated and that art. III GATT was not 
applicable, because the measures in question were PPM- and not product-based. 
Like in Tuna-Dolphin I the Panel did not find any justification according to art. 
XX GATT either. Although it did not agree with Tuna-Dolphin I that domestic 
laws and regulations having an extraterritorial effect would be impermissible 
under GATT, which could be derived from the existence of art. XX (e)1138 
GATT,1139 it only held that own nationals or vessels may be bound by 
extraterritorial laws.1140 The Panel further held that not taking into account 
whether the importing state had itself imposed measures to protect dolphins 
made the measure not “least GATT-inconsistent” and thereby not “necessary”. 
Furthermore it argued that the intermediate nation embargoes were not directly 
(“primarily”) aimed at protecting the objective set our in art. XX (g)1141 as only 
when the exporting state changes its policy the exhaustible natural resource, i.e. 
dolphins, are protected, but not by the import ban itself. According to this 
decision the use of trade restrictions to change a state’s behaviour, the very aim 
of sanctions as set out above, is not permissible under GATT. The Panel also 
pointed out that multilateral treaties and agreements like CITES and the 
Stockholm Declaration could not be referred to when interpreting GATT rules, 
because not all states that adopted GATT had also adopted the Stockholm 
Declaration. 
 
                                                 
1138
 Art. XX (e) GATT covers measures relating to products of prison labour. 
1139
 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 93: the counter argument is that the objective of 
art. XX (e) is the protection of the domestic economy from competition of cheaply produced 
goods rather than extraterritorial human rights, because ILO Convention No. 29 does not hold 
any prison labour to be socially unacceptable, but provides for certain requirements that have 
to be met in order so be socially acceptable. 
1140
 On the incoherency of this reasoning see Sarah Joseph, Blame it to the WTO? A Human 
Rights Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 107, pointing out that extraterritorial 
effects coercing the policies of other states may also be given when only the state’s own 
nationals are bound. 
1141
 Art. XX (g) GATT covers measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption”. 
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The Tuna-Dolphin decisions are also considered to be an example for the 
effectiveness of unilateral trade restrictions based on the production methods of 
a good by showing its long-term effect and its ability to raise awareness and 
work as a catalyst for multinational agreements. After the already above 
mentioned Tuna-Dolphin decisions, for example the International Agreement 
for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality was concluded in 1992 and signed by 12 
states, among them USA and Mexico.1142 However, the effectiveness of targeted 
trade restrictions is not unchallenged.1143 
 
2 Gas Guzzler Tax Case 
The Gas Guzzler Tax Case1144 was a pre-WTO case on extraterritorial protection 
of environmental rights. The US taxed the import of cars according to the cars’ 
fuel consumption, taxing those with a higher consumption higher than those 
with a low consumption. The EU opposed this measure, claiming that the equal 
treatment clause of art. III:2 GATT (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation) was violated and no justification was given by art. XX (g) or (d) 
GATT. The Panel rejected this reasoning, stating that when the tax was first 
implemented, most domestic automobiles could not meet the threshold provided 
for in the Gas Guzzler law, so the target was not on foreign automobiles and 
neither was the effect a change of conditions of competition. Foreign producers 
could esasily adhere to requirements of the Gas Guzzler law. Furthermore, it 
held that GATT only prevented protectionist measures but not measures in 
                                                 
1142
 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, “International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation“ (1997) 91 AJIL 168, 300; for further examples see 
Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 37-8. 
1143
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford , 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 120; on the ineffectiveness of Special and Differential 
Treatment and options for a new framework see Bernard Hoekman, “Operationalizing the 
Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment” in Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann (ed), Reforming the World Trade System, Legitimacy, Efficiency and 
Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 223-245; Peter Sutherland 
(Chairman) et al, “The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new 
millennium” Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpadki (Geneva: WTO, 2004)  par. 94 concerning GSPs and “developed country 
lobbying agendas”. 
1144
 The Gas Guzzler Tax was one of three measures examined in United States – Taxes on 
Automobiles (DS31/R) GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 11 October 1994. 
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accordance with national environmental protection laws.1145 Therefore art. III 
GATT was not violated.  
 
3 EC - Hormones Cases 
A more inwardly oriented case, concering the protection of the right to health of 
the importing state’s population, yet still affecting corporations abroad was the 
EC-Hormones Case.1146 The effects on the right to health by new developments 
in WTO law are reflected in the decisions concerning this case. Already before 
the foundation of the WTO the US and Canada brought a case before a GATT 
Panel against the EC, because they were of the opinion that the EC import ban 
of meat from beef treated with hormones violated GATT law. In this first dispute 
the US and Canada were not successful. It was only due to the stricter rules of 
the new SPS Agreement1147 that later allowed the DSB to find that the import 
ban violated WTO law by not being consistent with art. 5.1 SPS.1148 
The Hormones cases1149 dealt with EC import bans on US and Canadian meat 
and meat products, because the EC had passed the Council Directive 
88/146/EEC Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain Substances 
Having a Hormonal Action.1150 The US and Canada considered this to be a 
breach of Articles III or XI of the GATT, dealing with  National Treatment on 
Internal Taxation and Regulation and the General Elimination of Quantitative 
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 See also Richard Senti, Die WTO im Spannungsfeld zwischen Handel, Gesundheit, Arbeit 
und Umwelt (vol. 32, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006) 39, 49; the case is also examined in 
Andreas Diem, Freihandel und Umweltschutz in GATT und WTO (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1996) 46-8. 
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 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (“Hormones”) 
WT/DS26/R/USA (26 January 1996) WT/DS48/R/CAN (18 August 1997) WT/DS26/AB/R 
and WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998). 
1147
 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (1995). 
1148
 Wolfram Spelten, WTO und nationale Sozialordnungen (vol.11, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2005) 217-9; on the stricter rules of SPS than GATT see also Caroline Dommen, 
“Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and 
Possible Strategies” (2002) 24 HRQ 1, 17 and 22, stating that in European Communities - 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (“Asbestos”) WT/DS135/R 
(18 September 2000) and WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001) the Panel did not require 
scientific proof for the health risks, but only applied a sort of reasonableness test. 
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 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (“Hormones”) 
WT/DS26/R/USA (26 January 1996) WT/DS48/R/CAN (18 August 1997) WT/DS26/AB/R 
and WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998). 
1150
 Council Directive 88/146/EEC Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain 
Substances Having a Hormonal Action (1988). 
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Restrictions, and a breach of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement, dealing 
with Basic Rights and Obligations, Harmonization and the Assessment of Risk 
and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary 
Protection, as well as a breach of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement,1151 dealing 
with the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulation by 
Central Government Bodies and of Article 4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture,1152 dealing with Market Access. 
The Panel found that the import ban violated art. 3.1 and 5.1 and 5.5 SPS. They 
read as follows: 
Art. 3 
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise 
provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
 
Art. 5 
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant 
life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant 
international organizations. 
 
5. With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or 
health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different 
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. Members shall cooperate in the Committee, in accordance with 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop guidelines to further the practical 
implementation of this provision. In developing the guidelines, the Committee shall 
take into account all relevant factors, including the exceptional character of human 
health risks to which people voluntarily expose themselves. 
 
The AB reversed the Panel’s findings on art. 3.1 and 5.5 SPS, but upheld the 
finding that the import ban violated art. 5.1 SPS. The EC requested a reasonable 
period of time for the implementation of the findings. Retaliatory measures were 
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 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (1995). 
1152
 Agreement on Agriculture (1995). 
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imposed by the US because the EC did not implement the findings within the 
given period of time. In 2003 the EC introduced a new Directive, yet the US did 
not consider the new rules to be based on scientific grounds and claimed that it 
was still violating SPS. Several requests for consultation were filed in the 
following1153 before a mutual acceptable solution was notified in 2009.1154  
 
4 Shrimp-Turtle 
Shrimp-Turtle1155 dealt with similar issues as the Tuna-Dolphin panels described 
above, yet they are not pre-WTO and were adopted by the DSB. The 
requirement of a certificate that shrimp was caught turtle-friendly to be able to 
import shrimps and shrimp products into the US was held to violate art. XI 
GATT by both, the Panel and the Appellate Body. The most striking part for 
human rights triggered trade restrictions is the assessment of art. XX GATT by 
the Panel and the Appellate Body. Import bans on shrimp and shrimp products 
were imposed by the US to protect sea turtles. Only the states providing a 
certificate on their turtle-friendly harvesting methods were allowed to import 
shrimp and shrimp products into the US. The panel held that although the GATT 
preamble referred to “sustainable development” as being an aim of the 
WTO/GATT, the main aim was still the encouragement of free trade.1156 
Furthermore, it pointed out that a general preference for a multilateral approach 
was given as could be seen from art. III:2 WTO Agreement1157 and art. 23.1 DSU 
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 These were United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones 
Dispute 3WT/DS320/R (31 March 2008) and WT/DS320/AB/R (16 October 2008) and 
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 See WTO Website, “Dispute Settlement: DS26” 
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 United States – Import Bans of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”) 
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 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 95. 
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 Art. III:2 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (“WTO Agreement” or 
“Marrakesh Agreement”) (1994) reads: “The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations 
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the Ministerial Conference.” 
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Understanding.1158 Therefore art. XX had to be interpreted narrowly. Like 
already in Tuna I the Panel found that only where the credible approaches of 
creating a multinational solution failed, a state may impose unilateral measures. 
Just like in Tuna II the Panel therefore argued that, if other states began to 
impose unilateral measures like the US did, this would undermine the world 
trade system by creating domestic laws contradicting one another and the aims 
of WTO/GATT by making world trade far less predictable instead of enhancing 
its predictability. The Panel found that domestic law of this kind was unduly 
influencing the policy of other states, thereby violating the sovereignty of the 
other states as defined in the Rio Convention.1159 Not taking into account the 
measures individual states may have imposed to protect turtles and just to rely 
on a certain certificate issued by the US was a an unjustifiable discrimination.  
As the Panel had begun its assessment of art. XX GATT with the chapeau,1160 
the Appellate Body had to assess the objectives of art. XX (b) and (g) itself, 
after criticizing the reverse order the Panel had used to determine whether a 
justification according to art. XX was given. According to the Appellate Body 
Art. XX (g) was fulfilled and therefore (b) did not have to be assessed. When 
examining art. XX (g) the Appellate Body explicitly referred to CITES and 
stressed that the term “resources” had to be interpreted dynamically, including 
the use of soft law sources.1161 As far as the possible extraterritorial character of 
the US measures were concerned, the Appellate Body held that there was a 
sufficient link between the US and the subject of protection, i.e. the turtles, 
because the turtles in question were migratory turtles and occurred and/or 
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 Art. 23.1 Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 
(Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement) reads: “When Members seek the redress of a violation of 
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 See Mary E. Footer, “The (Re)Turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO 
Law” (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int’l L. 241, 262. 
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moved through waters under US jurisdictions as well. By referring to this link, 
the Appellate Body did not generally allow measures having extraterritorial 
effects, but only those where a sufficient link can be established.1162 The 
Appellate Body then went on to assess the chapeau. It argued, similar to the 
Panel and Tuna I that unjustifiable discrimination was given for example 
because local protection measures were not taken into account when issuing the 
certificates and because of the lack of multinational negotiations to find 
multilateral solutions before imposing unilateral measures.1163 The Appellate 
Body concluded that unilateral measures to protect endangered species were not 
generally GATT-inconsistent. 
In 1997 Malaysia claimed under art. 21.5 DSU that the US had not properly 
implemented the findings of the Shrimp-Turtle decision.1164 Malaysia was of the 
opinion that the US had to lift the import bans in order to adhere to the AB 
ruling, while the US was of the opinion that the Revised Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection 
of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations were sufficient to justify the 
remaining trade restrictions under art. XX (g) GATT. The Shrimp-Turtle 
(Malaysia) implementation Panel affirmed the US opinion, stressing that the 
obligation to negotiate multilateral agreements before implementing unilateral 
measures did not entail the obligation to conclude such an agreement, but to 
negotiate in good faith with the parties of the dispute. The AB upheld this ruling 
in Malaysia’s appeal.1165 
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 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 152. 
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 The other reasons given are more related to the individual case and therefore not 
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Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle decisions see for example Joseph Robert Berger, “Unilateral 
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 This amendment of the United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
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 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 by Malaysia (“Shrimp-Turtle Malaysia”) WT/DS58/RW (15 June 2001) and 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (22 October 2001). 
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5 EC - Asbestos 
The Asbestos1166 case dealt with French measures - including an import ban - 
concerning asbestos and products containing asbestos. Canada was of the 
opinion that these measures violated SPS Agreement art. 2 (Basic Rights and 
Obligations), 3 (Harmonization) and 5 (Assessment of Risk and Determination 
of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection), TBT art. 2 
(Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulation by Central 
Government Bodies) and GATT arts. III (National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation), XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) 
and XIII (Nullification or Impairment). 
As Canada had not made sufficient claims concerning the exceptions under TBT, 
the Panel did not decide on those, but focused on GATT art. III:4 and XX 
(General Exceptions).  
Art. III:4 GATT reads: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
 
The Panel held that asbestos fibres and fibres that could be substituted for them 
as such were like products in the sense of art. III:4 GATT and so were asbestos-
cement products, and the fibro-cement products. Therefore, concerning these 
like products art. III:4 GATT was violated by the French Decree, because it 
discriminated against those products from Canada containing asbestos. 
However, this violation was justified under the introductory clause of art. XX 
and art. XX (b) GATT. They read as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures: 
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 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos 
(“Asbestos”) WT/DS135/R (18 September 2000) and WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001). 
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[…] 
 
(b)      necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
In essence it was held that asbestos was a danger to the health of employees and 
consumers and that therefore no other more GATT friendly measure than 
banning production, import, export, processing and sale was given. That is why 
the measures were justified under art. XX (b) GATT.1167 
 
The AB upheld the Panel’s decision on art. XX GATT, but reversed the Panel’s 
ruling on the likeness of products containing asbestos and those not containing 
asbestos. The AB argued that the health risks had to be considered as well when 
assessing the physical properties to determine the likeness of the products. It 
held that Canada had not sufficiently established that the products were like 
products and that therefore a violation of art. III:4 GATT could not be found. 
 
6 EC - Sardines 
In EC-Sardines1168 Peru claimed that EC Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2136/891169 prevented Peruvian exporters from exporting products of the species 
sardinops sagax sagax as “sardines”, although this species was listed among the 
species considered as sardines in the Codex Alimentarius standards. Therefore 
Peru claimed that the Regulation violated TBT’s arts. 2 (Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Technical Regulations by Central Government Bodies) and 
12 (Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members) and 
GATT arts. I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), III (National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation) and XI:1 (General Elimination 
of Quantitative Restrictions). Both, the Panel and the AB found that the 
Regulation violated art. 2.4 TBT, which reads: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, 
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 See also Richard Senti, Die WTO im Spannungsfeld zwischen Handel, Gesundheit, Arbeit 
und Umwelt (vol. 32, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006) 17. 
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 European Communities - Trade Description of  (“EC – Sardines”) WT/DS231/R (29 
May 2002) and WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002). 
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as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or 
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the 
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or 
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems. 
 
The Panel and the AB found that the Codex Alimentarius standards on sardines 
are neither ineffective nor inappropriate to fulfil the EC’s legitimate perspectives 
of market transparency, consumer protection, and fair competition. This was 
because it had not been established that European consumers expect sardines not 
to be sardinops sagax sagax and because the very aim of the labelling of 
“sardines” provided for in the Codex Alimentarius standards was to enhance 
market transparency.1170 The AB did not address further violations of art. 2 TBT 
or art. III GATT and the Parties found a mutually agreed solution in 2003.1171 
 
7 The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
An example for multilateral trade restrictions for the protection of human 
rights1172 is the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme concerning conflict 
diamonds. It is a set of non-binding soft-law rules1173 that were developed by 
governments, the international diamond industry and civil society 
organizations.1174 In this case import bans are an example of smart sanctions as 
set out above, because they are intended to cut off non-state, but de facto ruling 
war parties in Sierra Leone from their main source of income, in this case the 
selling of diamonds.1175 Human rights groups supported the idea of banning 
conflict diamonds, many diamond traders agreed on an obligatory certification 
for “conflict free” diamonds to support the sanction1176 and the UN passed 
                                                 
1170
 See particularly European Communities - Trade Description of  (“EC – Sardines”) 
WT/DS231/R (29 May 2002) and WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) par. 287-290. 
1171
 See WTO Website, Dispute Settlement: dispute DS231 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds231_e.htm.> 1 May 2014. 
1172
 See for example Susan Ariel Aaronson, “A Match Made in the Corporate and Public 
Interest: Marrying Voluntary CSR Initiatives and the WTO” (2007) 41 J.W.T. 629, 630 and 
642-4. 
1173
 Mary E. Footer, “The (Re)Turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO 
Law” (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int’l L .241, 274. 
1174
 See Kimberley Process Website <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>1 May 2014. 
1175
 Olaf Poeschke, Politische Steuerung durch Sanktionen? (Wiesbaden: Deutscher 
Universitätsverlag, 2003) 85. 
1176
 Ibid. 
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Resolutions A/RES/55/561177 and S/RES/14591178 to make sure the certification 
procedures were established and trade with uncertificated diamonds was banned 
worldwide.1179 The WTO granted a waiver,1180 putting an end to doubts 
concerning the accordance of the trade bans with WTO law.1181 Needless to say 
that the unilateral imposition of such a broad-scale and worldwide embargo is 
not possible, but that these measures have to be confined to import or export 
bans of a smaller scale.  
 
8 GMO Cases 
“GMO” is the abbreviation for “genetically modified organism”. The so-called 
GMO-Cases1182 dealt with the import of such modified organisms into the EC.  
The EC did not allow the import of food containing GMOs due to a moratorium 
applied in 1998. The US, Canada and Argentina were of the opinion that this 
violated SPS; TBT, GATT and the Agricultural Agreement. 
The Panel found that the moratorium itself was not an SPS measure, because it 
was no procedural requirement itself, but influenced the implementation of such 
requirements.1183 Therefore the benchmark for the moratorium’s SPS conformity 
was not art. 2 or 5, but art. 8 in connection with Annex C no. 1 (a) SPS,1184 
                                                 
1177
 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/56 (29 January 2001). 
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 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/149 (28 January 2003). 
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 See UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/56 (29 January 2001); see also UN 
Security Council Resolution S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) especially A.2.3. and A.5.; UN 
Security Council Resolution S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001) especially B.2. and B.6. 
1180
 See WTO Website, WTO News: 2003 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/goods_council_26fev03_e.htm> 1 May 2014. 
1181
 Whether the waiver was in fact necessary to achieve WTO compatibility is doubted, see 
James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 94; on the issue of the Kimberly Process Scheme and WTO 
see also Krista Nadakavukaren-Schefer, “Stopping Trade in Conflict Diamonds: Exploring the 
Trade and Human Rights Interface with the WTO Waiver for the Kimberley Process” Thomas 
Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi (eds), Human Rights and 
International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 391; Joost Pauwelyn, “WTO 
Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for ‘Conflict 
Diamonds’” (2003) 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1177. 
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 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products (”GMO”) WT/DS291/R, WTO/DS/292/R and WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006). 
1183
 On the case see also Philipp Jehle, Harmonisierung im Welthandelsrecht durch Verweis 
auf internationale Standards (vol. 46, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008) 51-2. 
1184
 Annex C of SPS dealing with Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures reads 
“Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of 
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because the approval procedures were not carried out with undue delay. 
Concerning the product-specific measures, the Panel reached the same 
conclusion. With regard to the EC’s safeguard measures a violation of art. 5.1 
and 2.2 SPS1185 was found by the Panel, because the measures were not based on 
a risk assessment according to the requirements of SPS and were therefore 
considered to be applied without sufficient scientific evidence. Once more the 
EC asked for a reasonable period of time to implement the findings. After the 
period of time hade expired after extension, an agreement between the US and 
the EC was reached in 2008, and in 2009 a mutually agreed solution was found 
with Canada and in 2012 with Argentina.1186 
 
9 Tuna-Dolphin III 
In contrast to the earlier Tuna-Dolphin cases already mentioned, Tuna-Dolphin 
III1187 did not deal with import bans by the US, but a label that was not 
mandatory for imports in the US. That dolphin-safe label was issued by the US 
Department of Commerce. The Act  on the label provides that no matter where 
tuna is harvested, it must not be caught by “setting on”1188 dolphins, otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                        
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that: (a) such procedures are undertaken and completed 
without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like 
domestic products”. 
 
1185
 Art. 2.2 SPS reads: “Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is 
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based 
on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as 
provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.” 
1186
 See WTO Website, Dispute Settlement: DS291, DS292, DS293 at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm> 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds292_e.htm> 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm> all 1 May 2014. 
1187
 United States - Measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale of tuna and 
tuna products (“Tuna-Dolphin III”) WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011) and 
WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012). 
1188
 As tuna associate with dolphins, particularly yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific Ocean (ETP), “fishermen locate schools of underwater tuna by finding and chasing 
dolphins on the ocean's surface and intentionally encircling them with purse seine nets to 
harvest the tuna underneath. In the early years of fishing by setting on dolphins there was 
considerable incidental dolphin mortality.”  and “In contrast, because only mature yellowfin 
tuna are able to swim fast enough to "associate" with dolphins, the method of fishing by 
setting on dolphins produces a large catch of mature tuna appealing to the marketplace…”  
both from Mexico’s written submission in United States - Measures concerning the 
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the tuna is not eligible for the dolphin-safe label. Within the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific Ocean (ETP), where Mexico is harvesting tuna, stricter rules for the 
protection of dolphins are applied. Depending on where the tuna is caught and 
which fishing method is used, different certificates have to be presented to be 
eligible for the label. The Act also prohibits any reference to dolphins on labels 
of tuna products in case the tuna is not caught in accordance with the 
requirements of the dolphin-safe label. Mexico was of the opinion that the 
requirements for the dolphin-safe label set out by the US Act violated TBT and 
GATT, because they were discriminatory and unnecessary. The Panel considered 
the label to be a technical regulation and that therefore TBT was applicable on 
the case, particularly art. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4. The Panel also considered the label to 
be a de facto mandatory technical regulation as other labels referring to dolphins 
and the information that they were not harmed were not allowed under the US 
Act. However, the Panel found that Mexico had not established that Mexican 
tuna products were discriminated against, which means art. 2.1 TBT was not 
violated.Yet the Act was found to violate art. 2.2 TBT, because it was more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to accomplish the legitimate US objectives, i.e. 
to protect dolphins and to prevent misleading consumer information. The Panel 
found that a co-existence between the US Act and the Agreement on the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) as suggested by Mexico 
was a less trade restrictive equivalent. As far as art. 2.4 TBT was concerned, the 
Panel ruled that the international standards referred to by Mexico were not 
appropriate or effective to achieve the perspectives the US was aiming for with 
its Act. That is why the US did not have to base its measures on these standards 
and therefore art. 2.4 was found to be not violated. GATT issues were not 
decided on by the Panel. 
The AB decided in May 2012 that the US measures did in fact violate art. 2.1 
TBT, because most Mexican tuna products were excluded from the dolphin-safe 
label, which was a big competitive disadvantage on the US market. In addition, 
the label did not take into account different fishing techniques in different areas 
of the ocean, addressing dolphin mortality outside the ETP only by prohibiting 
the setting on dolphins, while the use of other fishing techniques harming 
                                                                                                                                                        
importation, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products (“Tuna-Dolphin III”) 
WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011) par. 4.7. and 4.11. 
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dolphins did not prevent the tuna from being eligible for the dolphin-safe label. 
The AB argued that in doing so, the label did not address the risks for dolphins 
even-handedly. The AB also reversed the Panel’s findings on art. 2.2, stating 
that other measures proposed by Mexico were not equivalent to the challenged 
one with regard to the objectives, because the dolphin protection within the ETP 
would be lowered. It also found that the Agreement on the International Dolphin 
Conservation Program (AIDCP) was not an international standard in the sense 
of art. 2.4 TBT, because new members could only accede by invitation. It also 
criticized that the Panel had not decided on art. I:1 and III:4 GATT. 
 
B Challenges for trade restrictions implemented by WTO member states 
As just seen from the examples mentioned, protecting rights - be they 
internationally recognized or not -  by using the means of trade restrictions may 
be difficult, because international trade is governed by WTO law. On the other 
hand, trade bans and labelling schemes seem not far-fetched when tackling the 
issue of human rights and TNCs acting abroad, at least when the products are 
finally imported into the home state. Therefore a closer look on trade bans and 
labelling schemes as a possible state option and the main challenges they face 
under WTO law will be provided in the following, before the relationship of 
WTO law and human rights will be assessed in more detail below. 
 
1 Trade bans 
As already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, trade bans can be 
considered “tailored trade restrictions”, being like a more TNC-focused, more 
flexible, broader and easier applicable version of sanctions as assessed in the 
preceding chapter. At least where the foreign subsidiaries of home state TNCs 
export their products into the home state, trade bans could therefore be an 
adequate state option to tackle the human rights issue. Yet as could be seen from 
the examples above, trade bans are challenged by WTO law in various aspects. 
Mainly the compatibility with art. III, XI and XX GATT, art. 2, 3, 5 SPS and art. 
2 TBT is challenged as could be seen above. 
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2 Labelling 
A less restrictive alternative to trade bans could be labelling. There are different 
labelling schemes, imposed by private actors only, sponsored by governments, 
linked to codes of conduct, etc, so general observations are hardly possible.1189 
A major NGO in this area many consumers may know is Fairtrade Labelling 
(FLO) with 17 sections in 40 states, labelling for example coffee, rice, tea and 
fruits.1190 Yet as this enquiry deals with home state options to control the human 
rights record of its TNCs acting abroad, only state sponsored labelling is 
assessed here. Labels that come to mind are positive labels, i.e. that PPM 
standards are in accordance with human rights, as well as negative ones,1191 i.e. 
that human rights were violated and even a combination of these labels - most 
likely the positive label -  with an “absence label”, a label stating that no proof 
of human rights conformity was produced. These labelling schemes may be 
voluntary as well as mandatory. Of course labelling measures may be import 
restrictions, for example when banning the import of non-labelled products,1192 
as already sketched above. Yet when using labels as a less restrictive means to 
import bans, only allowing for informed consumer choice, there might be less 
issues arising concerning the compatibility with WTO law.1193 However, this, at 
least at first glance, may also be a flaw. Due to being less trade restrictive, labels 
not amounting to trade bans are often considered rather ineffective.1194 As 
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 See Carlos Lopez-Hurtado, “Social Labelling and WTO Law“ (2002) 5 JIEL 719, *2. 
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 Richard Senti, Die WTO im Spannungsfeld zwischen Handel, Gesundheit, Arbeit und 
Umwelt (vol. 32, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006) 32; on labels dealing with child labour see 
Janet Hilowitz, “Social Labelling to combat Child Labour: Some Considerations” (1997) 136 
ILR 215. 
1191
 On the effectiveness of positive and negative labels see for example Chiara Lombardini-
Riipinen, “Time for negative eco-labels?“ (2005) at 
<http://endogenouspreferences.wordpress.com/2005/06/27/post11/> 1 May 2014, wfr. 
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 See Carlos Lopez-Hurtado, “Social Labelling and WTO Law“ (2002) 5 JIEL 719, *9, 
referring to India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector WT/DS146/R and 
WT/DS175/R  (21 December 2001) and WT/DS146/AB/R and WT/DS175/AB/R (19 March 
2002) paras 7.223 and 7.224. 
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 In the World Trade Report 2012 the issue of non-tariff measures, including labelling, is 
addressed, see World Trade Report 2012, WTO Website, Resources, 
<http://wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr12_e.htm> 1 May 2014; on mandatory and 
voluntary labelling under TBT and GATT see also Jeroen Denkers, The World Trade 
Organization and Import Bans in Response to Violations of Fundamental Labour Rights 
(Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia, 2008) 55-64. 
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 See on the issue of labelling compared to trade bans also Robert Howse and Donald 
Regan, “The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ 
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Harrison puts it the effectiveness of labelling “is likely to be limited”, because 
labelled products are usually more expensive than unlabelled ones, their market 
therefore limited and a large-scale use of labelling unrealistic in the near 
future.1195 Yet a 2008 field experiment achieved different results, suggesting that 
consumers are willing to pay higher prices for products produced under good 
working conditions1196 and other surveys had similar outcomes.1197 This suggests 
that enabling consumers to make an informed choice could make human rights 
issues an immediate economic factor for TNCs. That large-scale or global 
labelling is rather unrealistic can on the other hand be seen when considering 
that Belgium’s attempt to create a voluntary social labelling scheme has been 
criticized as violating WTO law and interfering with the ILO’s authority by the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)1198 and that a global social 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Trade Policy” (2000) 11 EJIL 249, 273-4, arguing that labels are not equally effective to 
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 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 183; see also Paul Cook, “Law of Trade in Human Rights: A 
Legal Analysis of the Intersection of the General Trade Agreement of Tariff’s Article XX (b) 
and Labor Rights of Children” (University of California, Los Angeles, 2012) available at 
<http://works.bepress.com/paul_cook/3> 1 May 2014, 33. 
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<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/SocialLabeling.pdf> 1 May 2014. 
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(2005) 24 Rev. Sci. Tech. (Off. int. Epiz.) 747, 750-1 on eggs; Peter Van den Bossche, Nico 
Schrijver and Gerrit Faber, Unilateral Measures addressing Non-Trade Concerns. A Study on 
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Production Methods (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2007) 64. 
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 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, “Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 March 
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Trade Organization and Import Bans in Response to Violations of Fundamental Labour 
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183; giving a short overview on the restistence is Christine Breining-Kaufmann, “The Legal 
Matrix of Human Rights and Trade Law: State Obligations versus Private Rights and 
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label suggested by the ILO was opposed by ILO member states.1199 This is 
regrettable, as broad-scale labelling could indeed allow the consumers to make 
an informed choice, and in some sectors, where there are hardly any labels so far 
enable choices at the first place.1200 Yet although broad-scale labelling might not 
be realised in the near future, unilateral approaches could be strengthened. In 
Tuna-Dolphin I mentioned above, the Panel, after rejecting the application of 
art. IX,1201 held that voluntary “dolphin-safe” labels were not violating art. I:1 
GATT once they met the MFN treatment, because they did not make PPM 
standards a requirement for sale in the importing state nor did they grant 
government benefits. It is solely the free choice of the consumer - enabled by the 
label - that could cause a disadvantage for non-labelled products.1202 In 
Thailand-Cigarettes the Panel proposed labelling as a less trade restrictive 
means than import bans under art. XX GATT.1203 Labels, particularly eco-labels 
have also been subject to WTO assessment by the Special Committee on Trade 
and Environment as well as the TBT Committee1204 and have been subject of the 
2005 World Trade Report.1205 Yet so far no clear or generally accepted results 
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 Carlos Lopez-Hurtado, “Social Labelling and WTO Law“ (2002) 5 JIEL 719. 
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 World Trade Report 2005, WTO Website, Resources 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr05_e.htm> 1 May 2014. 
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concerning social labelling have been produced. Nevertheless some argue that 
labels may be the very link to make PPMs a product-related criterion.1206 
Although Tuna-Dolphin III brought some clearance concerning the TBT 
Agreement, the subject still remains a complex one, particularly where non-
incorporated PPMs are the issue,1207 because these PPM are only of indirect 
matter for trade and therefore difficult to deal with under trade law.1208 
Therefore when dealing with WTO law in more detail below, the focus is not on 
trade bans but broader, to include labelling as well when assessing on art. III and 
XX GATT and art. 2 TBT.1209 
 
II RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND WTO LAW 
As just seen labels as well as trade bans have already been assessed by the 
GATT panels and the DSB, mainly concerning the domestic protection of health 
and environmental issues, and in most cases the measures adopted by the 
member states were not found to be inconsistent with GATT/WTO law. One 
could therefore jump at the conclusion that human rights protection and free 
trade are mutually exclusive and trade law is not allowing for any human rights 
protection. The reason for this could be that although the trade law and human 
rights law systems deal with similar situations,1210 they were created as two 
separate areas of law and have also developed separately.1211 Human rights for 
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example have been in the focus of development of public international law after 
World War II and the holocaust, while trade law has not.1212 However, it would 
be too rash to conclude that the two areas of law cannot be linked. Why the two 
areas should be linked and how this could be done within the next couple of 
decades based on the developments already taking place, will be assessed in the 
following, after sketching the reasons for the differences of the two systems in 
more detail. 
 
A WTO: core principles 
To be able to understand the differences between the two areas of law, not only 
human rights law that has already been examined in more detail in this enquiry, 
but also trade law has to be understood. As this chapter focuses on WTO law, an 
overview about its core principles will be given in the following. However, it 
would go beyond the scope of this research to give more than a short overview 
over the principles relevant for trade bans and labelling as a means of human 
rights protection. Some rules relevant for this enquiry will be assessed in more 
detail below. 
Two core principles of the WTO that can be found in all three agreements 
assessed in more detail in the following, i.e. GATT, SPS and TBT, are the Most-
Favoured-Nation status, prohibiting discrimination based on the origin of 
products and the National Treatment requirement, a non-discrimination rule, 
prohibiting less favourable treatment of foreign products compared to “like” 
domestic products.1213 The SPS Agreement contains further basic provisions like 
the necessity requirement, demanding that the trade restriction must not be more 
trade restrictive than necessary, the scientific disciplines, requiring that 
measures are based on scientific evidence, the goal of harmonization by the use 
of international standards and the obligation not to arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
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of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 842 and 
817. 
 238
discriminate or use disguised trade restrictions.1214 Other basic substantive 
provisions of the TBT Agreement apart from MFN and National Treatmen are 
also the necessity requirement, and the use of international standards as a base 
for the restrictions.1215 
A further core principle of GATT is the prohibition of quantitative restrictions in 
art. XI GATT.1216 As Harrison puts it “[t]he fundamental aim of the GATT 
system is therefore to attempt to ensure equality in terms of equal treatment of 
products from all WTO Member States, whatever their origin or destination.”1217 
As far as the human rights protection in the TNC context, i.e. by trade bans and 
labelling, is concerned, art. III (National Treatment) as well as XI may be 
violated, depending on whether the restriction is implemented and applied as a 
border measure, or an internal measure. The former are affecting the importation 
of the product, whilst the latter are affecting the imported product.1218 This 
already shows that the nature of the restriction may depend on its particular 
implementation and application in the very case at issue. Trade bans for example 
are usually border measures and are therefore covered by art. XI GATT as could 
be seen in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases above, dealing with import 
bans. Prohibitions of sale or labelling requirements not being required for the 
importation itself are usually internal measures and covered by art. III GATT as 
could be seen in EC-Asbestos and also a little at Tuna-Dolphin III.1219 Yet there 
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are also cases where one measure may fall into the scope of both articles, 
depending on its different specific effects.1220 As this distinction can only be 
drawn properly by single case analysis and this enquiry deals with state options 
in a more general way, to assess the issue of how to distinguish between art. III 
and art. XI would go beyond the scope of this research. It should be sufficient to 
keep in mind that the admissibility under GATT may depend on the particular 
implementation of a measure.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that even if art. III or XI are violated, there is 
still the possibility of an exception under GATT, for example when fulfilling 
certain domestic policy objectives or protecting the national security, as 
provided for in art. XX and XXI GATT.1221 There are also other exceptions to 
the core principles of GATT. For example according to art. XIII GATT a waiver 
can be sought, allowing for temporary deviation from GATT duties as has been 
done for the Kimberley Scheme. Such waivers have also been used for 
permitting for example GSPs1222 with human rights clauses under certain 
conditions.1223 Art. XXI (c) allows for deviations from GATT in cases of UN SC 
decisions and art. XIX allows a state to protect its domestic producers from 
“serious injury”1224, yet the latter is not a likely scenario for trade restrictions in 
the TNC context1225 as has been outlined in earlier chapters of this enquiry. So at 
least as far as measures going beyond countermeasures as assessed in the 
preceding chapters are concerned, art. XX seems to be more promising than arts. 
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XXI and XIX.1226 The issue that arises for the topic of this enquiry is whether 
and to what extent human rights issues as part of public international law and 
binding principles imposing obligations on the signatory states are taken into 
account when assessing and applying these exceptions.1227 
 
B Tensions between human rights law and WTO law 
While trade and human rights cannot be considered as contradicting each other 
per se as already sketched above,1228 the issue assessed in this enquiry shows 
that tensions do exist. Different underlying principles and aims, the legal 
relationship of human rights law and trade law and the role of the DSB are 
factors that suggest human rights and trade law do not have much common 
ground. These factors will be outlined in the following. 
 
1 Different underlying principles and aims 
One of the most striking reasons given why trade and human rights law are said 
to not have been linked for a long time is the perception of the two areas of law 
as treating absolutely different issues and as trade law dealing with private law 
rather than public international law, because it deals with transactions of private 
actors.1229 While WTO law grants rights and duties to member states, thereby 
affecting private actors, human rights law grants rights to individuals, obliging 
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(New York, London: New York University Press, 2009) 64 arguing that the Bretton Woods 
entities were “the private, economic arm to the public political United Nations”. 
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states to fulfil their respective duties.1230 That means there is a different means-
end rationale. In addition, once more the debate on private actors and public 
international law is triggered. Another difference is the direction of protection 
granted by the different areas of law. Trade law tends to protect from non-
discrimination by foreign countries while human rights are supposed to protect 
individuals against interference by their own governments.1231 Therefore, human 
rights law is usually, at least in its traditional sense, somewhat more inwardly 
oriented that trade law.1232 Furthermore, the moral reasoning underlying trade 
law is traditionally perceived as utilitarian and consequentalist, focusing on 
outcomes of individual utility rather than precedurs or acts on their own 
terms.1233 The underlying moral reasoning of human rights law on the other hand 
is  non-utilitarian, but liberal and deontological, focusing on the nature of an act 
itself with regard to its effect on the equal and moral worth and dignity of each 
individual instead focusing on the act’s consequences and utility.1234 Human 
rights law morals value the person as an end in itself rather than a means to ends 
of others or his own.1235 So, once more, a different means-end rationale comes to 
notice. 
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That for example environmental protection and free trade may have a 
challenging relationship was also addressed by the WTO secretariat in 1999.1236 
Harrison describes the main difference of trade and human rights law as follows: 
[I]nternational trade law is based on the commercial need for predictable rules that 
allow effective competition between equally treated market participants. Protection 
and promotion of human rights, on the other hand, requires the flexibility to take 
measures to stop abuses occurring, particularly with regard to the vulnerable or 
disadvantaged.1237 
 
He goes on to explain that the principle of non-discrimination is inherent in both 
areas of public international law - trade law as well as human rights law, but that 
it has a different connotation or meaning in the two areas of law. While in trade 
law non-discrimination means “not to discriminate between nationals and non-
nationals and to treat both equally in terms of market access in order to remove 
unnecessary barriers to trade”,1238 human rights law considers non-
discrimination to be the tool “to achieve ‘justice and equality between all 
individuals, whatever their status’.”1239 Non-discrimination in human rights law 
“is intrinsically linked with the principle of equality”1240 and may require 
affirmative action, which can be considered a violation of the non-
discrimination principle of international trade law.1241 Furthermore, freedoms 
granted by human rights law are usually limited by rights of other individuals. In 
WTO law countervailing rights are not an acknowledged exception to foreign 
traders’ freedoms.1242 Yet this on the other hand shows, that human rights law is 
not immune to trade-offs and trade law’s utilitarism and human rights law’s 
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idealism might be reconciled “to indeed make the world a better and more 
prosperous place.”1243 In EU law human rights may for example confine 
economic freedoms and free trade.1244 
 
2 Application of overriding law rules? 
Due to these different perceptions of the same principle the question may arise 
which set of rules is more apt to deal with trade restrictions triggered by human 
rights violations abroad, WTO law or human rights law, particularly special 
human rights law like ILO Conventions.1245 Although the lex posterior and lex 
specialis rules are widely accepted in public international law, and art. 3(2) DSU 
requires the DSB to interpret WTO treaties in accordance with costumary rules 
of interpretation of public international law, these rules are not of much help in 
this case to decide which law is overriding the other.1246 This is because for the 
lex posterior rule, codified in art. 30 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,1247 it could be referred to various dates, for example the date of signing 
the Convention by the targeted state or the sanctioning state or the 
recommendation of the ILO to impose trade sanctions, depending on the point of 
view and interests in the issue.1248 Furthermore, the application of the rule on 
customary law seems to be difficult as these rules and norms emerge 
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gradually.1249 Similarly, the lex specialis rule, for example mentioned in art. 55 
of the ILC Draft Articles1250 mentioned earlier in this enquiry, will produce 
different results as to which set of rules is more specifically applicable 
depending on whether this issue is assessed from a trade law or human rights 
point of view. As trade law is supposed to deal with any kind of trade 
restrictions to overcome obstacles of free trade and create a multilateral 
framework providing for transparency and legal certainty it can be argued that 
not applying trade law to the cases of trade restrictions triggered by human 
rights violations would contradict the ideas of the WTO and foster 
circumventing WTO rules and DSB by simply referring to human rights norms 
and standards as the base for trade restrictions.1251 Human rights law on the other 
hand tries to provide all human beings with their basic needs and rights deriving 
from their dignity, including labour standards, the right to health, which includes 
environmental protection, labour and property rights. While the competent 
authorities to decide on human rights violations and the consequences are UN 
agencies and procedures provided for in human rights treaties,1252 trade 
restrictions are so to speak merely a by-product of the unilateral approach to 
enforce human rights.1253 Not applying human rights law and relying on trade 
law instead can impede effective human rights protection, because it is claimed 
trade law panels are not taking into account human rights concerns properly and 
neither are they equipped or authorised to do so.1254 So no set of rules can in this 
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context necessarily be considered to prevail over  the other one.1255 An easy 
answer for situations where both set of rules are applicable can therefore not be 
given.1256 
 
3 Role of the DSB 
A difficulty of human rights and trade law is that the DSB as the best 
functioning arbitral body in public international law is a trade law body only and  
there is no international equivalent for human rights.1257 That there exists a 
better equipped dispute settlement mechanism for trade law than for human 
rights law can be explained by one of the main differences between the two 
areas of law - whereas rights and obligations under trade law are bilaterisable 
and “trade rulings can be enforced through the withdrawal of concessions by the 
wounded party”,1258 this is not the case for human rights as already set out in the 
preceding chapter. As Harrison explains, “human rights violations require a 
form of reparation that is far more intrusive into national jurisdiction”1259 while 
trade law enforcement does not affect a state’s sovereignty and domestic 
policies to the same extent.1260 Its unique role means that all disputes involving 
trade law in some way will automatically be brought before the DSB. This is 
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also supported by the wording of Art. 23 DSU Agreement1261 and XXIII 
GATT1262 which provide authority for the WTO/GATT Panels and Appellate 
Bodies to assess any violations or impairments of GATT benefits and any 
impediments of attaining any objectives of WTO/GATT. Yet of course, the DSB 
is best equipped and authorised to approach cases from a trade law perspective. 
As Pauwelyn has put it so figuratively claiming that the WTO is not increasing 
the protection of non-trade issues “is very much like being disappointed that a 
bakery does not sell meat.”1263 
 
C Developments taking place in WTO law 
So as just seen the relationship between human rights and trade law is a complex 
one. Yet this does not necessarily mean that there are insurmountable 
differences and that trade restrictions cannot be used at all to pressure 
compliance with human rights law. As will be set out in more detail in the 
following, the developments throughout GATT and WTO history and 
particularly recent case law suggest that the WTO is not generally opposed to 
taking into account other issues than solely trade. 
 
1 From GATT to WTO - broader integration 
The idea that at least environmental and labour rights should be considered 
when dealing with international trade law is not a new one. Environmental rights 
and the possibility to impose trade restrictions once resources like the 
atmosphere or a lake are polluted by a foreign producer in certain circumstances 
have been mentioned in 1971 by GATT, but then never again.1264 Labour 
                                                 
1261
 Art. 23 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU Understanding) (1994) mentions “violation of obligations or other nullification or 
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements” (emphasis added) and “impediment to 
the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements”. 
1262
 Art. XXIII GATT mentions nullification or impairment of benefits directly or indirectly 
accrued by the Agreement as the result of “the application by another contracting party of any 
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement” (emphasis added) 
and “attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded”. 
1263
 Joost Pauwelyn, “Recent Book on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt 
the WTO” (2004) 15 EJIL 575, 591. 
1264
 GATT, Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade. GATT Studies in 
International Trade No. 1, (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 1971) 15-18; Lorenz Khazaheh, “Oil 
 247
standards on the other hand have been an issue several times so far. Already 
when drafting the ITO-Charta fair labour conditions were referred to.1265 During 
the Uruguay Round from 1986-1994 the idea was introduced again, but no 
social clause or reference to labour rights was included.1266 In Singapore in 1996 
the general director of the ILO was invited as a speaker on the issue of labour 
rights, but was disinvited again due to pressure by the Group of 15, which 
consists of developing states,1267 and the ASEAN states.1268 The ministers could 
only agree on stressing the importance of core labour rights, while expressing 
their opposition to protectionist use of a social clause and stating that the ILO 
was the organization in charge for labour matters.1269 The latter was stressed 
once more for example in Geneva (1998),1270 Doha (2001)1271 and Hong-Kong 
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(2005),1272 while the discussion about a social clause were withdrawn from the 
agenda1273 due to pressure by India and other developing countries.1274 Yet there 
has been a shift from the rather policy and negotiation-based GATT towards 
more juridification, a more rule-oriented WTO1275 and autonomy of WTO 
bodies such as the newly introduced DSB and the Secretariat with is General 
Director.1276 In addition, new Agreements have been added to GATT. Two of 
them broadening the integration are the TBT and the SPS Agreements, which not 
only deal with non-discrimination, but also the ban on restrictions.1277 The idea 
behind those new Agreements was to prevent states from using non-tariff trade 
barriers for protectionist means while at the same time allowing for a better 
application of health-related GATT/WTO law.1278 Yet by imposing a ban on 
trade restrictions, more interference with national law for example protecting the 
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environment, may occur, because nation states are not only prevented from 
imposing tariffs, but also in the application of their national law as far as this 
application may be trade restrictive.1279 In doing so, TBT and SPS are increasing 
the degree of integration by imposing more detailed rules and obligations, 
calling for harmonization in art. 2.4 TBT and art. 3.1 SPS.1280 On the other hand, 
the TBT Agreement for the first time refers to PPM instead of only considering 
the characteristics of the final product1281 and so does the TRIPS.1282 After all 
this, it can be concluded that WTO law is regulating more areas of law now, 
some of which have been solely national law so far1283 and that competences 
also including those formerly not treated by GATT law have shifted slowly from 
the member states to the WTO.1284 Furthermore, the WTO is still open for 
changes and developments as can be derived for example from art III:2 WTO 
Agreement, where it is set our that “[t]he WTO may also provide a forum for 
further negotations among its Members”.1285 Yet the SPS and TBT Agreements 
are not only showing the growing influence of WTO law on national law, but 
also the opening up of WTO law towards other international law systems. TBT 
and SPS link WTO law to those international organisations that are relevant for 
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health and technical issues. The new Agreements do not establish own 
standards, but refer to and rely on standards developed by other international 
organisations.1286 The openness of the WTO can also be found in other parts. Art 
XXIII. 1 (c) GATT for example allows for written representation or proposals in 
cases of nullification or impairment of benefits deriving from the Agreements 
not only in cases of failures to comply with GATT or the application of any 
measure, but also in the case of “the existence of any other situation”.1287 
Furthermore, art. 14.2 TBT and art. V:1 and V:2 WTO Agreement support the 
consultation of non-trade experts in DSB cases.1288 
 
2 Developments in GATT/WTO case law  
As the DSB1289 formulates and thereby defines “the precise nature of WTO 
obligations”,1290 it is decisive for this enquiry how Panels and the Appellate 
Body have taken into account non-trade matters so far and which GATT/WTO 
articles were used to do so. When having a look at the changes in WTO law and 
the higher degree of integration it becomes clear that for the DSB this may be 
help and hurdle at the same time. As just seen WTO has enlarged its scope1291  
and is regulating many different areas, including agriculture, product safety, 
industrial standards and is even asking for positive measures for example in the 
context of intellectual property.1292 Overlaps or even interferences with non-
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trade regulations and interests, including human rights, may occur.1293 Therefore 
a decision involving human rights could be asked from WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body any time.1294 How the DSB is will handle such a situation could 
be derived from cases dealing with non-trade issues like the ones outlined 
above. The DSB is neither equipped nor authorised to decide on non-trade 
issues, so that just like bringing cases obviously involving foreign policy matters 
before the DSB, the human rights cases also mean burdening the DSB with a 
position somewhere between a mediator of public international law and its 
court-like role in the WTO.1295 Yet a mediator has to keep in mind a system as a 
whole and its protection as a whole when deciding individual cases.1296 This 
may result in decisions like Shrimp-Turtle where the Panel argued that allowing 
for measures with extraterritorial effect would mean that all states might impose 
their own laws with extraterritorial effect, thereby undermining the multilateral 
system of GATT. This argument was rejected by the Appellate Body, because 
the Panel had not treated the case before it as an individual case only, but based 
its conclusion of enabling an undermining of GATT on the presumed action of 
all states.1297 Likewise, the argument that allowing unilateral standards to force 
other states to adopt the same standards or to act in accordance with these 
standards would undermine the competitive effects given by different standards 
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and “the trading system would start down a very slippery slope”1298 would be 
such a mediator decision.1299 In addition it becomes clear from these examples 
that the decision on what exactly is GATT law may be more important to the 
parties and WTO members than the dispute at issue in the particular case.1300 
That the WTO/GATT Panels have repeatedly expressed that they will only 
assess WTO/GATT provisions and will not take into account historical or socio-
economic arguments produced by the parties1301 is of no help for the latter issue, 
because as in the context of human rights triggered trade restrictions, clarifying 
what the applicable WTO law is and how it is to be interpreted is the very issue 
and complexity of the case. Once a case demands for such a decision, the DSB 
will have to clarify the relation of WTO and the respective non-trade issues in 
some way. Yet the Panels have not always done so in a satisfactory way. In the 
Tuna-Dolphin I decision for example the Panel’s reasoning concerning art. XX 
GATT is somewhat circular.1302 To simply argue that unilateral measures deprive 
other states from their rights under GATT is neither legally conclusive nor 
satisfactory or sufficient, as art. XX GATT allows for deviations from rights 
normally provided under GATT.1303 It is the very article to determine the degree 
of such an allowed deviation. Yet still this decision is of importance as far as 
non-trade issues are concerned and reflects GATT openness already  before SPS 
and TBT Agreements were in force. In Dolphin-Tuna I for example the Panel 
referred to multilateral agreements on the protection of species when 
considering whether the unilateral measure was covered by art. XX GATT. In 
doing so the Panel somewhat contradicted its own argument that it had no 
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authority do decide whether the aim pursued by the unilateral measure within 
the scope of one of the objectives of art. XX GATT was legitimate.1304 In 
addition, this means a restriction of the sovereignty of the state imposing the 
unilateral measure1305 which could violate the in dubio mitius principle. Yet as 
the sovereignty of the other state involved and affected by the unilateral 
measures has to be taken into account as well, using multilateral agreements to 
decide on the justification of unilateral measures could be a way to go.1306 A 
similar approach was taken in Tuna-Dolphin II. The decision referred to 
multilateral treaties like CITES and rejected their application, because not all 
GATT states had adopted them. Yet core human rights have to be observed by 
any state and core human rights treaties have been signed by all states.1307 Their 
use is therefore not precluded like the use of CITES or the Stockholm 
Declaration. This shows the general openness of WTO law towards human 
rights law. In Gas Guzzler Tax the openness towards domestic protection 
measures concerning non-trade interests was also affirmed. The Panel decided 
that even in cases where domestic measures affect foreign products more 
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severely than national products, these measures can be GATT consistent.1308 
Similarly, the WTO stresses on its website that in Tuna-Dolphin II the panel 
found that the “dolphin-safe” label also at issue was not violating GATT, 
because it was applied to all tuna products, “whether imported or domestically 
produced”.1309 Yet the decision also emphasises that using trade restrictions to 
change a state’s behaviour is not permissible under GATT. However, as far as 
the use for the TNC context is concerned, this does not preclude the use of trade 
restrictions to change the behaviour of private actors like the TNCs subsidiary. 
In addition the panel opinion was overruled in a later decision. In contrast to 
Tuna-Dolphin II the Appellate Body stressed in Shrimp-Turtle that all measures 
imposed under art. XX GATT are aiming at a change in policy or behaviour of 
the state affected, thereby acknowledging this aim as GATT-consistent1310 at 
least where a “sufficient nexus” exists. This suggests that unilateral measures, 
including import bans, may be imposed to protect exhaustible natural resources - 
and possibly also other objectives of art. XX GATT - where serious 
multinational negotiations failed and protection measures and standards by the 
individual states involved are taken into account when implementing the 
measure to avoid unjustifiable discrimination.1311 In addition, the measure has to 
be applied in a transparent way, granting hearing to the state affected and 
providing appropriate time-limits to achieve the required protection 
standards.1312 It is also indicative for the Appellate Body’s openness towards 
unilateral protection measures that although the US measures were considered to 
be GATT inconsistent, the US was pleased with the decision, whereas the 
appellees were disappointed.1313 So it can be concluded that the decisions of 
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Tuna -Dolphin II and Shrimp-Turtle mean a change in the interpretation of art. 
XX GATT concerning extraterritorial measures,1314 because the location of the 
protected resources was not limited by art. XX (g).1315 In addition, Shrimp-
Turtle, including Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia) broadened the application of art. XX 
(g) by including biological and renewable resources as well1316 and 
unincorporated PPMs.1317 The latter was affirmed in Tuna-Dolphin III. 
Furthermore, the AB particularly stressed that it had not decided  
that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance to the 
Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations 
that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered 
species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided 
that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, 
either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or 
to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.1318 
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This stresses the awareness the AB has concerning non-trade issues and their 
relatedness to trade law. 
Other cases dealt with the changing criteria to differentiate products. The 
Asbestos case has for example shown that the WTO is open to accept an 
(incorporated) PPM as a criterion for trade restricting measures when the 
environmental concerns can be based on “global public good grounds”.1319 From 
Gas Guzzler Tax it can be concluded that different consumption characteristics 
may result in products that cannot be considered equal any longer.1320 From 
Tuna-Dolphin III it can be concluded that that domestic laws on unincorporated 
PPMs, like the fishing method of tuna, may in fact be a technical regulations 
according to Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement.1321 It can also be derived from 
the latter decision that state-run labels may be imposed in a non-discriminatory 
way when they are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the 
domestic law objectives according to 2.4 TBT. The latter allows for a certain 
amount of influence and control on domestic law issues and interests. Shrimp-
Turtle and Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia) demonstrated that even trade bans based on 
unincorporated PPMs may be admissible under WTO law. 
However, the cases also showed that there are clear limits and restrictions 
concerning domestic law approaches to protect non-trade interests by using trade 
law. The GMO cases show that it is difficult to apply a higher level of protection 
if this protection cannot be based on a scientific base in accordance with SPS 
and this is a pretty strict one. EC-Sardines demonstrated the impact of 
international standards on WTO law and therefore also on the domestic law of 
the member states. EC-Hormones showed that the broader integration by 
introducing the SPS agreement made measures incompatible with WTO law that 
had been allowed before.1322  
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Yet none of the cases dealt with labour standards and there is no such link for 
human rights, including labour rights, as there is for environmental and health 
issues in art. XX (g) GATT or TBT and SPS, so the protection of human rights is 
not possible in the same way.1323 However, the WTO/GATT has already dealt 
with human rights issues. Although the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
is a rather unique example and not a “case”, because it was not decided by a 
Panel or the AB and although it is disputed whether the waiver was in fact 
necessary to achieve GATT/WTO compatibility, it is nevertheless important 
concerning the WTO and human rights. For the first time the link between trade 
bans and human rights protection by a voluntary set of rules has officially been 
established and the WTO approved this approach.1324 This shows the early 
awareness of WTO member states concerning human rights and trade and the 
willingness to reconcile the two areas of law once there is clearly no link to 
protectionism.1325 
 
3 Developments addressed within the WTO system 
As could already be seen in the preceding sections WTO law and the WTO itself 
are constantly developing, trying to cope with new issues, including domestic 
laws on environmental and health protection as well as labour rights.1326 Most of 
these discussions and developments, like committees and council decisions, are 
in the non-binding “soft law” state.1327 
The awareness of its rather negative perception by many citizens of the world is 
also reflected on the WTO website. Even a section called “10 common 
misunderstandings about the WTO”, dealing, amongst other things, with the 
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reproaches of being anti-green and anti-health can be found.1328 The central 
themes in the WTO statements seem to be that (1) the WTO is not preventing 
member states from adopting measures protecting the environment and health as 
long as they are not discriminatory and that (2) the WTO is not the agency to 
define standards of environmental or health ptotection.  
On the WTO Website it is stressed that environmental issues are considered to 
be “a specific concern”1329 and the WTO emphasises the importance of the issue  
stating that “[t]he objectives of sustainable development and environmental 
protection are important enough to be stated in the preamble to the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO.”1330 Particularly in 2010 there have been a lot of 
workshops, conferences, etc on the subject of trade and environment as can be 
seen from the list provided on the WTO Website.1331 Furthermore, “green 
provisions” of WTO law are listed e.g. art. XX GATT, TBT and SPS and the 
work of the Trade and Environment Committee (CTE) established in 1995 is 
described whose “duties are to study the relationship between trade and the 
environment, and to make recommendations about any changes that might be 
needed in the trade agreements.”1332 The basic findings of the CTE are 
summarized like this:  
Briefly, the WTO’s committee says the basic WTO principles of non-discrimination 
and transparency do not conflict with trade measures needed to protect the 
environment, including actions taken under the environmental agreements. It also 
notes that clauses in the agreements on goods, services and intellectual property allow 
governments to give priority to their domestic environmental policies. 
The WTO’s committee says the most effective way to deal with international 
environmental problems is through the environmental agreements. It says this 
approach complements the WTO’s work in seeking internationally agreed solutions 
for trade problems. In other words, using the provisions of an international 
environmental agreement is better than one country trying on its own to change other 
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countries’ environmental policies (see shrimp-turtle and dolphin-tuna case 
studies).1333 
 
It is also emphasized that the CTE finds that often there are other more effective 
solutions for environmental protection than trade restrictions, like financial 
assistance or training and that there has not yet been a case of an action taken 
under international environmental agreements challenged in the GATT/WTO 
system.1334 The CTE is even of the opinion that actions taken under such 
international agreements “are unlikely to become a problem in the WTO if the 
countries concerned have signed the environmental agreement”.1335 Yet it admits 
that this issue has not yet been answered completely. Another issue where 
further discussion in the CTE is needed according to the WTO is the issue of 
labelling as far as non-incorporated PPMs are concerned, because eco-labelling 
is an important environmental policy instrument for the member states. Yet so 
far only labels concerning the product itself and which adhere to MFN and 
national treatment are considered to be fully WTO compatible.1336 However, in 
the 2005 World Trade Report the WTO suggests itself that while “[t]he 
multilateral trading system has long be hesitant to deal with non-incorporated 
PPMs,” this may have changed, as “with the US-Shrimps decision, such 
measures may be argued to have become part of the system.”1337 Yet it is also 
stressed by the CTE that many countries may consider eco-labels referring to 
non-incorporated PPMs as not being consistent with WTO law.1338 
 
Yet as already mentioned above, this is not a totally opening up of WTO law, 
integrating all kinds of other issues and objectives. Rather, it is also stressed that 
the CTE principles include the idea that free trade itself is contributing to 
environmental protection and that the WTO is no environmental agency, but 
only competent to deal with trade. It is particularly expressed that “[i]ts 
members do not want it to intervene in national or international environmental 
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policies or to set environmental standards” and that  “[o]ther agencies that 
specialize in environmental issues are better qualified to undertake those tasks.” 
Scott Vaughan of the WTO Trade and Environment Division stated that 
standards of production methods should not be defined by the WTO but by 
UNCTAD or UNEP.1339 That the issue of international standards is not an easy 
one shows the amount of effort the WTO is putting in to further examining it. 
There is for example a GATT Council and amongst other things SPS and TBT 
Committees dealing with the issue of international standards.1340 Standards were 
also the topic of the 2005 World Trade Report titled “Trade, standards and the 
WTO”.1341 Another hint as to how little competence the WTO should demand in 
environmental issues is the CTE’s recommendation that once a dispute arises 
between WTO member states concerning a trade action taken under an 
environmental agreement both states have signed, they should try to use the 
environmental agreement to solve the dispute rather than WTO agreements.1342 
In stressing the different competences the WTO acknowledges the difficulties 
that may arise between different overlapping interests of different international 
organizations. Yet the WTO also stresses that it is cooperating with other 
international organizations like UNCTAD and OECD1343 for in-depth 
assessments of certain overlapping issues. In a 2006 Secretariat note for example 
OECD and UNCTAD studies concerning trade and environment were 
examined.1344 This cooperation is important for the WTO. In the Draft Cancún 
Ministerial Declaration it is stressed that the CTE should continue to  
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invite to its meetings […] secretariats of the multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) invited thus far and of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).1345 
 
The work and information on labour standards is much briefer, essentially 
stressing that the ILO is the organization in charge.1346 However, it is also 
stressed that  
[t]here is a clear consensus: all WTO member governments are committed to a 
narrower set of internationally recognized “core” standards  - freedom of association, 
no forced labour, no child labour, and no discrimination at work (including gender 
discrimination).1347  
 
It is also referred to the Ministerial Conferences in Singapore (1996), Seattle 
(1999) and Doha (2001), where the importance of core labour standards was 
stressed, but no further agreement reached.1348  Similar to emphasizing the 
cooperation with international organizations concerning environmental 
protection, the WTO stresses its cooperation with other international 
organizations like the UN and the ILO in its Annual Reports of the last years.1349 
 
D Reasons to overcome the contradictions and tensions 
There is now an ongoing discussion on linking human rights and trade law and 
the way this linkage should be achieved.1350 The issue assessed in this research, 
the examples of WTO cases provided above and the developments taking place 
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suggest that some changes are required to improve human rights protection in 
trade-related situations. Although it is argued that international trade law with its 
trade liberalization itself enhances human rights promotion and protection,1351 
this is not really conclusive and might just not be enough as the current situation 
demonstrates1352 and was already sketched in the introductory chapter. That is 
why it is also argued that the development of free trade alone is not protecting 
human rights, e.g. labour standards, properly,1353 but may even harm human 
rights and that human rights and trade law have therefore to be linked in some 
way.1354 Such a linkage can be based on the understanding that free trade and 
                                                 
1351
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 37; see also Robert D. Anderson and Hannu Wager, “Human 
Rights, Development, and the WTO: The Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Policy” (2006) 9 JIEL 707; Peter Sutherland (Chairman) et al, “The Future of the WTO: 
Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium” Report by the Consultative Board 
to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpadki (Geneva: WTO, 2004); it is also argued that 
free trade is promoting peace, see Eugene Kontorovich, “Reconciling Political Sanctions with 
Globalization and Free Trade: The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign 
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?” (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 283, 299 wfr. 
1352
 That continuing efforts are clearly needed is also acknowledge by authors considering free 
trade as promoting human rights, see for example Robert D. Anderson and Hannu Wager, 
“Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: The Cases of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Policy” (2006) 9 JIEL 707, 708-9. 
1353
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 41; on the only small impact of trade liberalisation on 
increasing prosperity see ibid., stating that the Uruguay Round lead to an increase of the 
global GDP of  0.7% according to the ”most expansive figures” and stating that reducing 
poverty alone is not equal to increasing human rights protection in general and on other 
policies that therefore have to be tied to free trade see ibid. at  42 wfr; see also Robert D. 
Anderson and Hannu Wager, “Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: The Cases of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Policy” (2006) 9 JIEL 707, 717, stressing that trade is 
no panacea; Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr, “Quantifying the 
Uruguay Round” in Will Martin and L. Alan Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and the 
Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) in particular 3-6. 
1354
 Philip Alston, “‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International 
Labour Rights Regime“ (2004) 15 EJIL 457 471-6 on the different perception of this linkage; 
Caroline Dommen, “Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: 
Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies” (2002) 24 HRQ 1; James Harrison, The Human 
Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 76 
and 77; Richard N. Lock, Karen Roberts and Myron J. Roomkin, “Models of International 
Labor Standards” (2001) 40 Indus. Rel. 258;Carlos Manuel Vázquez, “Trade Sanctions and 
Human Rights - Past, Present, and Future” (2003) 6 JIEL 797, 817; from an economic 
perspective see Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, “Pros and Cons 
of Linking Trade and Labor Standards”, Discussion Paper No 477, University of Michigan 
(May 2002); from a policy perspective compare Nicola Bullard, “Social Standards in 
International Trade” Report for the Deutscher Bundestag commission of enquiry 
 263
human rights are not contradicting one another per se.1355 Human rights 
protection does not require the abolition of free trade and neither does trade 
liberalization require the violation of human rights. Trade law can indeed benefit 
human rights,1356 yet, as just mentioned, this does not mean that trade 
liberalization alone is sufficient to ensure due human rights promotion and 
protection. For example reducing poverty is not equal to protecting human 
rights, let alone the issue whether free trade is in fact reducing poverty on a 
broad scale, which is not clear either.1357 In addition, human rights like free 
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speech, fair trial and property rights can have a positive impact on trade 
liberalization,1358 yet these human rights should not be degraded to mere 
instruments of trade law, nor should different human rights be taken into 
account by trade law differently, depending on their functionality for trade.1359 
As Harrison remarks, data and research on this topic are not providing any clear 
results or allowing to draw clear conclusions1360 and the same is true for the 
argument that if no international standards were applied, a “race to the bottom” 
would take place, because disregarding human rights standards means 
competitive advantage.1361 All the above mentioned shows that the issue is 
simply too complex for easy solutions and answers.1362 Yet it becomes clear that 
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the two areas of law are interrelated, in particular by the changes taking place 
within the WTO shown above concerning the new Agreements also dealing with 
non-trade issues. 1363 As this factual linkage cannot be denied, a way to deal with 
it and the responsibility that flows from it has to be found. 
This is even more so when considering the findings from above that none of the 
sets of laws is overriding the other and that WTO member states are bound by 
human rights treaties and constantly try to adhere to both areas of law,1364 whilst 
the unclear position of WTO law on trade restrictions triggered by human rights 
violations causes a “regulatory chill” 1365 or “chilling effect”1366 to the 
disadvantage of human rights protection, although the measures could be 
considered WTO-consistent by the DSB.1367 A striking example of the difficulty 
for member states to adhere to both areas of law is that the ILO may in fact 
recommend economic sanctions to be imposed against a member that does not 
comply with ILO recommendations according to art. 33 ILO Constitution,1368 
but the WTO lacks an exemption clause similar to the one for UN Security 
Council decisions.1369 For these cases a solution has to be found. As the WTO 
members explicitly stated in the Singapore Declaration that the competent body 
                                                                                                                                                        
international law and policy at the World Trade Organisation, Paper prepared by Robert 
Howse E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (9 June 2004) in particular par. 3. 
1363
 See Wolfram Spelten, WTO und nationale Sozialordnungen (vol.11, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2005) 291-5 and 298-309, referring to the examples of General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) (1995) and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) (1994). 
1364
 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global 
Commons: Can we prosper and protect?“  (1992) 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1407, 1437; Iris 
Halpern, “Tracing the Contours of Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights Obligations in 
the Twenty-First Century” (2008) 14 Buff. HRL Rev. 129,142-3 wfr.; James Harrison, The 
Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 223-4. 
1365
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 236; Sarah Joseph, Blame it to the WTO? A Human Rights 
Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 50. 
1366
 Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food, Olivier de Schutter A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (4 February 2009) par. 35. 
1367
 So far it is claimed that there have not been cases identifying concrete conflicts between 
WTO/GATT law and human rights, see ILA (ITLC), Eighth Report of the Committee, (Rio de 
Janeiro Conference, 2008), available at <http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24> 1 May 2014, par. 38. 
1368
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 87. 
1369
 See ibid. at 92. 
 266
to deal with labour rights is the ILO,1370 the DSB could for example interpret 
WTO law in a way that allows for the sanctions recommended by the ILO, 
parallel to the proceeding concerning measures of the UN Security Council 
according to art. XXI (c) GATT.1371 This is because WTO/GATT regulations are 
part of public international law.1372 Yet operating within one framework of 
international rules, such as WTO/GATT does not automatically suspend the 
obligations deriving from other frameworks of public international law, like 
human rights.1373 This was also stressed by the ILA Declaration on International 
Trade Law and Human Rights 20081374 and the resulting ILA Resolution 5/2008. 
It is even argued that for example the ICESC contains the obligations for all 
signatory states to protect the rights granted in this Convention worldwide.1375 
This is similar to the idea of an obligation to globally protect human rights due 
to their universal character mentioned above. Yet whether such an obligation is 
presumed or not, to avoid conflicts between the different areas of public 
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international law and create coherence,1376 the WTO has to take into account 
human rights when creating rules or deciding on trade issues.1377 This is 
supported by the WTO preamble that states that “allowing for the optimal use of 
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development” is one of the WTO aims, as the “sustainable development” has 
been claimed to be an at least indirect way to include human rights into the 
WTO.1378 Yet so far no clear answer has been provided by the WTO in practice.  
A further example of the regulatory chill caused by the uncertainty concerning 
WTO law is reflected in the already above mentioned way the Kimberley 
Scheme was imposed. A waiver was granted although many commentators and 
for example the EC/EU were of the opinion that this was not needed, because an 
interpretation of WTO/GATT was possible that allowed for the trade ban on 
conflict diamonds, particularly when using art. XX GATT.1379 Furthermore, a 
UN Security Council Resolution demanding all states to ban the trade with 
conflict diamonds in order to help to put an end to the armed conflict in Liberia 
had been passed already in 2001.1380 So whether the waiver was in fact 
necessary to achieve WTO/GATT compatibility may be doubted, but it certainly 
helped to ensure WTO/GATT compatibility and to bring the US and Canada on 
board which had declared that they would not impose the Kimberly Scheme 
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without a waiver.1381 Although the waiver shows that there are WTO 
mechanisms allowing for trade bans to protect human rights, it also shows that 
there is great uncertainty as to which trade restricting actions to promote and 
protect human rights are GATT/WTO consistent and which are not.1382 This at 
the same time shows that the WTO/GATT is in fact dealing with non-trade 
matters as well and that it is ready to find solutions.  
Where states are acting unilaterally, without UN Resolutions and international 
consensus, these uncertainties are even more striking and may lead to inaction 
and a factual prevention of unilateral measures because of the assumed 
possibility of a WTO violation.1383 Such unilateral examples of inaction include 
domestic measures restricting the trade in tropical woods 1384 and measures with 
regard to social standards,1385 particularly child labour1386 that were not 
implemented due to the fear of WTO-inconsistency. Others still impose 
measures, for example the EU to internationally protect the environment via 
trade restrictions concerning whale products, sealskins, ivory, etc.1387 Some 
                                                 
1381
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 94; Krista Nadakavukaren-Schefer, “Stopping Trade in 
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for the Kimberley Process” in Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi 
(eds), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 394; 
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 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 94-5. 
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 Ibid. at 94-6. 
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 See for example Brian F. Chase, “Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of 
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749; see for further examples also Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen 
zum Schutz extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 39 and 83. 
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Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2000) 42. 
1386
 See for example German Bundestag document 13/1079 (6. April 1995) in particular 11-23 
where trade bans and their compatibility with GATT and WTO law is discussed. 
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 See for example Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2496/89 on a prohibition on 
importing raw and worked ivory derived from the African elephant into the Community 
(1989); Council Directive 83/129/EEC concerning the importation into Member States of 
skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom (1983) L 091, 09/04/1983 P. 0030 – 
0031, amended by Council Directive 89/370/EEC amending Directive 83/129/EEC 
concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products 
derived therefrom (1989) L 163, 14/06/1989 P. 0037 – 0037; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
348/81 on common rules for imports of whales or other cetacean products, (1981) L 039, 
 269
clarification by the DSB would nevertheless be helpful to provide clear guidance 
for governmental and parliamentary action in this context, in particular 
concerning human rights, which are still more “internal” than environmental 
right and “physical spillovers” or sufficient linkages are therefore not possible to 
prevent inaction at the expense of human rights.1388 For doing so the DSB would 
have to take a position concerning the measures in question, triggered by human 
rights violations, and their WTO compatibility. 
That free trade and human rights do not contradict one another per se can be 
seen very well when looking at the way the EU, which also provides for free 
trade among its members, is dealing with human rights.1389 There the broad 
interpretation of fundamental freedoms as limits to free trade had caused the 
penetration of domestic law with EU law in an increasing number of areas of 
domestic law, including social law.1390 To antagonize this trend and to take into 
account the interests covered by domestic social law, a common EU social 
policy has been introduced and fundamental rights have been used and are now 
established in various ways within EU law1391 as can for example be seen in art. 
6 (3) Treaty on the European Union (TEU).1392 Of course, this development 
cannot simply be transferred to the WTO, because the EU is far more than a 
trade organization by now and its members are more homogenous than those of 
                                                                                                                                                        
12/02/1981 P. 0001 – 0003; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3254/91 prohibiting the use of 
leghold traps in the Community and the introduction into the Community of pelts and 
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trapping standards (1991) L 308, 09/11/1991 P. 0001 – 0004. 
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Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 150. 
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 ILA (ITLC), Eighth Report of the Committee, (Rio de Janeiro Conference, 2008), 
available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24> 1 May 2014, par. 42: 
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Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “The WTO Constitution and Human Rights” (2000) 3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 19, 21. 
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 Wolfram Spelten, WTO und nationale Sozialordnungen (vol.11, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2005) 162. 
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 Ibid. at 170-1. 
1392
 Art. 6 (3) TEU reads: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of 
the Union's law.”, thereby acknowledging a triple source for human rights for EU law. 
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the WTO.1393 Yet it does show that free trade and human rights can be joined. 
There are even several studies on the issue of foreign direct investment and 
human rights or environmental regulations that suggest that such regulations do 
not reduce foreign direct investment,1394 cause relocation of corporations1395 or  
influence international competitiveness in a significant way.1396 Of particular 
interest for this enquiry is also the finding that home state corporations are often 
operating environmentally friendlier than domestic ones. 1397 This suggests that 
although WTO members are much more heterogenic and this for sure constitutes 
a challenge, increased human rights protection in home state TNCs operating in 
developing countries is already taking place and not harming them. 
Due to all the reasons just provided the question is not whether human rights 
have to be linked and whether “an explicit human rights discourse is 
required”,1398 but how this factual linkage can be supported. 
 
E Ideas to overcome the (remaining) tensions and contradictions 
There are many different suggestions as to how human rights and trade law 
should be linked most effectively, reaching from a broader interpretation of 
existing trade law norms1399 to changing WTO law by adding a social clause1400 
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 The heterogeneity of WTO members as a new challenge to trade, including environmental 
issues, is stressed in the World Trade Report 2007, WTO Website, Resources 
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(2004) 15 EJIL 575, 582, pointing out that due to the heterogeneity of WTO members they 
cannot and do not want to discuss further exceptions from GATT principles. 
1394
 World Trade Report 2005, WTO Website, Resources 
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and different ways of enhancing the cooperation between the UN, mainly the 
ILO, and the WTO. 1401 
 
1 Solutions by changing the WTO and human rights law systems 
The idea of changing the WTO and human rights law systems derives from the 
idea that trade panels are not the appropriate bodies to decide on human rights 
issues1402 and therefore human rights bodies should be involved1403 on equal 
terms, the latter focusing on the human rights aspects, the former on the trade 
aspects. This would also provide for more legal certainty concerning both areas 
of law.1404 Furthermore, approaches considering human rights issues not within 
trade law, but - at least also - from a human rights respective could grant that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
as constitutional reforms of WTO law; see also ILA Resolution 5/2008 International Trade 
Law. 
1400
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Nomos, 2000) 217-8. 
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ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws)“ in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, Fair Trade and 
Harmonization (vol. 2, Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1996) 
177, 194; see also Thomas Cottier and Alecandra Caplazi, “Labour Standards and World 
Trade Law: Interfacing Legitimate Concerns” in Thomas Geiser, Hans Schmid and Emil 
Walter-Busch (eds), Arbeit in der Schweiz des 20. Jahrhunderts. Wirtschaftliche, rechtliche 
und soziale Perspektiven (Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt, 1998) 469-508 including cooperation 
on labelling; Richard N. Lock, Karen Roberts and Myron J. Roomkin, “Models of 
International Labor Standards” (2001) 40 Indus. Rel. 258 in particular 286 where a “potential 
reconciliation” is described.  
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 See James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 121, 182. 
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 See for example Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz 
extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 209, pointing out that in EC-
Bananas III  WTO/GATT Panel and AB assessed the accordance with the Forth ACP-EC 
Convention of Lomé (“Lomé IV Convention”) (1989), because the preferences granted in this 
Conventions were only possible due to a WTO/GATT waiver, European Communities - 
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas III) WT/DS27/R 
(22 May 1997) par. 7.79 and WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997), par. 167, 169. 
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 See James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 121 and 182; see also Third World Intellectuals and NGOs’ 
Statement Against Linkage (1999) available at <http://www.cuts-international.org/Twin-
sal.htm> 1 May 2014 and the response of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, “Enough Exploitation is Enough: A Response to the Third World Intellectuals and 
NGOs’ Statement Against Linkage” (TWIN-SAL) (1999), available at <http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/25a/022.html> 1 May 2014, yet note that in this statement only voluntary 
approaches like reporting mechanisms etc in the ILO are suggested. 
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experts of the respective areas of laws stick to their specialised areas and 
cooperate on equal terms where intersections exist. At the same time this could 
also prevent that presumptions of guilt and the burden of proof are with the state 
imposing trade restrictions to protect human rights as is the case when art. XX 
GATT is used for justifications of such measures.1405 Such an approach would 
not be totally alien to the WTO as the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the 
WTO work similarly, the Commission setting the standards and the WTO 
watching their adherence.1406 A more radical change, banning cases involving 
human rights from WTO DSBs altogether would be rather counterproductive to 
the promotion and protection of human rights as well, because due to the just 
mentioned lack of equally effective enforcement mechanisms and dispute 
settlement bodies in human rights law, these cases would usually not be assessed 
at all and any trade restricting measures, including protectionist measures, could 
be based on human rights law to avoid control.1407 Such an approach could 
therefore only be taken when accompanied by an accordingly equipped human 
rights panel, yet the latter as well as the embrace of such an approach by the 
WTO and its members it doubtful. Changes in WTO law are hard to achieve,1408 
particularly when human rights protection is involved as the developing states 
usually oppose such approaches,1409 because they fear a loss of sovereignty, 
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this strong and general refusal, see International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 
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protectionism and a loss of their competitive advantage.1410 These issues have 
already been mentioned in the preceding chapters. Yet even in states in favour of 
a social clause trade sanctions are not necessarily considered to be an 
appropriate means of enforcement by all parties involved.1411 While the OHCHR 
suggested a social clause in its first two reports,1412 it deterred from doing so in 
the later reports1413 due to the realisation of complications and difficulties such a 
reference entails, like lacking political will and the negative impact of a failure 
of negotiations of such a clause,1414 the fear that the DSB might feel appointed to 
interpret human rights1415 and the uncertainty of the content of human rights 
obligations.1416 The WTO is not considered to be authorised to deal with human 
rights issues1417 and a further obstacle is that the WTO member states are far 
from homogenous in their human rights protection levels1418 as already noted 
above. All this is why the introduction of a social clause into WTO law, 
explicitly referring to human rights and their protection is not likely to be 
attained either.  
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Due to the lack of workable overriding law rules as mentioned above it has also 
been suggested that human rights and trade rights should be directly balanced 
against one another and that the “integral” human rights norms with their 
collective effect should override trade law in the case of a conflict of rules.1419 
Yet it seems unlikely that such an approach will be taken by the DSB should 
human rights issues arise there within the next years as can be derived from 
cases already decided by the DSB that involved non-trade issues.1420 
 
2 Solutions within the existing WTO law 
So as desirable as the just sketched approaches may be, it is rather unlikely that 
major change in trade law will occur during the next years, because the positions 
and arguments of developing and developed states seem rather gridlocked and 
the institutions affected will not embrace any fundamental changes either.1421 
Therefore, and because human rights issues will sooner or later arise under 
WTO DSBs1422 simply because there is currently no equivalent supervising body 
for human rights law, approaches within the existing WTO law are a possible 
solution1423 and the most likely approach to be taken within the next years.1424 
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When cases on trade restrictions imposed to protect human rights are brought 
before the DSB, the Panels and the Appellate Body should apply trade law in 
conformity with other public international law, not fostering conflicts in 
international law.1425 It should for example use appropriate human rights 
expertise, which is provided for in art. 13 (2) DSU.1426 Human rights experts 
could assess the question whether there was a substantial human rights issue and 
whether the measure taken addressed this issue,1427 preventing WTO Panels 
from interpreting human rights and human rights obligations.1428 Expert 
consultancy has been used by the DSB before. Concerning human health the 
WTO consulted the WHO in Thailand-Cigarettes1429 and in other cases the 
World Intellectual property organisation (WIPO) and the IMF were 
consulted.1430 This is perfectly in line with the ILA Resolution 5/2008, declaring 
that “WTO members and bodies are legally required to interpret and apply WTO 
rules in conformity with the human rights obligations of WTO members under 
international law.”1431 
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This also stresses that the interpretational approach is the most likely of the 
suggestions made for linking human rights and trade in a way that allows for 
trade restrictions triggered by human rights violations. However, it has to be 
stressed that although this may solve some of the difficulties that arise when 
assessing human rights within the framework of trade law, this is a merely 
pragmatic solution and different approaches, allowing human rights bodies to 
decide on human rights issues and a cooperation where trade and human rights 
obligations are involved, would be preferable,1432 but they do not (yet) exist and 
their coming into existence is rather unlikely at the present.1433  
From a trade law perspective this approach has the advantage of allowing the 
WTO to signal that trade law and  trade liberalization is not necessarily fostering 
the oppression of the poor, disadvantaged and vulnerable, a critique that has 
been claimed by many opponents of the WTO and “globalisation” until now.1434 
As Harrison puts it: “The WTO needs to demonstrate it has the ability to 
systematically deal with the issues raised by a human rights approach if it is to 
ensure the support it needs for its own well-being and survival.”1435 
To find out how such an interpretation of WTO law according to human rights 
might work out for the TNC context, the human rights potential of the norms 
closely linked to the present issue of trade restrictions triggered by human rights 
violations during the processing and production of the good will be assessed 
more closely. As the most striking and most discussed articles to take into 
account human rights of GATT law are art. III and XX, these will be the focus of 
examination in the following,1436 after assessing the relevant articles of the SPS 
and TBT Agreements.  
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(a) SPS and non-trade issues related to human rights 
As the SPS Agreement is the stricter one of TBT and SPS and according to art. 
1.5 TBT only SPS is applicable on SPS measures, the SPS Agreement will be 
assessed first. The SPS Agreement covers sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
concerning the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. This means 
they are aiming at the protection of the aforementioned interests from food-
borne risks or risks from pests and diseases.1437 Already here it becomes clear 
that the SPS Agreement may not be the one best apt to tackle the human rights 
and TNC issue assessed in this enquiry.1438 Yet still the existence of the SPS 
Agreement and its openness to non-trade issues and state sovereignty in 
pursuing them are worth mentioning. The aim of the SPS Agreement is 
balancing the need to increase market access for food and agricultural products, on the 
one hand, with the recognition of the sovereign right of governments to take measures 
to protect human, animal and plant life and health in their territories, on the other.1439  
 
In doing so, the WTO acknowledges the importance of domestic measures in the 
area of life and health protection, while it wants to prevent protectionist 
measures.1440 The importance of environmental protection has also been stressed 
in the GMO Cases where the Panel found that the SPS Agreement covers risks 
to the environment in general.1441 However, several obligations are imposed on 
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the member states when imposing sovereign protection measures. This can for 
example be seen in art. 2 SPS that provides the basic threshold SPS measures 
have to meet. There domestic protection measures and trade law are balanced by 
using the benchmark of necessity for the protection measure. Furthermore, it is 
required that the measure “is based on scientific principles and is not maintained 
without scientific evidence”, the so-called “scientific disciplines”.1442 These 
requirements are regulated in more detail in art. 5 and 7 and considered to be 
stricter than those in other international standards1443 as could already be seen in 
the examples above. Art. 2 further expresses the obligation to refrain from 
measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or constitute a disguised 
trade restriction and is interpreted somewhat stricter than the equivalent in the 
chapeau of art. XX GATT.1444 Art. 3 introduces the goal of harmonization, 
obliging member states to base SPS measures on international standards, 
including soft law ones,1445 except where there is scientific justification for not 
doing so.1446 This is of particular interest for the idea of this research to use 
universal human rights and international human rights standards to protect 
human rights abroad. Whether the measure was imposed before or after the SPS 
agreement entered into force is not relevant as was decided in  EC-Hormones, so 
human rights treaties already signed decades ago or for example standards 
developed by the ILO already in the beginning of its work could be applicable. 
Yet as already mentioned above when explaining the aim of the Agreement, it 
only covers protection measures concerning life and health within the applying 
                                                                                                                                                        
(”GMO”) WT/DS291/R, WTO/DS/292/R and WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) par. 7.197-
7.211. 
1442
 Robert Hudec, “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for An ‘Aim 
and Effects’ Test” (1998) 32 The Int’l Lawyer 619, 648; Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 842. 
1443
 See on the issue of the precautinary principle and the SPS for example Richard Senti, Die 
WTO im Spannungsfeld zwischen Handel, Gesundheit, Arbeit und Umwelt (vol. 32, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2006) 45-6; Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 862-6. 
1444
 For details see Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 847-8. 
1445
 Mary E. Footer, “The (Re)Turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO 
Law” (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int’l L .241, 267. 
1446
 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 842. 
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state’s own territory.1447 This is explicitly stated in par. 1 of Annex A of the 
Agreement.1448 However, the adherence to non-trade standards related to human 
rights and protection of human rights in the host state, not the home state, is the 
very topic of this research and the situation for which home state options are 
assessed. That is why it is not much help either, that PPM measures are also 
covered by the SPS Agreement. Covering PPMs and allowing the protection of 
life and health rights in a member state’s own territory only, means only 
covering incorporated PPMs.1449 So with regard to the topic covered by this 
enquiry, the SPS Agreement is only of limited interest. As long as PPMs are 
product-related and cause threats to life or health in the home state, SPS 
measures can be applied. The same is true for measures under TBT and GATT. 
This is the case in situations like EC-Asbestos, where the manufacturers in the 
host state as well as the sellers and consumers in the home state are affected by 
the risks to health. The more interesting part, because it is covering more of the 
cases assessed in the TNC context of this research and it is highly debated, is the 
case of unincorporated PPMs. Due to these considerations and the limited scope 
of this enquiry which assesses many different kinds of state options, the focus 
will be on unincorporated PPMs in the following. For SPS measures the answer 
to the question whether it is covering unincorporated PPMs is pretty clear given 
the just mentioned territorial scope - it does not. Therefore, only the TBT and 
GATT Agreements will be assessed in more detail below and the SPS Agreement 
will only be referred to where helpful for their interpretations. 
 
                                                 
1447
 Ibid. at 834. 
1448Annex A of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) (1995). 
1449
 On this conclusion see also Philipp Jehle, Harmonisierung im Welthandelsrecht durch 
Verweis auf internationale Standards (vol. 46, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008) 57; see also 
Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 62; see for the terms “incorporated PPM” and 
“unincorporated PPM” for example Manoj Joshi, „Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World 
Trade Organization Agreements?” (2004) 38 J.W.T. 69, 74; World Trade Report 2005, WTO 
Website, Resources <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr05_e.htm> 1 May 
2014; 150; using the terms “product-related PPM” and “non-product related PPM” is for 
example Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 808. 
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(b)  Human rights in the context of “legitimate objective” and “necessity” 
according to art. 2.2 TBT 
 
The TBT Agreement covers technical barriers to trade that do not fall under the 
SPS Agreement or the Agreement on Government Procurement.1450 Like GATT 
the TBT Agreement contains as a basic provision the MFN treatment and the 
national treatment already mentioned above. Yet the TBT also provides for the 
possibility to imply technical regulations, i.e. mandatory rules, that may 
discriminate against foreign products in cases where such regulations are not  
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia:  
national security requirements;  the prevention of deceptive practices;  protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing 
such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia:  available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products.1451 
 
Art. 2.2 is accompanied by art. 2.5 TBT which in its second sentence states:  
Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the 
legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with 
relevant international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. 
 
So the necessity test is automatically met when the regulation is for example 
based on human health or safety, thereby including human rights concerns in 
these areas, at least where international standards of human rights exist.1452 
 
Furthermore, the non-exclusive list of legitimate objectives goes beyond the 
exclusive list of art XX GATT. This means the DSB could find that other 
interests, including human rights, like “fair labour practices, are, in a particular 
                                                 
1450
 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) (1996); Peter Van den Bossche, The Law 
and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
815. 
1451
 Art. 2.2 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (1995), emphasis added. 
1452
 See Jeroen Denkers, The World Trade Organization and Import Bans in Response to 
Violations of Fundamental Labour Rights (Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia, 2008) 59. 
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case, legitimate policy objectives within the meaning of art. 2.2.”1453 The non-
exhaustive list is of particular interest for this enquiry because the legitimate 
objectives are not limited to those within the member states own territory.1454 
That means in contrast to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement is more apt to 
tackle the situation of TNCs violating human rights abroad. Furthermore, art. 2.2 
explicitly states that the risks of not fulfilling the legitimate objective have to be 
taken into account when assessing the necessity of the trade restrictive measure. 
This suggests that some sort of balancing of interests, similar to the one already 
developed for art. XX GATT1455 has to take place.1456 In this process of 
balancing of interests, human rights, once they are accepted as a legitimate 
objective, can - or even  have to - be taken into account.1457 
 
(c) Human rights and “international standards” according to art. 2.4 TBT 
A further basic provision of the TBT is the use of international standards,1458 
because they offer a good way to harmonize technical barriers to ease 
international trade.1459 As could already be seen when sketching the example of 
the Tuna-Dolphin decisions, the idea of using other international agreements or 
treaties when examining a member state’s trade restricting measures is not a new 
one. Yet in TBT and SPS this was laid down in more detail. Art. 2.4 TBT reads: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, 
as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or 
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relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the 
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or 
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.1460 
 
In contrast to art. 3 SPS Agreement no specific international standards or 
international bodies providing such standards are listed and the exception is 
rather broad. Therefore,  human rights standards could be relevant under TBT as 
well. The ILO for example is setting international labour standards.1461 The 
impact of the provision to use international standards where available could be 
seen in EC-Sardines sketched above, where it was held to be a trade-restriction 
not permissible under TBT that the EC had not implemented its own law in 
accordance with the corresponding Codex Alimentarius standards, which 
pursued the same objectives. In EC-Sardines the Panel affirmed the explanatory 
note concerning international standards in Annex 1 A to the TBT Agreement, 
which explains that international standards do have to be based on consensus.1462  
Yet human rights could also be considered in another way. There is an 
exemption to the obligation to use international standards already within art. 2.4 
TBT. This is the case when a legitimate objective according to art. 2.2 is pursued 
by the measures and the international standard is an inappropriate or ineffective 
means to achieve that objective.1463 This leaves some space for domestic 
protection of non-trade interests that is for example of higher level than the 
international standard provides for. In addition, the burden of proof for the 
appropriateness and effectiveness is with the complainant as the AB decided in 
EC-Sardines. So as human rights could be legitimate objectives as seen above, 
technical barriers to trade could be based on them. Where no human rights 
                                                 
1460
 Explanatory Note to Annex 1 A to the TBT Agreement. 
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 For an overview see for example ILO, Rules of the Game (Geneva: ILO, 2009) in 
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decided in European Communities - Trade Description of  (“EC – Sardines”) WT/DS231/R 
(29 May 2002) and WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002). 
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standards exist or where they are ineffective or inappropriate to achieve the 
pursued level of human rights protection, the member state is not prevented 
from imposing the measures in spite of this. Yet of course, MFN and national 
treatment have also to be observed under TBT and GATT is applicable 
complementarily, although usually prevails in cases of conflicts between WTO 
agreements.1464 Furthermore, art. 2.9 TBT has to be observed in such cases to 
inform other member states and allow for a discussion of the intended measure. 
This does also apply to mandatory labelling schemes according to the TBT 
Committee.1465 
 
(d) PPMs under the TBT 
As sketched above in the TNC-human rights context it is PPMs rather than the 
products themselves that affect human rights. So all the possible gateways for 
human rights protection under TBT can in many cases only be used if PPMs are 
an accepted benchmark. 
TBT Annex 1 defines the term “technical regulation” as a  
[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.1466 
 
This definition refers to characteristics of the product or their related processes 
and is therefore predominantly understood as only including those processes and 
production methods that affect the product itself,1467 i.e. incorporated PPMs. Yet 
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as the second sentence does not use the expression “related”, but instead 
mentions process and production methods alongside the term “product”, the TBT 
can also be understood as including unincorporated PPM standards.1468 
Therefore the conclusion can be drawn, that at least  
concerning ‘labelling requirements’ relating to NPR-PPMs [i.e. non-product related 
PPMs] are TBT measures within the meaning of Annex 1 to the TBT Agreements and 
thus fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement.1469  
 
As already mentioned above, unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement is 
not preventing the protection of legitimate objectives outside a member states’s 
territory. Therefore, unincorporated PPMs may be considered to be included 
more easily in the TBT. Yet whether the DSB would share this opinion is not yet 
clear, particularly because developing countries have been opposed to 
introducing labour issues into the WTO and including unincorporated PPMs into 
the TBT would also mean including them into art. III GATT.1470 Many member 
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states were already opposed to including them when drafting the Agreement and 
the final text was not supposed to include them.1471 Yet the Agreements and its 
Annex 1 can be understood in both ways. In addition, as already seen above, 
dynamic interpretation of WTO norms is possible and the DSB has done so for 
example concerning art. XX (g) GATT.1472 
 
(e) Human rights and TBT standards according to art. 4 TBT 
Using voluntary measures, i.e. standards instead of technical regulations, could 
be a way to consider human rights in an even broader scope, possibly including 
PPMs. 
Annex 1 A to the TBT Agreement defines the term international standard in 
more detail as: 
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and 
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.1473 
 
In the explanatory note to this definition it is set out that standards are voluntary 
whereas technical regulations are mandatory and that documents not based on 
consensus are also covered by the Agreement, as could already be seen above. 
While art. 2 TBT only applies to technical regulations, art. 4 deals with the 
“Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.” Art. 4 basically refers to 
Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement, titled “Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards”. Annex 3 D. contains rules 
on notification, discussion etc, yet it also contains the MFN and national 
treatment principles. Furthermore, it is set out in Annex 3 E. and F. that 
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standards must not create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and that 
standards should be based on international standards unless these are 
inappropriate or ineffective. In this respect the Annex is similar to arta. 2.2 and 
2.4 TBT. Yet it does not list legitimate interests and therefore the necessity 
requirement is not set out in that much detail either, leaving open as to how the 
necessity of an obstacle to trade has to be assessed exactly. A risk assessment is 
not mentioned either. That is why it could be argued that standards may be used 
to achieve an even broader range of legitimate interests. Therefore human rights 
protection by using standards could be easier. Yet as the list in art. 2.2 is an open 
one and MFN and national treatment still have to be observed under Annex 3, 
the requirements for voluntary and mandatory measures seem to be pretty 
similar in this respect. Furthermore, the sixth recital of the TBT preamble 
referring to the whole Agreement, including technical regulations and standards, 
speaks of to the “protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the 
environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices” and is thus similar to 
the legitimate objectives set out in art. 2.2 TBT. 
As far as unincorporated PPMs are concerned, the considerations already made 
above can be used, as the definitions of “technical regulation” and “standard” 
are the same concerning PPMs. That means that using standards instead of 
regulations is not an option allowing for more human rights protection under 
TBT. 
 
(f) PPMs and“like” products according to art. III GATT 
Art. III GATT demands for equal treatment. “Like” products have to be treated 
alike and foreign “like” products may not be discriminated against by domestic 
charges, regulations, etc in order to protect domestic production.1474 As can be 
seen from art. III:1, the very aim of art. III is to prevent internal mere 
protectionist measures.1475 The protectionist intent is either inherent in the 
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measure described in one of the more specific paragraphs of art. III or has to be 
positively shown.1476 The fundamental aim of art. III GATT is according to the 
Appellate Body “to ensure equality of competitive conditions between imported 
and like domestic products.”1477 The question that arises in the context of human 
rights is whether a product not produced in accordance with human rights norms 
is a “like” product compared to a product produced in accordance with human 
rights. If products manufactured under different PPMs are considered “like” and 
domestic products are regularly manufactured in accordance with the PPM 
standards required for sale while those of the host state are not, a factual “less 
favourable” treatment is given. Such a de facto discrimination is sufficient for a 
discrimination according to art. III GATT1478 and may be caused by the design 
and application of a law or regulations when exclusively or mainly foreign 
products are affected by it.1479 
When the products are considered “unlike” in the sense of art. III GATT, 
however, they may be treated differently. Therefore the question that will be 
assessed in the following section is whether PPMs, particularly unincorporated 
ones, may be referred to for determining “likeness” under art. III GATT. To 
determine the “likeness” of a product under art. III:41480 four criteria have been 
developed by WTO/GATT Panels so far, yet this is not being a closed list 
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according to them.1481 The criteria of which usually all four have to be 
considered1482 are (1) the properties of the product itself, its nature and quality, 
(2) its end-use, (3) consumers’ tastes and habits and (4) the tariff 
classification.1483  
These criteria already show that unincorporated PPMs are not exactly the main 
issue when considering the likeness of products. It is argued by some that PPMs 
are part of every (importing) state’s sovereignty and should therefore not be 
intervened with by WTO/GATT.1484 Yet this is not very convincing as the 
product standards themselves also affect the exporting state’s sovereignty.1485 A 
striking example for the latter is US-Gasoline1486 where the Panel demanded 
Venezuelan refineries to adhere to US product standards, which demanded large 
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adjustments by the said refineries.1487 Furthermore, the issue of protectionism 
art. III is seeking to prevent is an issue that occurs wherever differential 
treatment of imported and domestic products is given, no matter whether the 
distinction is based on product or production standards.1488 So non-
discrimination and the prohibition of protectionist measures could be sufficient 
for unincorporated PPM standards to be consistent with art. III GATT as well.1489 
Whether this is the case and whether unincorporated PPMs can be considered 
under art. III:4 GATT at all will be assessed now. 
 
(i) Using PPMs directly 
While in the Tuna-Dolphin decisions, the use of PPMs as a differentiation 
criterion under art. III was rejected, this may not always be the case,1490 
especially after the manifold criteria used in EC-Asbestos mentioned above1491 
and the reference to PPMs in SPS and TBT.1492 Whilst cultivation and processing 
methods were also rejected as a criterion to determine the likeness of products in 
Spain-Unroasted Coffee,1493 the Panel referred to “manufacturing processes of 
products” and “consumers’ viewpoint” to determine likeness in Japan - Customs 
Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic 
Beverages,1494 yet the panel did not explain in any detail what was meant by 
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(“Asbestos”) WT/DS135/R (18 September 2000) par. 3.14. 
1488
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Lucius & Lucius, 1997) 30-1. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2007) p. XXXIII. 
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Trade Organization (2nd ed, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 241. 
1493Spain-Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, GATT Panel Report (L/5135 - 28S/102), 
adopted 11 June 1981, par. 4.6. 
1494
 Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic 
Beverages (L/6216 - 34S/83) GATT Panel Report, adopted 10 November 1987. 
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these criteria.1495 This means it is not impossible that PPMs themselves are used 
as an additional criterion to determine “likeness”. As a supportive argument art. 
XX (e) GATT is sometimes used which allows for discrimination against 
products manufactured by prison labour.1496 Yet it is also argued that art. XX (e) 
is not protecting the prisoners, but the domestic products of importing states, as 
prison labour is cheap labour for the exporting state.1497 That art. XX (e) is not 
intended to protect prisoners can for example be derived from the fact that 
prison labour is not per se violating human rights or other international 
standards and that such a violation is no requirement of a justification according 
to art. XX (e) GATT either. 1498 Yet the TBT and SPS Agreements could also be 
supportive of using PPMs when assessing the likeness of products. The 
Agreements TBT and SPS have modified art. III GATT and are leges speciales 
overriding GATT1499 as already outlined above. Therefore TBT and SPS have to 
be considered when assessing art. III GATT. Yet as seen above unincorporated 
PPMs are not covered by the SPS Agreement and in the TBT it is an unsettled 
question whether unincorporated PPMs may be considered or not.1500 That 
means unincorporated PPMs could be used by future DSBs as an additional 
criterion themselves when assessing the “likeness” of products, but this is not 
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 Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic 
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International Development Law Organization, 2005) 15.  
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 Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 62. 
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compulsory. Due to the predominant perception of the TBT not including 
unincorporated PPMs, although this Agreement is broader than the GATT in this 
respect, it seems rather unlikely that PPMs will be included when determining 
“likeness” in the near future. Yet it should be kept in mind that the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)1501 as well as the TRIPS are 
both taking into account certain actions during the production process, although 
in a rather particular and confined context.1502 So changes in TBT and GATT 
interpretation could occur, although most likely not within the next few decades. 
 
(ii) PPMs as part of “consumers’ tastes and habits” 
Apart from including unincorporated PPM standards explicitly as an additional 
factor when determining likeness, PPM standards could also be included 
through the already existing criterion of consumers’ taste and preferences.1503 
The AB in EC-Asbestos stressed that this criterion and the one concerning the 
product’s end-use are the “key elements relating to the competitive relationship 
between products”.1504 Yet consumers may not only take into account 
incorporated PPMs. The price of a product has for example been considered a 
factor influencing consumers’ preferences and the price of a product is not 
                                                 
1501
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) (1994). 
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 See ibid. at 68 referring to art. 27 TRIPS. 
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 Carsten Helm, Sind Freihandel und Umweltschutz vereinbar? Ökologischer Reformbedarf 
des GATT/WTO-Regimes (Berlin: Ed. Sigma, 1995) 96; Henry L. Thaggert, „A closer look at 
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Environment Context“ in James Cameron, Paul Demaret and Damien Geradin, Trade & the 
Environment: The Search for Balance (vol. 1, London: Cameron May Ltd., 1994) 69, 72; 
Peter Van den Bossche, Nico Schrijver and Gerrit Faber, Unilateral Measures addressing 
Non-Trade Concerns. A Study on WTO Consistency, Relevance of other International 
Agreements, Economic Effectiveness and Impact on Developing Countries of Measures 
concerning Non-Product-Related Process and Production Methods (The Hague: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2007) 63-4; see also Robert Howse and Donald Regan, 
“The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in 
Trade Policy” (2000) 11 EJIL 249, 268 who argue that as the list of criteria to determine 
likeness is an open one, the purpose of the measure could also be taken into account to make 
sure that protectionist measures are excluded. 
1504European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos 
(“Asbestos”) WT/DS135/R (18 September 2000) and WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001), 
par. 117. 
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necessarily solely product-based.1505 Now when considering the Tuna-Dolphin 
case above, it was due to ecology groups, i.e. the population1506 and therefore the 
consumers themselves, that tuna that was not caught dolphin-friendly was 
banned. Another WTO example where it was assumed that consumers’ tastes 
and habits were influenced is EC-Asbestos - where the Appellate Body relied 
upon physical properties of the bricks containing asbestos and those that did not 
contain asbestos, but it also relied on consumer habits, arguing that they wanted 
to purchase bricks that did not represent health risks and came to the conclusion 
that the bricks were not “like” products.1507 The Appellate Body in this case 
decided in favour of public health and its protection by domestic measures. It 
has therefore been argued that other social concerns could also cause 
“unlikeness”, particularly when linked to consumers’ habits so that when 
consumers want to purchase products manufactured in accordance with 
international human rights standards, products produced that way and those that 
are not produced in such a way might be “unlike” as well.1508 However, this idea 
is highly contentious1509 and so far the DSB has not decided on this matter. Yet 
of course this does not mean that at least in cases of  “the most uncomplicated 
human rights measures”1510 imposed or where clear human rights violations are 
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 See United States – Taxes on Automobiles (DS31/R) GATT Panel Report, not adopted, 11 
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Violations of Fundamental Labour Rights (Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia, 2008) 42-
3, pointing out that consumers’ preferences may be shaped by governments, so this element of 
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 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 196. 
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occurring during or are closely linked to the manufacturing process, “likeness” 
could not be rejected by future DSBs due to consumers’ tastes and habits.1511 
Yet home states do not have to wait until the issue is decided by the DSBs. 
Consumers’ tastes and habits are not static, but changing and developing and 
open to influences by marketing agencies, trends and movements. This gives the 
home state the chance of influencing the criterion determining the likeness of 
products by informing and raising awareness among its consumers for the issue 
of human rights and TNCs acting abroad. 
 
(iii) PPMs as part of an “aim and effects” test under art. III GATT 
In addition to determining the likeness of products, an aim and effects test 
concerning the protectionist intention or effect of the measure implied is 
sometimes mentioned as a further requirement.1512 Under this test is was 
assessed, whether the aim and effect of the measure was applied as to afford 
protection of domestic products.1513 Therefore this approach is more open to the 
consideration of unincorporated PPMs.1514 It also meets the argument that an 
undue restriction of state sovereignty is caused by using a wide interpretation of 
“likeness”, which leads to the consequence that not even aims acknowledged by 
GATT could be pursued by internal measures discriminating between foreign 
and domestic products1515 or would have to meet art. XX to be justified. This 
argument is also in line with the idea of in dubio mitius, i.e. using the 
interpretation of a norm that is least restrictive for state sovereignty. This 
principle was for example mentioned by the Appellate Body in the Hormones 
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 Ibid. 
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 See James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 195-6 wfr; Robert Hudec, “GATT/WTO Constraints on 
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case.1516 The “aim and effects” test has been developed particularly in United 
States-Taxes on Automobiles.1517 Yet already before that case, in United States - 
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages1518 for example beer with a 
low alcohol content and beer with a higher alcohol content were considered 
“unlike” under the “aim and effects” test, because the aim was considered to be 
the protection of health and public morals and not the own economy as could be 
seen by the formal equal treatment of both, domestic and foreign products.1519 
The parties’ reasoning of protecting public morals and health, which was 
accepted by the Panel reminds very much of the exceptions mentioned in art XX 
GATT. This already shows some of its difficulties - the rather difficult 
differentiation between art. III and XX GATT resulting from the aim and effects 
test was one of the issues criticized,1520 alongside the fact that the wording of art. 
III GATT did not allow for such a test and that an interpretation contradicting the 
wording of art. III GATT was against the rules of treaty interpretation of public 
international law.1521 In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages1522 the Panel made the same 
points, arguing that art XX GATT was circumvented by such an extensive use of 
art. III GATT and that the aim and effects test was contradicting the wording of 
the assessed art. III:2 GATT. It also pointed out that in practice the aim of a 
measure was often hard to determine. The AB upheld this reasoning and the 
“aims and effects” test was rejected. Yet this rejection by the DSBs does not 
necessarily mean that it cannot be reconsidered using it again. Howse and Regan 
argue that although the “aim and effects” test may have been rejected, the AB 
has not rejected considereing the aims and effects of a measure when examining 
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1522
 Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (11 July 1996) and WT/DS8/AB/R, 
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it under art. III.1523 As a basis for the test, art. III:1 instead of art. III: 2 or 4 could 
be better, because the aim of preventing protectionism is explicitly stated 
there1524 and art. III:1 has to be considered when interpreting art. III:4, because it 
contains the general principle of art. III.1525 Yet of course such a reconsideration 
is rather unlikely after the DSBs have explicitly rejected this approach. It could 
also be that such a reconsideration is not necessary, because there is a further 
requirement to art. III:4 inconsistency, which will be assessed now. 
 
(iv) Lifesaver “treatment less favourable”? 
Even when (unincorporated) PPMs are not included into the determination of 
likeness a measure can still be considered in accordance with art. III GATT when 
it is not causing a “less favourable treatment” for foreign products as compared 
to like domestic products. It was stressed in EC-Asbestos that the rather broad 
interpretation of like products in art. III:4 was complemented by the requirement 
of establishing a “treatment less favourable” and therefore mere differential 
treatment between like products was not sufficient to violate art. III:4.1526 The 
AB explained in several decisions that no “treatment less favourable” is given, 
when equality in competitive conditions between domestic and imported 
products is granted.1527 In EC-Asbestos it was stressed that treatment less 
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favourable of art. III:4 GATT had to be read in line with the general principle of 
art. III:1 GATT, so its aim was so prevent protectionism.1528 This means that 
only protectionist measures are a “treatment less favourable”.1529 A trade 
restriction may therefore not be violating art. III GATT when the design and 
application of the measure is not causing a competitive disadvantage.1530 Labels 
used for domestic as well as imported products and leaving the choice to the 
consumer alone could be considered GATT consistent under these criteria.1531 
This is in line with the Tuna-Dolphin I finding mentioned above. However, the 
assessment is difficult as de facto discrimination is a treatment less favourable as 
well as already mentioned.1532 This means where imported products cannot meet 
the criteria for a label or are mainly or exclusively affected by the measure, the 
measure itself in its design and application is causing a “treatment less 
favourable”.1533 Yet as can be seen from case law, the AB is not jumping to 
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conclusions here. In Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes1534 the AB held that it was no treatment less 
favourable although a detrimental effect on the imported product was given, if 
the “effect is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign 
origin of the product, such as the market share of the importer in this case.”1535 
Yet as far as human rights are concerned a treatment less favourable will usually 
be given in those cases, where the host state is unable to provide for human 
rights standards high enough to get a human rights label in the home state,1536 as 
this is a factor related to the origin of the product. So the cases in the TNC 
context where no treatment less favourable is found would be rather limited. 
 
(v) Conclusion on the possible interpretation of art. III GATT 
After this short assessment it becomes obvious that although (unincorporated) 
PPMs could be included into the assessment of “like” products in art. III GATT 
it is not likely that this will happen. A repeating issue are the different “levels” 
of PPMs or their relation to the physical properties of a good. Those methods 
that do not affect the good itself, are not inherent in the good, are not included in 
the TBT as SPS Agreements’ definitions of “process and production methods” 
according to the prevailing opinion as set out above. It is argued that methods 
not affecting the product as such, like observing or violating human rights 
standards, are bearing a higher risk of protectionism than those more related to 
the product itself.1537 The “aim and effects” test is not properly substituted by the 
“treatment less favourable” requirement, as the intention of protectionism is not 
assessed there. Unincorporated PPMs concerning the human rights situation 
during the manufacturing or production is rather difficult to use as a 
differentiating criterion without treating imported product at least de facto “less 
favourable” due to their origin. As the more PPM-friendly “aim and effects” test 
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has been explicitly rejected, a reconsideration within the next decades is rather 
unlikely. The overall impression, especially when considering the DSB 
decisions so far, is therefore that it cannot be expected that PPMs involving 
human rights violations will soon be included into art. III. The only possible 
state option at the moment to accelerate the inclusion of unincorporated PPMs 
into art. III is to raise awareness for the human rights issues concerning PPMs, 
thereby possibly creating a change in consumers’ tastes and habits. However, 
this is an option with an outcome not easy to predict. Yet all this does not mean 
that human rights cannot be considered. Art XX may provide a means to do so 
and not only for (internal) competition issues, but more generally, including 
market access issues as well. 
 
(g) Human rights and art. XX GATT 
As including unincorporated PPMS into the interpretation of “likeness” is not 
likely and because cases exist that would not be included in such an 
interpretation, for example when already the market access is denied or, 
depending on the definition of “PPM”, when the link between PPMs themselves 
and human rights violations is not as close, for example in cases of 
expropriation, art. XX GATT may be decisive.1538 Certain unincorporated PPMs 
have indeed been admitted by meeting the requirements of art. XX GATT.1539 
The first decision where the “Gordian knot” has been cut1540 and such a measure 
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was deemed entirely WTO-consistent was Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia).1541 So art. 
XX could provide for ways to control human rights protection in the host state 
by the home state. Art. XX contains justifications to deviate from GATT 
obligations when certain important state interests and obligations are given.1542 
As a norm dealing with exceptions it must not be interpreted too broadly1543 to 
prevent rendering WTO obligations meaningless,1544 while the main guidance 
for interpretation is still the “ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words”.1545 
For trade restrictions in order to protect human rights, art. XX (a) and (b) GATT, 
which allow for exceptions necessary to protect “public morals” and “human 
animal or plant life or health” may be the most relevant clauses.1546 According to 
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Effectiveness and Impact on Developing Countries of Measures concerning Non-Product-
Related Process and Production Methods (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, 2007) 94. 
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Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 197, referring to United States - Standards for Conventional 
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WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996) 30-1. 
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Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (L/6439 - 36S/345) GATT Panel Report, adopted 7 
November 1989. 
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Art. XX of the GATT” (2001) 10 Minn. J. of Global Trade 62, 69-70; James Harrison, The 
Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 198; Christopher McCrudden, “International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human 
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WTO Government procurement agreement” (1999) 2 JIEL 3, 41. 
1545
 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (“Hormones”) 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998) para. 104 stating that being an 
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concluding what was cited above; see also United States – Import Bans of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”) WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998), WT/DS58/AB/R (12 
October 1998); United States - Standards for Conventional and Reformulated Gasoline (“US-
Gasoline”) WT/DS2/R (29 January 1996) and WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996). 
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 Paul Cook, “Law of Trade in Human Rights: A Legal Analysis of the Intersection of the 
General Trade Agreement of Tariff’s Article XX (b) and Labor Rights of Children” 
(University of California, Los Angeles, 2012) available at 
<http://works.bepress.com/paul_cook/3> 1 May 2014, 3 and 10 on art. XX (b); Helge 
Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer 
Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 86 who also mentions art. XX (d), yet as it deals 
with the objective of securing “compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
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United States-Taxes on Automobiles, US-Gasoline, EC-Asbestos and Tuna-
Dolphin II the justification of art. XX GATT is to be assessed in three steps. 
Firstly, the measure has to be consistent with one of the objectives named in art. 
XX GATT, secondly, in the case of XX (a) and (b) the measure has to be 
necessary to protect the objective and, thirdly, it has to meet the chapeau of art. 
XX which prohibits any “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and 
“disguised restriction on international trade” to exclude the misuse of art. XX 
for protectionist measures.1547 Human rights issues may be taken into account on 
all three levels of assessment, in particular after in Shrimp-Turtle the AB held 
that effects on the domestic policy of the exporting state are typical for 
situations in which art. XX justifications are applicable.1548 How human rights 
could be considered will be sketched in the following, beginning with the human 
rights relevant objectives, before necessity and chapeau will be assessed. The 
two most striking objectives named in art. XX that could include human rights 
are as already mentioned the public morals in art. XX (a) and human, animal or 
plant life or health in art. XX (b). Art. XX (e) is also sometimes mentioned in 
this context. All three objectives and their human rights potential will be 
sketched in this section. 
 
(i) XX (a): Public Morals 
Trade restrictions imposed to protect human rights could be based on art. XX (a) 
GATT, the public morals exception.1549 As no general social clause or human 
                                                                                                                                                        
with the provisions of this Agreement” and this enquiry does not deal with a particular case 
but a more general approach assessing the very GATT consistency of possible unilateral 
measures, including laws and regulations, art. XX (d) will not be assessed here. 
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 See for example United States - Standards for Conventional and Reformulated Gasoline 
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Measures concerning Non-Product-Related Process and Production Methods (The Hague: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2007), 93. 
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 See for example Frank J. Garcia, “The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away 
the Human Rights Principle” (1999) 25 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 51, 79-82; Berta Esperanza 
Hernández-Truyol, Stephen J. Powell, Just Trade: A New Covenant Linking Trade and 
Human Rights (New York, London: New York University Press, 2009) 146-9; Robert Howse 
and Jared M. Genser, “Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law?” 
(2008) 29 Mich. J. Int’l. L 165 on the issue of public morals see in particular pp. 184-8. 
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rights exceptions exists, the public morals exception could be the one best apt to 
cover human rights issues in a broad and general way. This is because the other 
exceptions are more specific, i.e. more restricted to particular rights. 
Furthermore, protecting the public morals in the home state is not a purely 
extraterritorially directed measure. Yet one of the main difficulties when relying 
on public morals is the lack of a definition of that term.1550 Even when dealing 
with the term in United States-Gambling, a decision on GATS,1551 neither Panel 
nor Appellate Body gave any detailed guidance.1552 It was however stressed 
once more that the member states themselves have the right to determine the 
level of protection they consider appropriate.1553 As “public morals” naturally 
differ from state to state1554 member states have to be granted broad discretion 
when using this justification and the DSB should only examine the necessity of 
the measures to protect the morals mentioned by the home state, but not the 
morals themselves parallel to the security interests  in art. XXI1555 and the 
necessity test outlined below. Yet as vague as the term “public morals” may be, 
fundamental rights must be included in this broad term, that was left open to 
evolve over time just like moral values do,1556 because any other perception 
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would contradict the ordinary meaning of the word in the sense of art. 31.1 
VCLT.1557 The vagueness of the term can even be considered the very reason to 
use human rights and labour rights when trying to interpret it in an 
internationally valid way.1558 Another advantage of this exception is, as 
mentioned above, that it does not necessarily require the inclusion of the 
protection of extraterritorial rights and interests into art. XX to tackle human 
rights violations abroad, because the protection of the domestic public morals 
may include these cases.1559 Although the effect on a state’s public morals is 
more direct when the good itself is morally objectionable, like (certain kinds of) 
pornography, than when a good is not itself morally objectionable but produced 
in a morally objectionable way, at least grave human rights violations may be 
considered morally objectionable.1560 Child labour for example may therefore be 
considered to be contradicting the public moral of the importing state, i.e. the 
home state.1561 This reminds of the “consumers’ tastes and habits” criterion to 
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in the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences” (2003) 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
1333, 1367-8. 
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 Lorand Bartels “Art. XX of GATT and the Problem or Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The 
Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights” (2002) 36 JWT 353, 356 wfr; 
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determine likeness in art. III, as public morals are shaped and influenced by the 
population itself and its values. As already mentioned above, allowing only 
dolphin-safe tuna into the US was a consumer-based demand. Yet whilst 
consumer demands or boycotts cannot be equalized with public morals, the 
underlying values and developments may be similar, particularly concerning 
human rights awareness, allowing a justification according to art. XX (a) GATT. 
This is notable, because of the evolutionary interpretation approach used by the 
Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle concerning art. XX (g), which suggests that 
other objectives may be interpreted evolutionary as well.1562 How the DSB 
would decide a case of import or sales restrictions based on the public morals 
exception because of human rights abuses in the exporting state is not clear. Yet 
at least where grave human rights violations occur public morals of the home 
state could in fact be protected by a trade restrictive measure. This case-by-case 
approach could also be more acceptable for developing states opposing the 
introduction of a social clause or labour standards into WTO law. In any case, 
necessity and chapeau would nevertheless also have to be met.1563 
 
(ii) XX (b): Human, animal or  plant life or health 
Human rights violated in the TNC context, particularly some labour rights,1564 
may be closely related to human health or even life and as far as environmental 
issues are concerned also animal and plant life. Similar to the public morals 
objective, generally states themselves define the degree of protection within 
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California, Los Angeles, 2012) available at <http://works.bepress.com/paul_cook/3> 1 May 
2014. 
1562
 James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 208. 
1563
 See below for further details on necessity test and chapeau. 
1564
 See on child labour rights for example Paul Cook, “Law of Trade in Human Rights: A 
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their jurisdiction.1565 Yet for measures having extraterritorial effect it seems 
more suitable to base them on internationally recognized standards. The Panels 
have referred to multinational treaties and international standards to determine 
for example whether a species is endangered as seen above. The use of such 
standards should of course include rules to prevent unilateral measures setting 
standards developing states cannot achieve.1566 It would also be helpful to adopt 
another idea of the TBT, namely that unilateral measures that meet international 
standards are “rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade”.1567 Yet this is difficult under present TBT law as human 
rights are not “explicitly mentioned” as one of the objectives in art. 2. 2.1568 
The gateway to including international standards into the WTO law 
interpretation is Art. 3 (2) DSU, which states that the WTO agreements have to 
be “interpreted in the light of customary rules of interpretation”, which suggests 
that the VCLT is applicable. Art. 31. 3. (c) VCLT in turn states that “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in relation between the parties” should to be 
taken into account. Human rights treaties and conventions are rules of 
international law, yet it has been debated whether they are “applicable in 
relation between the parties” in the cases where they have neither achieved 
customary international law status nor been ratified by all WTO member 
states.1569 “Applicable between the parties” is a difficult expression in 
connection with human rights obligations anyway as they are no bilateral or 
bilaterisable obligations1570 as already sketched earlier in this enquiry. States are 
still bound by human rights treaties, whether or not the other party or other 
WTO members are bound by the same norms. To protect its own population, for 
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example under the public morals exception, a state may therefore refer to human 
rights treaty obligations before the DSB when GATT obligations are interpreted, 
no matter whether others owe the same obligations to their populations.1571 So 
art. 31.3 (c) VCLT is not of much help in this context.1572 Yet art. 31. 1 VCLT, 
referring to the “ordinary meaning” of the terms used in treaties, could allow for 
some consideration of human rights obligations.1573 International standards have 
indeed been referred to in cases where not all WTO members nor all parties to 
the dispute had ratified them as could be seen in Shrimp-Turtle1574 and EC-
Biotech.1575 A remaining issue is that art. 3 (2) DSU also demands that WTO 
obligations are neither added to or diminished by DSB rulings,1576 yet the 
flexibility of art. III and XX GATT may help in this regard.1577 
 
However, whether extraterritorial measures in the sense of measures having 
extrajudicial effect are covered by art. XX (b) at all is not (yet) clear as the DSB 
has not yet decided the matter. In Shrimp-Turtle the Appellate Body decided that 
the migratory turtles provided a sufficient link as set out above, yet it stressed 
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that it was not deciding on the extraterritorial use of art. XX (g) GATT.1578 As 
Marceau puts it, the AB was “hiding behind the fact that the challenged fishing 
practices had effects in US territorial waters.”1579 Yet such a nexus is not given 
in cases where unincorporated PPMs like labour standards or human rights are at 
issue, as these are purely national situations of the exporting state.1580 The 
products may cross the border, but, unlike in the case of migratory turtles, the 
subjects of the protection laws, i.e. human rights laws, will not cross the border 
and enter home state. In the TNC situation the factual link between home state 
and subsidiary could be a sufficient nexus as already discussed in chapter II of 
this enquiry. Yet as seen above, this is not an internationally accepted linking 
factor yet. A context interpretation of art. XX GATT does not lead to clear 
results considering the justification of extraterritorial measures protecting for 
example the environment.1581 The preamble of the SPS Agreement seems to 
suggest that at least art. XX (b) was to be defined more precisely by the SPS 
Agreement,1582 which is confined to health protection within the own territory1583 
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as seen above. Yet as art. XX (b) GATT is the more general rule, it can also be 
broader in scope. Furthermore, as art. XX (f) and (i) for example explicitly 
mention domestic interests it can be concluded that the other objectives include 
extraterritorial interests.1584 In addition, art. XX (e) explicitly refers to 
extraterritorial interests, so that these interests are not completely alien to GATT 
law.1585 The, although only supportive,1586 historic interpretation is not providing 
clear answers for art. XX GATT either.1587 A clause allowing for the protection 
of domestic rights only was also discussed but finally not included,1588 just like a 
clause preventing the misuse of art. XX. 1589 Yet this can be interpreted both 
ways, either in the sense that it was not necessary, because extraterritorial 
measures would be considered an abuse of art. XX anyway1590 or that a broad 
reading of art. XX was meant to remain possible, particularly when considering 
that the US had already imposed measures to protect extraterritorial interests 
before GATT and assumed that such measures were GATT consistent.1591 In 
addition, it is argued that extraterritorial rights and interests may be protected 
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GATT/WTO-Regimes (Berlin: Ed. Sigma, 1995) 82-6; Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige 
Handelsbeschränkungen zum Schutz extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
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under art. XX, because art. XXI, which had been part of art. XX GATT when 
drafting the GATT, allows for the protection of extraterritorial interests as 
well.1592 Harrison who demands a “far greater level of justification”1593 for 
measures with extrajudicial effect for example suggests that as extrajudicial 
measures are possible under the security exception and when a UN Security 
Council decision exists, they should also be possible when an ILO 
recommendation as mentioned above exists and in cases of great international 
consensus like in the Kimberley Scheme and also in cases of worst human rights 
violations. 1594 To achieve this result, the extrajudicial effect of the measures 
must per se not preclude a justification under art. XX. It is also argued that trade 
restrictions are different from directly applying domestic law extraterritorially, 
because they have only an extraterritorial effect.1595 Therefore, a nexus as for 
direct extraterritorial application is not needed, especially because the further 
requirements like the chapeau have to be met, which prevents protectionist 
measures.1596 
However, as always when extraterritoriality is involved, even when only effects 
are caused, sovereignty issues are claimed.1597 Yet as already sketched earlier in 
this enquiry, in these cases the sovereignty claims of two states are facing one 
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another1598 and have to be reconciled on a case by case basis, particularly taking 
into account the gravity of the effect on the respective sovereignty where it can 
be taken into account that economic pressure is no enforcement of domestic law 
abroad and usually not violating the host state’s sovereignty.1599 
Generally it can be remarked that while the “ordinary meaning of the term” is 
supposed to be the basis for interpretation of WTO law, the exception clauses 
are still rather flexible so as to take into account the particular circumstances of 
the individual case. This has also been stressed in various WTO decisions1600 
and is the very idea of a general exception - to be flexible enough to deal with 
the very circumstances of a particular case.1601 Considering all these issues, it 
becomes clear that the application of art. XX (b) on home state trade bans or 
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353, 382-3; Meinhard Schröder, “Non-Intervention, Principle of“ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (vol. III, Amsterdam, Lausanne, New York, 
Oxford, Shannon, Singapore, Tokyo: Elsevier Science, 1997) 619, 621. 
1600
 See Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute 
WT/DS321/R (31 March 2008) and WT/DS321/AB/R (16 October 2008), par. 165; Japan - 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (11 July 1996) and WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS/10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996) p. 31. 
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 Paul Cook, “Law of Trade in Human Rights: A Legal Analysis of the Intersection of the 
General Trade Agreement of Tariff’s Article XX (b) and Labor Rights of Children” 
(University of California, Los Angeles, 2012) available at 
<http://works.bepress.com/paul_cook/3> 1 May 2014, 21-2; Gabrielle Marceau, “WTO 
Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” (2002) 13 EJIL 753, 790. 
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labelling schemes imposed on goods not produced by observing human rights 
standards abroad is possible under current WTO law, as far as human, animal or 
plant life or health are concerned and when the further requirements of art. XX 
are met.1602 As the DSB has already decided this way in Shrimp-Turtle 
(Malaysia) where a nexus existed and as the DSB is interpreting WTO law 
dynamically as could be seen above, the home state option of trade restrictions 
for the protection of human rights related to human, animal and plant life or 
health could be taken. Furthermore, as art. XX (a) and (b) are similar in their 
wordings, protecting public morals of the host state could also be possible, at 
least where grave human right violations are met. 
 
(iii)  XX (e): Prison Labour 
As just outlined, using trade restrictions based on unincorporated PPMs for the 
protection of public morals seems possible under current WTO law at least for 
grave human rights violations. The same is true for the protection of human 
rights related to human, animal or plant life or health. As explained above, this 
includes measures protecting human, animal or plant life or health in the 
exporting state and is also transferrable to the public morals exception. As a 
further argument art. XX (e) is sometimes used to stress that the protection of 
foreign social rights is not alien to art. XX GATT and it is even suggested that 
this idea is also inherent in the other exception clauses of art. XX.1603 That is 
why this exception will be sketched briefly in the following. However, using art. 
XX (e) to support the above findings that trade restrictions to protect foreign 
environmental rights and foreign public morals may be possible, is not 
unchallenged, as already mentioned earlier. This is because it can be doubted 
whether art. XX (e) is supposed to protect foreign prisoners. The objective of 
art. XX (e) rather seems to be the protection of the domestic economy from 
competition of cheaply produced goods. This can for example be seen from the 
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 See also Cook’s conclusion on the possible justification of trade bans under art. XX (b) in 
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fact that ILO Convention No. 29 does not hold all kinds of prison labour to bee 
socially unacceptable, but provides for certain requirements that have to be met 
in order so be socially acceptable.1604 The argument of an “economic spillover” 
has been used, arguing that a “race to the bottom” takes place where labour 
rights and other social rights are only protected domestically, as it can be a 
competitive advantage to violate certain labour and human rights to achieve or 
maintain cheap labour.1605 Although this seems conclusive at the first glance, 
this would be a solely economic argument, using protectionist interests to justify 
restrictions. Therefore art. XX (e) is rather difficult and also inappropriate as a 
base for the protection of social rights as this would rather fuel the discussions 
of protectionism than provide a solution capable of broader human rights 
protection. Protectionist trade restrictions - apart from those explicitly allowed 
like those related to prison labour according to art. XX (e) - especially when 
designed and intended to be protectionist can and should not be consistent with 
GATT and for example be filtered by the chapeau of art. XX GATT.   
 
(iv) Necessity  
Already under GATT the necessity requirement existed. Yet it has developed, 
providing more flexibility to domestic governments when designing the 
measures to protect the objectives of art. XX (a) and (b) GATT.1606 The main 
decisions defining the necessity requirement more closely are US-Gasoline 
Korea-Beef,1607 EC-Asbestos and US-Gambling. According to Korea-Beef a 
measure is “necessary” when there is no less trade restrictive measure that can 
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 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization (2nd ed, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 922; Gudrun 
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 Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (“Korea-Beef”), 
WT/DS161/R and WT/DS168/R (31 July 2000), WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R (11 
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reasonably be expected to be employed. In addition, the Appellate Body held in 
Korea-Beef that “necessary” is referring to a state between “indispensable” and 
“making a contribution to”, whilst being closer to “indispensable” than to 
merely “making a contribution to”.1608 In Korea-Beef and EC-Asbestos the AB 
found that not only those trade restrictions can be “necessary” under art. XX 
GATT that are indispensable for achieving the objective in question, but also 
those that are merely proportional to the objective pursued.1609 As also stressed 
in US-Gambling, where more than one measure can be applied that can achieve 
the chosen level of protection, the different measures have to be weighed and 
balanced mainly taking into account the contribution that is made by the 
measures to achieve the objective pursued and the restrictions the measures 
cause for international trade. This means that even import bans can be necessary. 
In EC-Asbestos the AB for example rejected the controlled use of asbestos as a 
less restrictive means to import and sales bans, because this would not allow 
France to achieve it chosen level of protection. So alternative measures have to 
be equally effective in achieving the chosen level of protection.1610 This allows 
for taking into account the importance of the objective pursued,1611 while it is 
generally still asking for the least trade restrictive measure to be implied.1612 
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That means the necessity test is still stricter than the “related to” test of art. XX 
(g) GATT, yet human rights can be taken into account as well.1613 Even 
“secondary sanctions” like anti-circumvention provisions affecting third states 
could be “necessary”, e.g. for the protection of public morals.1614 The weighing 
and balancing explicitly excludes the assessment of the necessity of the policy 
objective or the protection level the member state has chosen. Only the necessity 
of the chosen measure in order to achieve the objective is assessed.1615 In 
addition, as decided in Korea-Beef and stressed once more in EC-Asbestos and 
recently also in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres1616 the more vital or important the policy 
objective, the easier is a measure considered necessary under art. XX GATT.1617 
This means that the DSB to some extent decides on the importance of societal 
values and alternative measures to achieve their protection,1618 yet the necessity 
test is still not a classical proportionality test in the sense that human rights 
values and interests are directly weighed and balanced with trade rights 
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interests.1619 While on the one hand this was criticized for not providing 
sufficient human rights consideration in trade law,1620 this is in line with the 
development described above and the WTO self-concept of leaving human 
rights issues and the choice of their protection level to the member states, only 
deciding on their effects on international trade. In doing so, the DSB is dealing 
as little as possible with human rights by valuing and interpreting them as little 
as possible, accepting the importance and domestic level of protection the 
member states have chosen to give them.1621 This leaves room for domestic 
policies on human rights protection as well as for the consideration of human 
rights issues by the DSB without assessing or interpreting them. This is in line 
with the above sketched arguments that the DSB is neither equipped nor 
authorised to decide on human rights. Nevertheless, as the DSB does to some 
extent decide on societal values and GATT rules have to be obeyed, it is claimed 
that the sovereignty of the member states concerning the legislation of their 
protection laws is restricted.1622 Once more the sovereignty of the exporting state 
and the sovereignty of the importing state seem to face one another. Yet while 
economic pressure is usually not considered a violation of state sovereignty,1623 
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preventing the home state from passing and enforcing domestic laws and 
regulations that may have extraterritorial effect may indeed be considered a loss 
of sovereignty.  
 
From all this it can be concluded that human rights can be considered in the 
necessity test of art. XX GATT already to some extent, at least concerning the 
value of the objectives at stake in the individual case. Human rights could even 
be included by directly balancing human rights interests against trade interests. 
Yet such a classical proportionality test would include thorough interpretation of 
human rights and human rights obligations and would therefore go beyond the 
WTO’s authority  and it is doubtful whether such issues should be decided by 
trade experts in trade panels.1624 In addition, it has been argued that trade bans 
are usually not the least trade restrictive means, as negotiations, diplomatic 
efforts, etc are less trade restrictive.1625 It is claimed that trade restrictions are 
not effective to achieve human rights protection either.1626 When considering 
child labour for example, trade bans or labelling alone are not solving the 
problem. Although they might diminish child labour, they may cause more harm 
than good, because the children are forced to earn the money to survive by other 
means such as prostitution or other illegal action, being violated in their human 
rights to an even greater extent. So the issue of necessity is an obstacle that 
should not be underestimated in the human rights context, not so much because 
of trade law interests, but for the sake of human rights. 
 
(v) Chapeau 
As mentioned above, the chapeau is the third step when examining an exception 
or justification under art. XX GATT and excludes the use of unilateral measures 
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in an arbitrary way, as an unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised trade 
restriction. These three concepts may be read side-by-side and are not mutually 
exclusive.1627 As was stressed in US-Gasoline and Shrimp-Turtle, the chapeau’s 
purpose is to avoid misuse and abuse of the exceptions provided for in art. XX. 
In Shrimp-Turtle is was explained that the right of the member state to impose 
exceptions has to be balanced with the obligations this very member has under 
GATT vis-à-vis the other members.1628 The benchmarks to find the “line of 
equilibrium”1629 are the three limitations set out by the chapeau mentioned 
above. When interpreting the chapeau it has to be kept in mind that it has a 
different aim than the general WTO rules as set out in US-Gasoline. 
“Discrimination” in art. XX for example cannot simply be equated with 
discrimination under art. III GATT, rather the emphasis has to be put on the 
arbitrary or unjustifiable nature of the discrimination1630 and the exception at 
issue.1631 This kind of discrimination may occur between exporting states, but 
also between importing and exporting states where the same provisions prevail 
or where different conditions prevail, but the same measure is applied in an 
inflexible or rigid manner.1632 This could be seen in Shrimp-Turtle, where the 
DSB found that arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination was given, because the 
appropriateness of the regulatory programmes of the exporting states where not 
assessed and taken into account before trade restrictions were used to pressure 
the exporting states to use the same regulatory programme to achieve the policy 
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goal of turtle protection than the importing state. In Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia) 
the US had taken into account programmes of comparable effectiveness in the 
exporting states, and so the trade restrictions were deemed GATT consistent.1633 
Yet taking into account foreign programmes is not the only requirement that has 
been established. As seen above, “unjustifiable discrimination” was for example 
assumed in Shrimp-Turtle due to the lack of negotiations to find a multilateral 
solution. The Panels and the Appellate Body stressed multilateral approaches 
were preferential to unilateral ones and that states had to undertake the effort to 
try to achieve multilateral solutions before imposing unilateral ones. A reason 
for the requirement of multilateral negotiations could be the assumption that 
multilateral approaches are less likely to be protectionist that unilateral ones.1634 
In addition, multilateral solutions prevent tensions between states, because a 
consensus is reached instead of one state unilaterally imposing its values upon 
other states.1635 In Malaysia for example the Panels explicitly acknowledged the 
difficulty that multinational approaches may not be possible although the 
unilaterally acting state has seriously tried to negotiate a multilateral consensus. 
The conclusion of an international agreement was therefore not considered 
necessary to meet the chapeau, and to make a measure GATT consistent, rather 
the good faith approach of negotiations was stressed.1636 This meets the concern 
that otherwise, due to the difficulties or even impossibilities of achieving 
multilateral consensus at all, inaction would be the alternative to unilateral 
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Consistency, Relevance of other International Agreements, Economic Effectiveness and 
Impact on Developing Countries of Measures concerning Non-Product-Related Process and 
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action.1637 Yet it is argued that unilateral measures in accordance with 
international treaties or standards have to be allowed, because multinational 
solutions can only be achieved slowly, after years of negotiations and only as 
minimum standards.1638 This could also be seen earlier in this enquiry when 
assessing possible future developments on the international level. Before Tuna-
Dolphin I there had been decades of negotiations to achieve the La Jolla 
Agreement1639, yet Mexico had dropped out already in 1978.1640 Furthermore, it 
is once again argued that whether a strict preference of multilateral approaches 
is compatible with the unilaterally acting state’s sovereignty may be doubted.1641 
In US-Gambling the requirement of negotiations to render a measure 
“necessary” was in fact overturned, because of the uncertain outcome of such 
consultations.1642 A narrow interpretation of art. XX might rather contradict the 
principle of in dubio mitius already mentioned above, which the Appellate Body 
mentioned itself in EC-Hormones.1643 So does the demand for multilateral 
solutions in the case where a consent can only be achieved on a low level, 
whereas the state in question wants to achieve a higher level of protection and 
therefore imposes unilateral measures. Whether or not sovereignty is a suitable 
argument in this context, it remains unclear whether a solely low-level 
consensus can be considered a failure of multinational negotiations that allows 
for unilateral measures of higher protection levels.1644 Especially where human 
rights are concerned, the standards are not defined precisely, because the 
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2000) 111-2. 
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 See on his question Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Einseitige Handelsbeschränkungen zum 
Schutz extraterritorialer Rechtsgüter (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 116. 
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situations in the respective states have to be taken into account.1645 In GATT 
there is no such clause an in art. 3.3 SPS that explicitly allows for higher 
protection levels than provided for by international standards under certain 
circumstances.1646 Yet as the SPS contains such a clause and dynamic 
interpretation was used for the objectives of art. XX GATT in Shrimp-Turtle, an 
interpretation of art. XX GATT allowing for a higher standard of protection by 
domestic measures is not per se precluded.1647 The DSB has stressed in various 
cases that it is the member states that decide on the level of protection.1648 In 
addition, several cases show that unilateral measures may even contribute to and 
accelerate the finding of a multilateral solution1649 as already mentioned above. 
So while the issue of human rights protection under art. XX (a) and (b) and the 
chapeau’s non-discrimination clauses is not easy and more clarification is 
needed, it is not impossible. 
The third limitation beside the two non-discrimination clauses is the requirement 
that the measure must not be applied in a manner that constitutes a “disguised 
restriction to international trade”.1650 That makes the chapeau basically a 
threshold to preclude mere protectionist measures, which could actually allow 
for a broader reading of the objectives and the necessity clause, so that they 
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could include human rights, because protectionist measures could still be filtered 
by the chapeau.1651 As was stressed for example in US-Gasoline and EC-
Asbestos, the design, architecture and structure of the measure are assessed as 
indicators to determine whether the measure pursues protectionist objectives. As 
already stated earlier in this enquiry, human rights protection measures do not 
have to be more protectionist than any other measure,1652 so this requirement 
could be met. 
So although the rather flexible chapeau is important for trade law and human 
rights can indeed be taken into account within the chapeau, challenges remain: 
[c]oncerning human rights adhering to the chapeau is particularly challenging, because 
Human rights violations are notoriously difficult to assess and quantify. Further, most states 
are human rights violators on one level or another. Consequently, an accusation of 
arbitrariness might easily stick to most country based measures.1653 
 
(h) Conclusion on the possible interpretation of art. XX GATT 
Having briefly sketched the human rights potential of art. III and XX GATT it 
became clear that the DSB can in fact take into account human rights when 
deciding on unilateral measures by a home state that imposes trade restrictions 
on goods not produced in accordance with human rights in its subsidiaries. Yet 
the decisions assessed suggest that a broader interpretation of art. III that 
includes unincorporated PPMs as a differentiating criterion is rather unlikely, 
while art. XX GATT, although mainly restricted to human rights concerning 
human, animal and plant life or health,1654 has been used in this context several 
times. In the long term a broader reading of art. XX GATT could even lead to a 
broader reading of the art. III GATT likeness criterion as well, allowing for 
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unincorporated PPM standards to influence the likeness of products.1655 
However, art. XX is not easily applicable to human rights either.1656 The scope 
of art. XX (b) GATT concerning human rights is limited. While child labour 
might be a dealt with by trade restrictions as this may be a threat to the child’s 
health,1657 freedom of association for example is not covered the human life or 
health of art. XX (b).1658 Art. XX (a) GATT on the other hand may provide 
broader human rights protection, but has not been used in this respect so far. As 
there are many opponents concerning the inclusion of labour or social clauses 
into WTO law, a broad application of the public morals exception, amounting to 
a human rights clause, seems rather unlikely.1659 Shrimp-Turtle suggests that 
unilateral measures based on international standards may be GATT compatible 
when imposed in a non-arbitrary way and multinational negotiations have failed. 
This even allows for import bans like in Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia). Trade 
restrictions amounting to coercion are said to be almost always the only means 
left after diplomatic measures failed and therefore the necessity requirement is 
usually fulfilled.1660 The international standards trade restrictions can be based 
on in such cases should however not only be labour rights as laid down by the 
ILO, because these do not include property rights of landowners, environmental 
issues, etc. Rather, a broader scope of human rights has to be used. The General 
Comments could be of help when assessing their content.1661 
The overall conclusion concerning the human rights potential of art. III and XX 
GATT is nevertheless positive for trade restrictions imposed to prevent human 
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rights abroad, as there could be seen a development in the Tuna-Dolphin and 
Shrimp-Turtle decisions, including the latest ones of Tuna-Dolphin III and 
Shrimp-Turtle (Malaysia), towards a WTO that is more open for unilateral 
measures to protect non-trade interests. Trade bans and labelling have both been 
considered possible by the DSB. Furthermore, the WTO stresses its openness 
towards non-trade issues, for example by the TBT Committee or the WTO’s 
discussion with the ILA.1662 Yet it has to be stressed again that a mixed panel of 
human rights and trade experts, or some other sort of cooperation between the 
UN and the WTO not deciding within the WTO system but independently on 
equal terms would be preferable and broaden the scope to which human rights 
could be assessed,  but the interpretational approach is much more likely to 
happen. 
 
F Trade restrictions outside WTO law as a further option? 
As just seen it is very well possible to include human rights issues when 
interpreting WTO law. Yet there are limits for this approach as well. As seen 
above, there is no social or labour law clause in WTO law. Only environmental 
and health issues have entered WTO law so far. That means as far as other 
human rights issues are concerned there is basically only art. XX (a) GATT 
WTO law that could be interpreted more broadly to grant more human rights 
protection. However, broad interpretation of WTO law can even cause more 
restrictions on human rights protection in certain cases. Joshi for example 
suggests that even governmental voluntary labelling schemes concerning 
unincorporated PPMs are outside the scope of TBT and GATT and are therefore 
a possible means to be taken that does not violate WTO law.1663 As seen above, 
the TBT Agreement does not cover regulations and standards concerning 
unincorporated PPMs. According to Joshi GATT art. III:4 only covers measures 
where the government can be hold responsible for, which, according to him, is 
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not the case for voluntary governmental eco-labelling schemes.1664 Whether 
voluntary government labelling schemes can be considered outside the scope of 
TBT and GATT, especially after Tuna-Dolphin III, seems at least doubtful. Yet 
still a lesson can be learned, namely that by interpreting TBT more broadly, in 
this case by including unincorporated PPMs, TBT and GATT become applicable 
on more voluntary labelling schemes. At the same time they are becoming the 
benchmarks for permissibility of these labelling schemes, factually restricting 
their applicability. Of course, this is different for 2.2 TBT and art. XX GATT and 
rules alike, where exceptions from WTO law are broadened. 
 
Apart from measures that are beyond or outside the scope of WTO law and 
therefore possible for home states to take, there could be cases where other 
public international law overrides trade law.1665 This was already mentioned 
earlier when assessing whether the overriding law rule is applicable. It was 
found above that in a general way this rule was not applicable. Yet when 
sketching the developments within the WTO it became clear that there seems to 
be international consent, including those opposing  the introduction of social 
clauses or labour law into the WTO, that the institutions in charge for such 
clauses and standards are the ILO, the UN or other human rights 
organizations.1666 Yet this means that WTO members acknowledge that for some 
trade-related issues other institutions may develop and apply rules, thereby also 
influencing trade due to the interrelatedness of the areas of law. A reason for this 
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may be that linking human rights to trade law by somehow including them into 
trade law entails the connotation of using them as a means in trade law, i.e. as a 
protectionist measure.1667 When they are linked to trade law outside the WTO, 
the fear of protectionist uses could be reduced. A further and less promising 
reason however is that those opposing linking human rights and trade within the 
WTO are hoping that other institutions will not come up with standards and 
clauses within near future, thereby opposing the introduction of human rights 
into WTO law could also be a cheap way out of human rights issues in a more 
general way. The ILO for example sets standards and even provides for the 
possibility of trade sanctions in art. 33 ILO Constitution, yet no such sanctions 
have ever been imposed so far.1668 This is because the ILO is based on a fragile 
relationship of cooperation of its members, including developing states and 
compulsory measures could disturb this rather effective system.1669 
Yet how should cases be dealt with where trade restrictions are implemented in 
spite of actual WTO law incompatibility? The issue that arises in these cases is 
whether such measures could still be implied and justified under general public 
international law as set out above. The “smart sanctions” that were examined in 
the preceding chapter did usually not include trade restrictions, an exception 
being luxury goods used by the ruling élite. That is why this chapter focused on 
trade restrictions and also on WTO law. The decisive issue is whether the WTO 
has to be considered a “self-contained regime”,1670 not allowing for recourse to 
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general public international law, including for example the law on sanctions. 
The term “self-contained regime” was developed by the ICJ in the Teheran case 
where it held that diplomatic law was a self-contained regime, providing its own 
sanction mechanisms and not allowing for a fallback on measures outside 
diplomatic law to answer violations, no matter whether the measure was a 
response to a violation of diplomatic law or other (general) law.1671 The ILC 
differentiated between self-contained regimes not allowing a fallback at all, 
because they were a separate system of law of their own and those where the 
measures of the regimes had to be exhausted before a fallback on more general 
public international law was possible,1672 the latter rather being a system of leges 
speciales.1673 That WTO/GATT is not isolated from other public international 
law, but influenced by it could already be seen above when sketching the 
developments within the WTO.1674 Furthermore, the Appellate Body explicitly 
stated that WTO law cannot be read “in clinical isolation from public 
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international law”.1675 In addition, the Panel in the United States - Sections 301 -
310 of the Trade Act1676 allowed for a fallback on domestic law that provided for 
trade restrictions in a solely trade-related context1677 in cases where DSU 
mechanisms were exhausted.1678 That means WTO law is not excluding the 
application of other law allowing for trade sanctions, not even where the 
primary intention of such law is the protection of trade interests.1679 In addition, 
it is also pointed out that the WTO Agreement preamble itself is providing a link 
to general public international law by mentioning the objective of “sustainable 
development”.1680 Yet does this mean that a fallback on the rules about sanctions 
in public international law is possible e.g. when trade restrictions imposed to 
protect human rights are violating WTO law? The WTO itself does not exclude 
a fallback on economic sanctions, but provides for a fallback by the security 
exception of art. XXI GATT. 1681 Whether this explicit fallback is exclusive due 
to the self-contained character of the WTO, or whether other fallbacks are 
possible is not entirely clear, but for example Hahn who considers art. XXI 
GATT an exclusive fallback nevertheless concludes that ius cogens and erga 
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omnes obligation violations are always essential security interests in the sense of 
art. XXI (b) (iii) GATT.1682 This means that a fallback on general public 
international law would be possible in cases of erga omnes obligation violations 
and violations of ius cogens, which are exactly the cases in which 
countermeasures could be imposed as assessed in the preceding chapter. This is 
also in line with Denkers, arguing that WTO law concerning “countermeasures” 
is only lex specialis in cases where these measures are answering viloations of 
WTO law.1683 So it can be noted that reprisals are possible and that these 
measures may even violate WTO law, but only in the restricted cases of ius 
cogens and erga omnes obligations violations which are not likely to occur very 
often in the TNC context as already pointed out in the preceding chapter. 
As far as trade restrictions as compulsory measures of ILO or UN are concerned 
it was already pointed out above, that the ILO has not used this possibility so 
far. In addition, due to the ILO’s special negotiation-based character it is 
unlikely that it will do so in near future. The UN on the other hand is not 
equipped to fill this gap and the gap concerning non-labour human rights, 
because there is for example not even an individual complaints mechanism for 
ICESC rights.1684 So the possibilities of using public international law to justify 
WTO violations in some way are rather restricted. 
 
However, there seems to be another way of using trade restrictions outside the 
WTO, yet not so much outside WTO law, but outside WTO disputes. For this 
pragmatic option, nothing - or at least not much - has to change. States have not 
brought cases to the DSB so far that deal with trade restrictions implemented to 
protect human rights. Yet in the WTO system the principle of nullo actore, 
nullus iudex applies, so the DSB will not rule on WTO incompatibility of 
measures as long as no one is challenging the measures. That home state 
measures might go unchallenged is not totally unlikely. To the opposite - so far 
trade restrictions concerning human rights have not been decided by the DSB, 
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because in the rare cases that occurred the issue was solved in other ways. When 
the US imposed an import ban on products from Burma because of the human 
rights situation there, Japan and the EU took the case before the WTO.1685 
However, the DSB did not decide on the case as a settlement was reached by 
internal negotiations.1686 In the case of conflict diamonds, a waiver was passed 
and a permanent waiver as an amendment to TRIPS is aimed for concerning the 
more general issue of reconciling the protection of public health and Intellectual 
Property Rights.1687 In addition, the WTO has proven to be open to non-trade 
issues and in Gas Guzzle Tax and Shrimp-Turtle for exampled is was stressed 
that domestic measures to protect certain interests are not violating WTO law as 
long as they are not imposed in a protectionist measure. Especially the 
knowledge of these DSB decisions is important, because it could help getting rid 
off the regulatory chill mentioned above, even if nothing changes. Yet of course 
official consensus on the issue, for example by official declarations of the DSB 
or the WTO or by a member state agreement not to bring such cases before the 
DSB would be of help. So would more decisions on the issue by the DSB. That 
is why it might be a good idea of making it a WTO issue, even by implementing 
measures and letting the DSB decide. Then at least a new basis for discussion 
would be provided. 
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III CONCLUSION ON TRADE RESTRICTIONS IN THE HOME STATE-TNC CONTEXT 
As outlined in this chapter, trade restricting measures such as import bans or 
labelling can be imposed by importing states in order to protect non-trade 
interests in the exporting state. Non-trade issues can be taken into account on 
different levels when assessing unilateral restrictions to international trade. As 
far as human rights are concerned, those related to the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health are covered in more detail by the SPS and TBT 
Agreements, which can also cause more obstacles for unilateral protection 
measures. As far as human rights unrelated to human, animal or plant life or 
health are concerned, only GATT is applicable. The most promising and most 
likely way for GATT compatibility of unilateral trade restrictions because of 
human rights violations when manufacturing and producing the good is art. XX 
(a) GATT. However, the necessity test and the chapeau should not be 
underestimated in the human rights context. Labelling schemes may be 
considered “necessary” more easily than trade bans. Yet the TNC context 
contains further challenges. When using labelling schemes only for those 
products manufactured by subsidiaries of own TNCs this will most likely be 
considered as a treatment less favourable of like products, because as outlined 
above, unincorporated PPMs are not (yet) a criterion when deciding on the 
likeness of goods. This is even more so for art. XI violations caused by import 
bans. An exception under art. XX is difficult not only because of the vague term 
of “public morals” and international standards of human rights often do not 
exist, but also because the necessity of such trade bans and labelling schemes 
may be questioned. Pressuring the parent company in the home state by holding 
it responsible for human rights violations of its subsidiaries abroad for example 
could be considered a less trade restrictive means. Furthermore, treating goods 
from home state TNC subsidiaries differently from those produced under the 
same circumstances, using the same PPMs by other exporters could also be 
considered arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. So while trade restrictions 
may be a way to protect human rights abroad, at least for singled-out human 
rights where accepted international standards exist, it is rather difficult to use it 
in the restricted and confined situation of the TNC context (only). That is why 
the potential of this home state option is doubtful. This is even more so when 
considering that - if at all - this option can only work for TNC subsidiaries 
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exporting their goods into the home state.1688 Yet the export industry is often the 
branch that is already better off than many other branches in developing 
countries.1689 Again, host states fearing trade bans and a loss of foreign 
investment could withdraw their personnel and resources from other places and 
concentrate on the exporting TNC subsidiary only, which could cause a 
worsening of the overall human rights situation in the state. Focusing on 
exporting TNC subsidiaries and labour rights only could even be considered a 
denial of the universalism of human rights and their protection.1690 Having made 
all these considerations, it seems that a broader approach of human rights 
protection, not limited to the TNC context would be a more promising one under 
WTO law, as could also be seen from Tuna-Dolphin III and Shrimp-Turtle 
(Malaysia). Labelling schemes only used on TNC products for example would 
be rather ineffective compared to large-scale labelling,1691 enabling a real 
consumer choice and thereby creating competitive pressure. Yet whether large-
scale compulsive measures should be used for the protection of human rights is 
a difficult issue, raising once more the issues of protectionism, violations of state 
sovereignty, the doubts concerning the effectiveness of such measures and 
cultural imperialism. It is argued that trade restrictions may cause more harm 
than help for human rights and are therefore inapt for human rights 
enforcement.1692 The example of child labour was already set out above 
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demonstrating this.1693As already stated in the preceding chapter, trade 
restrictions should also be accompanied by assistance and help for the host state, 
e.g. by GSPs1694 to improve the overall situation in the host state. Yet assessing 
broad-scale human rights protection approaches outside the home state-TNC 
context would go beyond the scope of this research. Considering all the above 
said it has to be concluded that trade restrictions are only a rather limited home 
state option to protect human rights in the TNC subsidiaries abroad. 
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 CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
As this enquiry has shown, the flexibility in forms and enforcement of human 
rights is also of advantage in the TNC-human rights context. Understanding 
human rights not as a rigid, but flexible set of rules, a complex, developing web 
of norms and codes, binding as well as non-binding, reveals many ways home 
states may handle the TNC-human rights issues described in the introductory 
chapter and throughout this work. While this confined situation of home states, 
human rights and TNCs can be a hurdle, e.g. in the WTO context, because of 
equal treatment requirements, this very confinement is what makes applicability 
and enforcement easier in many other situations, e.g. when applying domestic 
law on trans-border cases, because the reproaches of imperialism, disrespecting 
sovereignty, etc. are overcome more easily. 
 
As seen in chapter V trade restrictions are only of limited help for home states to 
handle the TNC-human rights issues. Firstly, because only imports into the 
home state can be targeted by trade restrictions like labelling or import bans and 
secondly, because treating only home state TNC products manufactured abroad 
differently may cause difficulties with regard to the equal treatment clause. 
 
In chapter IV it was found that sanctions can be a valuable tool as far as positive 
measures are concerned, while the scope of negative measures is actually limited 
to erga omnes obligation violations and TNCs themselves cannot be targeted 
directly at all. 
 
Chapter III showed that international law is no promising tool so far to handle 
the human rights and TNC issue, because TNCs cannot be held liable under 
public international law yet, as they lack a generally accepted legal personality 
under public international law so far. 
 
This pretty much leaves the home state option of applying home state law, in 
particular tort law, especially by pressuring the parent company as suggested in 
chapter II. 
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However, as the enquiry also outlined, things do not have to stay the way they 
are. Human rights as well as politics are flexible and able to adapt to new 
challenges. As the International Council on Human Rights Policy put it 
there is a clear basis in international law for extending international legal obligations 
to companies in relation to human rights. This basis is particularly strong in regard to 
indirect obligations. States are under a duty to protect human rights, and increasingly 
this requires them to prevent private actors, including companies, from abusing rights. 
Though less solid, there is also some basis for extending direct legal obligations to 
companies and a trend towards doing so is clearly underway.1695 
 
So eventually extraterritorial application of domestic law may become more 
accepted. In addition, TNCs may someday be accepted as new actors with legal 
personality and human rights protection obligations under public international 
law. Furthermore, erga omnes obligations can develop and include more human 
rights obligations, broadening the scope for sanctions and the application of 
international law as for example in ATCA cases and similar domestic law. Such 
changes can be accelerated by home states taking the already possible unilateral 
steps such as positive sanctions or applying domestic law with extraterritorial 
effect.1696 Bi- and multilateral level agreements and harmonization are also 
helpful to speed-up changes in human rights protection law, because the more 
approximation exists among nation states and the more shared values can be felt 
and found, the more likely are new developments in public international law. 
 
However, a precondition for all these changes is the political will of the home 
states. Unfortunately it seems that at the moment, with the consequences of the 
economic crisis still at hand in many home states, pressuring their TNCs to 
protect human rights abroad more effectively is not a priority on Western states’ 
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agendas. Yet this is where Engle’s words should be kept in mind: “The world is 
getting smaller, so our minds must grow”.1697 
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